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Auditorium 
Whittier College School of Law 
Los Angeles, Californ 
November 19, 1982 
CHAIRMAN ELIHU M. HARRIS: morning. This is ~he 
Assembly Judiciary Committee hearing on 
Ordinarily, I would introduce the members of 
you, but, as you can see, we don't 
As yet, we don't have "surrogate 
do the best we can. 
parenting. 
our Committee to 
members attending. 
" so w~'ll to 
The rna purpose of today's ing is to es ish a 
record as it relates to this most significant and controversial 
issue. We intend to a closer look at arrangements in which 
a woman agrees to bear a child for a who is physicallv 
incapable of having their own children. I am sure that you have 
heard about this extremely controversial arrangement and AB 3771, 
the bill to legitimize surrogate parent contracts. We hope 
the testimony at this hearing will he us to examine the legal, 
social, and ethical implications of these contracts. 
Because of the number of people on our agenda, I will be 
asking witnesses to come forward in groups for testimony. I'd 
like for each witness to keep his or her testimony as brief as 
possible and to avoid repeating what a previous witness has said. 
I want to give everyone on the agenda an opportunity to speak. I 
would also ask that anyone who has testimony in writing to, 
rather than read that testimony, simply give us a synopsis and be 
prepared to answer questions. 
Without further delay, we'll go to our first witness, the author 
of AB 3771, Assemblyman Mike Roos. Welcome. 
ASSEMBLY~~N MIKE ROOS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Welcome to Los Angeles. 
I would only sav that I regret that other members of the 
Committee aren't here hut, since there has been an unusually high 
turnover in the Legislature, it is understandable and I'm glad 
that we're going to have a chance to have a written record 
documenting some of the fine witnesses, diverse witnesses that we 
have today. I think the most important member of the Judiciary 
Commit.tee is here -- the only one that I really care about --
because I believe that if I can convince you, then the rest of 
the members of the Committee will fall in line. You're the best 
attorney on the Judiciary Committee. 
Last year, I thought we had some good hearings on this, 
as good as any I have ever witnessed in the Legislature. 
Clearly, the concept of surrogate parenting is one that can be 
readily accepted by a legislative body. In fact, the obstacles 
seem to be in the words of art that we use to clarify this as a 
matter of law. 
That's my remarks are going to be very brief. It's 
just to cast an overview and to say that the reasons my 
continued to push this bill have not abated. 
In il among women is high ion pool are low; need for 
ldren continues to be one of most remarkab 
When you put all of those three 
l mass, and explos i 
sts l s the problem that 
slature must address. It's that there 
going this soci that I don't 
condone, outright sell 
lorable putting together of 
can create logically def 
that ne ther the biological nor 
ld wants that baby, and you just 
soc 
, 
at 
we 
b 
I believe that the framework 
is a good point of departure, one 
that makes a lot of sense for contemporary 
that contemporary society is now about the 
lies together. 
I've la out is one 
we can ref , one 
soc and the way 
bus putting 
In that line, it's interesting to me 
Angeles Times of yesterday, November 18th, there was an 
on page 36 of the "Vie\>\' 11 section, "Feminists Have Their Own Sperm 
Banks". ~ust to quote a couple of these things: "The idea of a 
feminist sperm bank might startle those who perceive feminists 
and artificial insemination as threats to the traditional family. 
Health center officials, however, say that they favor all 
lies, whether heaned by one parent or two, and whether the 
mother is heterosexual or a lesbian." "'To take the position 
that there must be a male figure is a slap in the face of every 
single woman raising a child in this country ... '" I guess what 
I'm telling you and those who read this transcript is that every 
there are substantial transformations in how lies are 
formed, not only in this state but on this planet, and in these 
two quotes that I just read are practices that have been legally 
sanctioned by the State of California. That practice is legal. 
I believe that my approach of allowing an infertile woman the 
same opportunity to have a child as an infertile man, if you 
will, is a far more conservative approach than some of the kinds 
of practices that are already going on that are legal 
sanctioned by the State of California. 
That's whv I would, Mr. Chairman, appreciate your 
indulgence in listening carefully to use your incredibly good 
lawyer skills to help find and flush out the right terms of art 
to make this work in the next legislative session. I think that 
the society demands it, and I think that there are individuals 
out there who have a crying need to make sure that in fact that 
eventuates. Otherwise, vou're going to have a lot of hurt 
people, both economically as well as emotionally, because they're 
going to indulge in some kind of practice, some way, to get 
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children. I believe that it is in the best ends of our commun:i.ty 
and our state to make sure that we have a way that produces the 
best outcome for all parties. Thank you very much. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Mr. Roos, f st of all, it's 
remarkable that you would take on this complex and controversial 
subject. It's very complicated. Certainly it's breaking new 
ground in the area of law, and I think that you're to be 
congratulated for having the courage to deal with this issue. 
Secondly, I'd like to ask if you would be willinq to 
join me on the podium because one of the things that I'd l to 
do is focus on questions as to how detailed legislation of this 
nature might be. I don't think there's question in my mind 
that this is an area that we should attempt to define some 
parameters, even if it's just for purposes of future litigat 
that may result from disagreements as to the nature of a 
surrogate relationship or who, in fact, is rightful of 
a child who comes from such a relationship. I would really 
appreciate it, if you have the time to spend it with us and ask 
questions of witnesses. 
I would like to ask the first witness to come forward. 
In fact, it's a group of witnesses, group numher one. William 
Handel, William Karow, JilJ and Bill Jamieson. 
DR. WILLIAM G. KAROW: I am Dr. William Karow, an 
infertility specialist ;n Los Ange s. I have been in the 
practice of infertility now 21 years and have dealt with a group 
of people that we're talking about today all of my medical life. 
The problem certainly is presented ~hat we have 15 to 20 
percent of the married couples in the United States that are 
infertile, and they are infertile for a number of reasons. More 
recently people are starting families later. They are developing 
careers so we have a group of people now that are coming into the 
forefront in their 30's where they used to get pregnant in their 
20's. As a consequence of this, they have developed some of the 
medical problems like endornetreosis that precludes or cuts down 
significantly on their chances of pregnancy. With the sexual 
mores having changed, the use of contraceptives -- IUD's --
exposure to the incidence of infection and permanent sterility 
have increased so we have a population of infertile people who 
are on the increase, not the decrease. 
Methods of treatment are basically these. Infertility 
treatment -- with this we can take care of about half the 
problems where these couples can have a child. Adoptions, this 
dav in time, with the tremendous number of abortions that occur, 
are significantly down. In this county, last vear and the year 
before, there were less than 2,000 adoptions completed. The 
biggest agency, Children's Horne, had close to 7,000 applications 
last year and placed less than 500 children. A childless home is 
a solution. That's not a very good one when a child in the 
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the American way. 
Legislature passed 
that s al 
male is 
test-tube 
donor insemination, the 
a law several years ago which is a 
to age, and i~ is a 
, and In vitro 
se is on own, but 
15 ago. In the Un States, we're up to 
now. been some str s, s 
year or two, but we have on 15 s 15 years. So 
date, does not answer the prob well, and we have 
Now, I 
parenting is the law, 
I think, belong with But, I 
, as far as we're concerned, we obligations 
from the medical side as far as the surrogate the adopting 
coup We have to, a sense, protect the surrogate from 
ings that might happen to her. We have to be sure that this 
husband of the adopting couple is not going to give the surrogate 
a disease that would render her permanently le. We have 
to be sure that a reasonable get pregnant 
from his sperm so she and the coup up spending 
weeks and months the hope of getting We have to, on 
the other side, adequately evaluate the surrogate to be sure that 
she stands a reasonable chance of getting pregnant. These 
couples have put time and effort, their future, and their heart 
into this as a last resort, to have a child in their familv, and 
if the surrogate is not adequately worked up ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Excuse me, Dr. Karow. I don't want 
to interrupt your testimony, but all of the things that you're 
saying are things that there really is no conflict in the 
Legislature about, not only the background but the fact that it 
does work. The problem really does seem to be in the way that we 
write the law. The problem seems to eventuate with legislators 
who ask, "Well, what happens if the baby is biologically deformed 
and neither the biological mother nor the potential adoptive 
mother and the biological father wants the child?" That's one 
issue area. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Or particularly if there's been a 
violation of the contract. The surrogate says that she will 
swear off drugs or alcohol and in fact does use drugs or alcohol 
during the term of her pregnaLcy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: And she's seen a bar ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Those are the kinds of things, and 
maybe if you could quickly address them or defer to Mr. Handel or 
do whatever you think appropriate. How do we allay the fears of 
the members of this Legislature that we are creating a legal 
nightmare, that we are creating more problems than we are trvi.ng 
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to solve? Therein lie the real problem and the obstacle in my 
getting their vote. I really believe that they understand the 
necessity. They understand the num~ers, the low supply of babies 
and the number of people who want babies. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Since we've already interrupted your 
testimony, at this point let me take the time to introduce 
Assemblyman Dave Stirling, who has joined us. 
DR. KAROW: I think I real don't have a whole lot more 
to say, but basically, from the other side, you have to give us 
some necessary minimal guidelines in evaluating the surrogate 
In other words, we have to be sure the surrogate is not walking 
into this in a way that she's going to hurt herself, that she is 
not going to get hurt. If we have adequately spent time with the 
surrogate and screened her well, then it is unlikely that she's 
going to be on drugs and so forth. I think if you 1 us down 
some good guidelines that we follow, then they become standard of 
care. If we fail to do that, then the law has recourse in the 
way of malpractice, if nothing else. You qive us some guidelines 
so that we will sit down and at least adequately evaluate and 
screen all the people involved. Then you will have very few of 
the problems that you have described. 
That ends my testimony. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much, Doctor. 
MR. WILLIAM W. HANDEL: My name is Bill Handel. I'm an 
attorney at law. My partner, Bernard Sherwyn, and I have a huge 
law firm consisting of two attorneys that specialize in surrogate 
parenting law. This is our primarv field of endeavor. We have 
over 50 couples that we've already signed contracts for, and we 
basically have two problems whenever couples come to us. 
Obviously, they're infertile. Obviously, they have generally 
come from someone like Dr. Karow after several years of surgery, 
have been put on a waiting list, and have been determined that 
they, in effect, will not have children. This is their last 
chance. I have to tell these couples when they walk in the 
door ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt you. When we're 
talking about surrogate parenting, are we always talking about 
the surrogate mother? 
MR. HANDEL: Yes, in this case, it's the surrogate 
mother. Sperm donor is very simple, it's just ..• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So the infertility is always on the 
part of the woman then? 
MR. HANDEL: In this case, under the surrogate parent 
law. When the male is infertile, you simply qo to Dr. Karow, who 
has a bank, and he artificially inseminates the fertile wife. 
It's a very simple concept. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: And there's no problem there. 
MR. HANDEL: No, the law allows it under the sperm donor 
act of 1975. It is perfectly legal, and, more importantly, the 
sperm donor has no rights as a father and has no liabilities as a 
matter of law. 
The two things that I have to tell these couples when 
they walk in the door -- number one, I have to look them in the 
face and si'ly, "We may be committing a felony." vJe may be 
committina a crime such that we are conspir to commit a felony 
f the courts deem this to be baby-sell We may be committing 
a misdemeanor if the courts hold that this is payment for 
adoption. We adve se surrogate mothers on behalf of the 
couples. If that is illegal, because the law does state that 
advertising for adoption other than through a licensed adoption 
agency is illegal, we're looking at, techn lly, 20 years. 
That's the first step. That's fairly easy to dispense with 
because most of us in the legal profession think that those laws 
are clearly unconstitutional when applied to surrogate parenting. 
This is not buying or selling bab s, particularly when the 
practitioners have done a thorough job, as they should. 
The main problem is the enforceability of the contract. 
The couple has paid out between 20 and 25 thousand dollars, and 
the first thing they ask is "What if the surrogate changes her 
mind? Is that child ours?" We have to say, "We don't know." 
The law says that a biological mother bearing a child is the 
mother of that child. If that surrogate is married, under the 
law today, it is possible that the father, the man who has 
donated his sperm, the man that we can prove is the father of the 
child, who has paid $20,000, who has probablv hocked his house, 
taken out seconds on everything he owns, borrowed money from 
evervbody he's ever met -- there's a very good chance he doesn't 
even have the right of standing in court to determine that he is 
the father of that child. It's a very frightening thing for 
these couples to then say, "Well, we need a child. We need it 
badly. We're going to take a chance anyway." Thank God that 
we've never had a problem where a surroaate has changed her mind, 
at least in our contracts or with the practitioners here in 
southern California, because of the care that we use in selecting 
surrogate mothers. Tha-t care is incorporated in the law that you 
see before you, the proposed Surrogate Parent Act that 
Assemblyman Roos wrote. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask you right there whether we 
should exclude married women from being surrogates. 
MR. HANDEL: I think that that would be completely 
unconstitutional if you were to ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why? 
HR. HANDEL: I think it's illeaal discrimination. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: To tell a woman that cannot 
surrogate 
MR. HANDEL: If she is married or unmarried because 
is not re whether she can a ld or not. It's 
law that says husband is sumed to be the 's 
the problem, not the that she is 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm really not c here. 
ASSEMBLYMAN DAVE STIRLING: I 
year. On 
MR. HANDEL: That sumption has len? 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Yes. 
MR. HANDEL: So much for that. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Anyway, as to that consti 
issue, I'm not as clear on it as you seem to be. 
st 
onal 
MR. HANDEL: Okay. I don't think that vou can 1 
married from unmarried. First of all, on a practical level we 
generally like women to be married. You will hear testimony from 
a surrogate who is married. It's a verv emotional issue. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: If she's married, does the husband 
have any rights at all? 
MR. HANDEL: We don't know. Here's the situation. 
Assuming that a surrogate mother changes her mind and is married, 
and her husband claims paternity, the real father, to my 
understanding, may be precluded from claiming paternity even if 
we can prove he is the father of the child because the 
presumptions that now exist in the law. These are conclusive 
presumptions. 
As the laws in California are written, when applied to 
surrogate parenting they make absolutely no sense. The 
California Legislature has said that a biological father, one who 
is the father of the child, whom we can prove is the father of 
the child -- if he donates his sperm and inseminates someone 
other than his wife, through a physician, he is not the father of 
the child. He has no rights. He has no liabj_Jities of support. 
In effect, that child is fatherless. On the other hand, as to a 
surrogate mother, who in effect does the same thing (although 
differently biologically, obviously), donates her egg and carries 
that child for someone else -- in effect donates that concept --
not only does the law not say, as it should, that she is not the 
mother and has no rights, but the law says that she probably is 
the mother, the real father may not have rights to stand up and 
claim paternity, and her husband may be the father of that child. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask aga I just want to make 
sure. I don't want to explore it too long I'm not sure 
we can answer my question here. It would seem to me that if you 
have a woman who is married, her husband may in fact have some 
legal rights, that he could put into the s to 
whether or not this is an interference wi s marr 
MR. HANDEL: He certainly could. I on go back to 
practicalities. In our practice,- the husband is integrally 
involved in the contract. When we use a 
husband is at group sessions. Her husband 
negotiations at all times. Her husband has to s 
document the surrogate signs, and, in effect, of 
them, the team that produces the child for e. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: We aren't a to do that as a 
matter of law. That's a matter of your own 
MR. HANDEL: That's a matter of my 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: That becones a problemat 1 
for legislators who are hearing this for the f t time -- trying 
to separate out what a practice has done to insure zero error, if 
you will, versus what the law states and all of the s lities 
that can happen under the law. That's what troubles my 
colleagues. They see us writing a bill that simply says that a 
surrogate can be anyone. They envision, perhaps, a surrogate who 
may not use your particular service, who may go to another 
attorney and maybe she's separated, maybe she had a quarrel, 
maybe she sees economic necessity and doing this versus doing 
something else and so she gets involved. It's not that carefully 
screened because we only have minimum levels of screening the 
bill, and six months later she is pregnant and her husband is 
outraged and files suit for damages. 
MR. HANDEL: That is the reason why the parameters in 
the bill are included, why there are safeguards the bill. We 
can do it in one of several ways. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Show them what the safeguards are. 
MR. HANDEL: All right. For example, if you'll turn to 
page three of AB 3771, the first thing that we do is we place the 
entire contract and the conduct of the parties directly within 
the jurisdiction of the court, the superior court of the State of 
California, probably the County of Los Angeles or depending on 
the county that you're in. The court has to agree to the 
petition. In fact, the court has to okay, prior to the 
insemination, that this contract can go ahead. It's almost a 
declaratory relief action in the sense that you're asking the 
court to okay conduct prior to it's occurring. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Now the Judicial Council is going to 
come up here and sav that they don't like that because that's 
prior approval of a contract. 
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MR. HANDEL: What we're going to argue is that it's very 
similar to a conservatorship where, in effect, you're asking the 
court to okay ct transfereuce of one's estate to someone else 
prior to it happen and we're s ly asking for these 
safeguards to be met. The way that the bill is envisioned, once 
this checklist has been basically checked off by a judge, I don't 
see any problem with the Judicial Council. There isn't a of 
work. In effect, is the work of the attornevs to do. What we 
have to do is we have to give an executed copy of the contract 
which both sides have signed to the judge. 
We have to have evidence of the fe's in rtility. We 
think that this should not be a matter of convenience, that 
people who are infertile should go take the are 
involved in surrogate parenting. 
Evidence of the medical evaluation of husband and 
the surrogate -- we think this is critical, both the 
and the husband ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me, what if a woman, for lth 
reasons ... 
MR. HANDEL: That's defined. Infertility is def as 
an inability to bear children or, because of health reasons, 
cannot bear children -- because of high blood pressure or because 
of various other reasons. Dr. Karow can certainlv give you much 
more information on that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But this doesn't say that. 
MR. HANDEL: Section (a), page two, 7502. As used in 
this act, "infertile couple" means a husband who is capable of 
producing viable sperm and his wife who has been determined by a 
licensed physician to be incapable of conceiving or carrying a 
child to term without significant risk to her life or who has 
been unable to conceive for one year. That's a determination by 
a physician, obviously, if she's incapable of conceiving without 
risk either to her life, and, we would go even further, risk to 
the child, assuming that she has some hereditary disease that she 
does not want to pass on to her child and yet she still wants a 
child. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm just thinking about the 
requirements as evidence of the wife's infertilitv ... 
MR. HANDEL: "Infertility" as defined by Section 7502. 
Evidence of the medical evaluation of the husband and the 
surrogate -- it just so happens that in our practice we utilize 
Dr. Karow, who probablv provides the most extensive and thorough 
medical evaluation which you could ever imagine. We think that 
that is imperative, that both the adopting father, the natural 
father, and the surrogate be thoroughly screened. As part of 
that screening, a psychological evaluation must be done on the 
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surrogate to at least determinP that she's not as crazy as a loon 
or in some way is going to jeopardize the entire contract. 
Proof that the funds to be paid to the surrogate, 
medical bills, et cetera are deposited in a trust account prior 
to the insemination. It's pretty difficult to start asking 
people to come up with money after the pregnancy has occurred. 
Obviously, you can't change your mind and say, "No." We don't 
want to encourage abortion. We don't want to encourage children 
that are not wanted, so these are some of the safeguards that are 
used. 
We obviously want evidence of the ability of the 
infertile couple to care for the child. This can be done via a 
home study. This can be done with the psychological report. The 
bill holds that a home study by a licensed agency is enough, and 
we tend to agree, and of course evidence of the marriage of the 
infertile couple. Now, these are wide parameters. 
We also give the discretion to the judge that, if he has 
any doubts whatsoever, he can bring in any of the parties to see 
that in fact no coercion is taking place, that the woman is not 
doing it out of destitution, that she is doing it because she 
truly wants to do it. Now, t.hat is not to say that someone who 
is doing it simply for the money is not a valid surrogate. We 
don't know. It's too early in the game. 
Last, but not least, both sides must be represented by 
counsel. It's very important that in a contract of this nature, 
with the ramifications involved, both sides be apprised of their 
legal rights. These are the parameters as we've seen it. Hy 
partner and I think that either these parameters or just a very 
simple bill limiting surrogate parenting to him or myself would 
he just fine. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Should we include penalties, civil or 
otherwise, for those individuals who may not conform to the 
requirements of the law? 
MR. HANDEL: We certainly can't see criminal penalties. 
Our contract allows for a cause of action of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress upon ~he adopting couple should 
the surrogate arbitrarily abort or change her mind or no~ give up 
the child, because of the great distress that would occur to the 
couple. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I guess I'm trying to see whether or 
not there's something that would in fact encourage people to 
comply with the law because the alternative is ... 
MR. HANDEL: I think fear of the civil remedies -- we 
have breach of contract in the damages that may result, and the 
damages would be more psychological. In addition, of course, 
there is rescission of the contract. At this point, let's say 
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that you've already spent 12 or 15 thousand dol 
mother change her mind, but that would 
s should the 
not be the 
of the damage. The damages would far You 
have a ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Should we state 
in the law surrogate, for 
a pre 
rest of 
requ s are not 1 with? 
MR. HANDEL: I think that a that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That the 
surrogate and the custody belongs to 
to 
surrogate? 
MR. HANDEL: No. I think ... 
CHAIR¥~N HARRIS: Why don't we put a burden on the 
people who are in fact going to seek out a surrogate to 
with these contractual and legal provisions? 
MR. HANDEL: Well, the burden is al 
they've already gone through five or ten rs of 
work, they're spending $20,000, and they have gone 
rigmarole of trying to obtain a child. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, but what if they haven't compl 
with the law? What if they just found a woman walking down 
street and said, "Will you have a child for us? 
MR. HANDEL: Under those circumstances, I think that 
same remedies-- but I don't know-- who would ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What I'm saying is v1hy should somebody 
comply with the law if there aren't protections that are 
guaranteed to the infertile couple under the law that aren't 
available outside the law. 
MR HANDEL: Who would be damaged, assuming that someone 
were to do that? I don't understand. See, the damage that we're 
dealing with here ... 
CHAIRNAN HARRIS: What we're trying to do by this 
legislation is to clear up the ambiguity that nay result from a 
surrogate having a child and then there being a dispute as to 
custody or parenthood. Right? 
MR. HANDEL: I think-- I think ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Otherwise, why have a law? 
MR. HANDEL: Okay. I think the ambiguity, as best as 
can be done without writing a literal tome on the various ways 
that the law could address this issue, is addressed in the hill 
and that is, one, civil remedies -- whatever they are -- mav 
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apply, including specific performance. Specific performance --
turning the child over, going to a doctor. 
Obviously, we have a situation where we've qot certain 
Supreme Court cases, particularly Roe v Wade [410 u.s. 113 
(1973)], which holds that we cannot force-a-woman to abort or not 
abort or go to a doctor or do anything to her body. But, does 
that mean that if she fails to do that-- let's say that the 
contract says, "If, in the event we have a severely retarded or a 
Down's child~" --and the couple decides that they want to abort 
-- or, on the other chance, they say they don't want to abort and 
they want the child, no matter what -- and the surrogate says, "I 
don't care. I've got a child, and I want to produce the child 
anyway." 
We know that we cannot force a woman to do one or the 
other. But, does that mean the damages don't lie? I don't know. 
I don't know if that can be addressed in a statute. As to a lot 
of these issues, unfortunately, all we can do is attempt to try 
to clear them up as best we can. I really think that a lot of 
these major issues are going to take U. S. Supreme Court 
decisions to determine exactly where the parameters are. 
DR. KAROW: Mr. Harris, could I make a comment or two? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, please, Doctor. 
DR. KAROW: Mr. Handel mentions the psychological 
screen. I think one of the obligations of the psychological 
screen is to be sure the surrogate is not getting herself in a 
situation in which she doesn't belong. In other words, I think 
where, from the lawyers' standpoint, they are much more 
representing the adopting couple, the physician is actually much 
more the surrogate's doctor. He has much more to do with her so 
he has an obligation to be sure she is not going to do something 
that's detrimental to herself. In this situation, there is 
recourse. In other words, we get attacked all the time by the 
law in the way of malpractice suits. If we fail to observe 
reasonable guidelines as you set up, then there is recourse to 
come back and blame us. I think you probably have the same 
things with the lawyers. If they fail to follow reasonable 
guidelines that you establish, you can always go to the 
malpractice method of recourse. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. HANDEL: I don't believe I have anything more to 
add. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Thank you. 
As I said, there are probably going to be a million 
questions that are 9oing to emanate as a result of this subject, 
and, unfortunately, the reality is that many of these things arc 
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up 
have 
vvri te a 
it re s to case law. We're going to 
the courts might be heading so we don't 
to be unconstitutional and 
Next, I'd 1 to 
couple. She is a 
11 and 
who has 
le 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We 
her husband. She 
As a matter 
IS or 
name is Jill Jamieson. I a 
, Bill. Right now, I am WRiting 
don't know. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We were waiting 
(Laughter 
the big moment! 
questions 
JAMIESON: It has been too recent. Do you have 
you wou like to ask? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You've heard the brief background and 
obviously the complications in all of these things. I'm just 
wondering whether or not, from your perspective, you think there 
are legal protections that should be included in such a law to 
protect your interests as a surrogate mother or whether or not 
you think there are any other specific things that ought to be 
included the law. 
MRS. ,JAMIESON: 
does cover everything. 
the adopting couple. 
I believe the bill that is presented 
It protects the surrogate; it protects 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: May I ask a question? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Go ahead. Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: How about the fee? Do you think 
it should just be open-ended or should there be any kind of a 
statement as to what the fee ought to be or guidelines for the 
setting of the fee? 
MRS. JAMIESON: No. I believe it should be whatever the 
couple can a whatever the surrogate agrees on. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let. me ask another question. The 
issue was raised relative to the right of the surrogate mother to 
control her own body. What do you think about that? Obviously, 
I don't see what we can do to prevent an abortion or to force an 
abortion. What do you think should happen to the child if in 
fact there's a contract and the pregnancy mav not run a full 
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term? If the surrogate chooses to have the child and, for snme 
reason, the adopting parents, or the contracting parents, decide 
that they don't want the child because they think, as a result of 
the amniocentesis test, for example, the child is going to be 
mongoloid or something like that, what do you think should happen 
to the child? 
MRS. JAMIESON: You're saying if the adopting couple 
refuses the child? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let's say that you are in fact 
pregnant and in the sixth month of pregnancy amniocentesis tests 
are taken and there's a good likelihood the child's going to be 
retarded. The adopting parents say that they don't want a 
retarded child. 
MRS. JAMIESON: I don't believe in bringing a retarded 
child into the world. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: In your case, then, that would be the 
answer, but if you say that you don't believe in abortion, whose 
child is it? 
MRS. JAMIESON: Then it would be the responsibility of 
the surrogate because she wanted it. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. That's one interesting 
point. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Could I just pursue that? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Sure. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: On that issue, counsel, what do 
you do if that arises? Has that scenario ever occurred in your 
experience? 
MR. HANDEL: Thank God, no. Because .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Are you familiar with any cases 
that have arisen along those lines? 
MR. HANDEL: No. The only case that we're familiar with 
is where a woman changed her mind ~- in California -- just simply 
aid not turn the child over. Mr. Keane, an attorney from 
Michigan, will be able to speak a little bit more clearly on that 
later. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: If that did occur, where the 
surrogate was going to give birth ... 
MR. HANDEL: Then, we have the classic situation --
instead of everybody fighting for the child, we have everybody 
saying "We don't want the child." Our position is that ... 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: What would you do with your 
contract? 
MR. HANDEL: I would say that the surrogate breached the 
contract ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But it wouldn't be a matter of 
breaching the contract, in the sense that the adopting parent, if 
you will, doesn't want the child. Would you not bring the 
parties in ann simply change the contract? What would you do to 
simply get them off the hook, or does law have to deal with 
that? 
MR. HANDEL: I don't understand your question. Let's 
say that we have a retarded child that we find out through 
amniocentesis has Down's syndrome, and the adopting couple sa 
"We don't want the child." Our contract ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: The surrogate mother wishes to ... 
MR. HANDEL: ... wishes to go ahead. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: ... proceed with delivery. 
MR. HANDEL: Well, we've never had that problem, because 
of the psychological screening and because the kind of women we 
choose would not do that. In the event that that woul0 happen, 
two things happen. One, I think the attorney has committed 
malpractice if we had reasonable notice that would happen, if a 
woman said, "I don't believe in abortion, and I'm not going to 
abort, come hell or high water," and we went ahead and used 
her ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: What would you do to avoid the 
malpractice that you referred to? 
MR. HANDEL: By simply choosing a surrogate and a couple 
that basically believe the same way. Most of our surrogates 
believe the child they are carrying does not belong to them. 
They are carrying the child of an infertile couple. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Suppose she ends up stuck with 
it? Accept that she has decided, even though it's going to 
perhaps be malformed, that she is going to give delivery. 
MR. HANDEL: Once she has decided that, she is, in a 
sense, under that scenario, breaching the contract and saying, 
"We contracted for a child, that we co11ld do everything possible 
to produce a healthy child and if it were not ... " 
ASSEMBLY~ffiN STIRLING: It's a breach of contract. It's 
an act of God, in a sense. 
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MR. HANDEL: That aspect is certainly an act of God. 
The aspect that is not an act of God is the woman has a right to 
abort, and most of the couples, to be honest with you, would ask 
the surrogate to abort if the child were to be deformed. That's 
one of our principle ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: And at the time, she says, "No. 11 
What would you suggest happen? 
MR. HANDEL: We've never had that .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I know that, but what would you 
suggest? We're talking about the law. 
MR. HANDEL: You give me a scenario in 30 seconds. What 
do I do? I'd hit the books .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I know that. 
MR. HANDEL: I'd probably •.. 
ASSEMBIJYMAN STIRLING: Do you feel that that has got to 
be in some way addressed? 
MR. HANDEL: I don't think it can be nddressed. I don't 
think there's any way it can because we have two situations here. 
\-ve have Roe v Wade, that gives t.he woman the absolute right to do 
\vi th her body asshe wishes, and we have a couple who has hired a 
woman to carry their child. In one sense, it is their child, and 
they have a right to determine how they want their child to be 
born, except someone else's womb happens to he carrying it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But, they can definitely get out 
of the contract. There's no auestion about that under those 
circumstances we just talked about. 
MR. HANDEL: I don't know. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, that's got to be an 
absolute, it seems to me, under the circumstances. 
MR. HANDEL: I think vou have a conflict there that is 
almost insurmountable because ~hat we're saying is that, in 
effect, it's a personal service contract. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But, don't you have a provision 
in the contract that says that the child that they want will be a 
heal thy ..• 
MR. HANDEL: No. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: t'Vhy not? 
MR. HANDEL: Because that's an act of God. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: They don't ask for that? 
MR. HANDEL: Well, they ask. What we have in the 
contract says that whatever child is born belongs to that 
adopting couple. It is their child, no matter what. The only 
problem is that they have a right in the contract to ask for an 
abortion if the child is deemed to be seriously deformed or 
seriously retarded. If they ask for an abortion, with the 
physician's consent, then the surrogate agrees to go ahead and 
have the abortion. The problem is what happens if she says, 
"No." We've never had that problem, and that is, as my partner 
says, the inevitable nightmare. That's the very worst thing 
could ever happen, and I don't know if that can ever be addressed 
legally. It may ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What happens to the fee if she says, 
"Yes"? 
MR. HANDEL: She gets paid. Up to that point, there is 
no question. She has done everything she is supposed to do, and 
it is an act of God. It is absolutely not her fault whatsoever. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Thank you. I appreciate the 
testimony. 
Is there anything that anyone would like to add? 
MR. HANDEL: Could my partner add one aspect of it? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. BERNARD SHERWYN: I'm Bernard Sherwyn. I'm an 
attorney, practic1ng in Los Angeles, in surrogate parenting, and 
I'm Bill Handel's partner. 
I believe there was a question regarding the fact that 
the Judicial Council might be concerned about approving a 
contract prior to its performance. The provisions of the bill 
really don't address -- they are not approving the contract. 
What they are doing is approving the entire factual setting. 
They are saying, "All of the items that arA required in the act 
are there; therefore, we will deal with this arrangement. If a 
problem occurs, we will review the problem at the time it occurs, 
and we are petitioned by one of the parties to address it." They 
are not asked to deal with every possible situation ahead of 
time, and they are not asked to deal with the contract, except 
for the fact that it has the provisions that the bill requires 
and the evidence of the screening and the funds being on deposit 
-- those items that are required -- the minimum elements -- the 
court is saying, "Yes, those minimum elements are there." They 
are not saying, "This is a good contract. We will go this way or 
that way if something happens." 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand. Thank you for covering 
that point. It was very helpful. 
MR. SHERWYN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, may I ask Mr. Keane and Mr. 
FitzRandolph to come forward, please? 
MR. NOEL P. KEANE: Mr. Harris. Good morning. My name 
is Noel Keane, and I'm an attorney from Michigan. I've been 
involved in surrogate parenting for the past seven years. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm giving you a lot of publicity 
is this your book? [The Surrogate Mother] 
MR. KEANE: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So, obviously, you've spent a lot of 
time dealing with this new subject. 
MR. KEANE: I've spent about 100 percent of my time for 
the last four years on this area. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What is your background? 
MR. KEANE: Well, as an attorney in general practice, 
for the past 12 years. But ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How did you get into this unique 
field? Did you have an experience that directed your attention 
to this, or was it just circumstance? 
MR. KEANE: It was circumstances that occurred in 
Michigan, where a couple came in who were infertile and they 
wanted a biologically related child. Adoption was not for them. 
He was of Lebanese decent, and it was important for him to father 
his own child. His wife was infertile though, so we just started 
looking into it. 
In about six months, we will have delivered our 
forty-third child, working with couples all around the world, 
including several couples out of this state. 
We, too, have proposed legislation in Michigan. It's 
presently with the House Judiciary Committee. We started out 
with a bill that was almost as complete as the one we're talking 
about here today. After holding several public hearings, we 
backed off and came in with a different type of legislation that 
gives the bare minimals that acknowledge that surroqate parenting 
is going on, and it acknowledges that you can enter into this 
type of agreement without getting too specific. We thought it 
might be better to let problems arise, to see whether or not it 
is necessary to enter into legislation restricting or prohibiting 
it. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you favor that kind of an approach 
as opposed to a detailed approach? 
MR. KEANE: I don't think that you're ever going to get 
a 11 way it's dra here today. I read the bill, 
and I've also read some of comments to it. Even the 
courts don't want the authority ing them to take in 
s bill here. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Say that 
MR. KEANE: There's an objection to the 11, 
in the group o that I have in of me, that 
courts don't want this responsibility, as was pointed out 
earlier, of approving a contract that's dra before you ever 
get into it. I we re asking them to take too much 
respons lity. They're waiting for a dispute to arise also 
before they want to hear things. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you think that 's a need for 
any penalties for those who do not in fact conform to the law? I 
guess if you a general law then there's real no ... 
MR. KEANE: The penalties wouldn't be necessary. I 
think breach of contract would be in there. 
I also want to address that one question that you asked 
Mr. Handel earlier, about having a retarded or deformed child. 
In Michigan, we have a form called "Notice of Intent to Claim 
Paternity." We file that notice as soon as we know that there is 
a conception. We place a presumable burden that this child to be 
horn is from this man and he is responsible. I think that would 
take care of the State's interest, in the event a woman agreed to 
abort but did not. This man, up front, says, "That's my child." 
The State has already said that, if you father a child, you have 
responsibilities. I think that would take car8 of the State's 
interest to care, at least economicalJ.y, for that child that was 
born, even though the surrogate said that she would abort it if 
there was determined to be somethina wrnnq with it, even though 
you still may have your brearh of contract ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That the biological father would 
be responsible? 
MR. KEANE: That's correct. It's his child ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But he only agreed to the 
surrogate for the purpose of propagating a healthy child. 
MR. KEANE: We're talking about the natural father, who 
is going to end up with this child, under the agreement. We're 
assuming that if we had a defective child, in one way or another, 
that he wouldn't take that child. I'm simply saying that, if we 
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f intent and establish the legal relationship 
that child, as far as the State is concerned he 
le for the maintenance of that child, whether or 
fi 
between 
11 be 
not s possession. If the , who agreed to abort 
sn't do so, maybe a c 1 breach of contract 
maintained between those two. But, for the State's 
child is maintained. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Under the Michigan approach, how 
c 
area? 
in interpreting the 
called to into this 
What we're trying to do, I think, is to avoid that, to 
let the Legis make those determinations and avoid that, 
rather than the court make all the law. 
MR. 
Michigan, 
actions going 
discussed. I 
move forward. 
KEANE: I agree. I wish that would happen in 
have both things going on. We have court 
on, and we have proposed legislation being 
the court action is making the legislation 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, it happens that way out 
here, too. (Laughter) 
MR. KEANE: I would like to point out to this Committee 
that I'm almost certain, and most professors would agree, that 
there's an inherent constitutional right of a man to have a 
ld, whether he's married, whether he's single. If that 
important privacy right is there, then surrogate parenting is 
going to go on without anybody being able to restrict it or 
prohibit it. In other words, a man will be able to pay a woman 
to carry his child if his wife can't do so. So ... 
CHAIID"..AN HARRIS: Isn't that true for the wife as well? 
MR. KEANE: Sure. Married or single for each. She can 
go to a sperm bank and be inseminated, and nobody can stop that. 
The only point I'm trying to make is that you must have 
legislation of some type, to restrict and protect and so forth, 
because it's going to go on. The worst thing that you could do 
is try to pass legislation that would drive it underground. 
ASSEr.1BLYMAN STIRLING: It's my understanding that you 
have filed action to question the validity of the baby-selli.ng 
laws in Michigan. 
MR. KEANE: Yes, that's correct. We filed an action 
against the attorney general and the prosecutor in the State of 
Michigan as to whether or not the prohibition of payment in 
conjunction with an adoption applies to a surrogate arrangement. 
The trial court -- circuit court -- of Wayne County held that the 
prohibition would stand. We appealed that decision to the court 
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of appeals, and they sustained the circuit court action, saying 
"We are not going to prohibit and prevent a man from having a 
child in this manner, but we are not going to let you use the 
adoption statute to further that type of activity." [Doe v 
Kelley, 6 FLR 3011 (BNA), 106 Mich. App. 169, appeal denied, No. 
67308] So, what they have done, now, is allowed the child to be 
born. You allow the man's name to be placed on the birth 
certificate, but they're not going to let the woman's name go on 
the birth certificate, and that's absurd. That case has been 
appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court~ they refused to hear it. 
Last week, we filed with the U. S. Court under writ of 
certiorari. We have not heard whether or not they're going to 
hear it yet. 
But they have not prohibited the act We can do 
this. We can make the payment; we just can't do the adoption. 
What they've caused now is couples to search out le states 
that will allow us to do the adoption, where the reporting of a 
fee is not a requirement. For instance, Florida, California --
where you have a step-child adoption law that doesn't require the 
reporting of expenditures in conjunction with the adoption, 
because one person is already the biological parent or adoptive 
parent of that child. The activity is going on, and it would be 
foolish to say it's not. It's going on in 15 states now, and 
still there hasn't been a Jaw passed. 
I really don't. have much more to add unless you have 
some questions. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm sure we have a lot of questions. 
Unfortunately, the questions are sort of open-ended. They lead 
to other questions, and we'd like to have some conclusionary 
questions questions that would help us to reach some specific 
ends, but it is obviously very, very difficult. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Mr. Keane, relating your 
experience in Michigan to your experience in the Pasadena case ... 
MR. KEANE: The Pasadena case was a young lady who 
volunteered to be a surrogate for a couple out of New York. I 
had never met her, and, at that time, we were working only with 
volunteer surrogates, meaning that they were not paid a fee for 
carrying the child. She said that she wanted to help someone. 
We neither had medical personnel nor psychological personnel at 
that time to help us do a proper screening. I simply said, 
"Would it be all right if I gave your name to a couple in New 
York?" She was impregnated in New York. Later she was 
impregnated in Pasadena, and in her fourth month of pregnancy, 
she read about another woman who was paid a $10,000 fee for doing 
this. She said, "I would like to have $7,500 to complete this 
transaction." This couple wasn't sure if it was legal, nor did 
they have $7,500 to pay her, so we came out here and started a 
custody action for that child. It later was resolved in that she 
kept custody by an agreement, and his name was placed on the 
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birth certificate. There were no orders entered by the court in 
any way. What that has done for me ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Was that a settlement? 
MR. KEANE: It's an out-of-court settlement. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I can't imagine that as a 
settlement ... 
MR. KEANE: What 's done -- we've come a long way 
since then, doing the psychological screening, also working with 
a fee, and having their own lawyer appointed for them, and so 
forth. 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: So, it really doesn't help us too 
much in retrospect ... 
.HR. KEANE: Not at all. That issue has never been 
determined -- what the courts are going to do if she does 
withhold. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: All right. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: f-1r. Fi tzRandolph. 
PROFESSOR JOHN A. FITZRANDOLPH: Mr. Chairman, as the 
dean of the law school here, let me welcome you all and thank you 
for being here. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
PROFESSOR FITZRANDOLPH: About three years ago, Bill 
Handel, whom you heard earlier, who is a graduate of this 
institution, came to me with a problem. He said, "I'm 
representing some couple, and I think I'm breaking the law." And 
he probably wa~. It's a classic case. If he was, it's a law 
that was never intended to prohibit surrogate parenting. I'm 
sure the Legislature had never heard of the phrase when they 
passed that law, and it was being imposed, theoretically at 
least, on a situation which is so new -- technically new -- and 
as a policy matter, quite new. 
As a result of that, he called my attention to the 
problem, and a class at this school on legislation, which I 
teach, drafted the initial bill in this area. We took it to 
Assemblyman Roos, who had the foresight and wisdom to introduce 
it. As it appears here today, it is not substantially different 
from the way it was as it came out of the class. 
The policy choices which you will have to make are the 
same ones that this class wrestled with, only yours matter 
because they're qoing to affect people's lives. One of the 
choices was to just do as Mr. Keane suggested Michigan may be 
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considering, which is to pass a bill saying that surrogate 
parenting is excluded from the baby-selling prohibition. That's 
how we started, with that premise. Is that all we ought to do? 
On thinking it through and discussing it with various 
, it seemed like some more detailed procedure was necessary 
because there are some people here in this situation who need 
protection, not the least of which, is the child. I think that 
in defense of this system, putting it in the courts, outlining in 
some detail some minimal contract provisions and having the court 
supervise it is •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you prefer this detailed approach, 
as opposed to a more general one? 
PROFESSOR FITZRANDOLPH: I think so. I think that it 
makes some sense and only because all the alternatives don't make 
as much sense. I realize it's a potential burden for the courts, 
but I think that, if you think in terms of what we've done here, 
this bill is set up to help married couples who are infertile to 
acquire a child through the only way that may be available to 
them at this time. 
Why put it in the courts? I guess the parallel is to 
adoptions. If we can use that analogy -- it seemed to be the one 
that motivated the class and, I think, is to be viewed here. 
It's parallel to an adoption situation because, as a matter of 
fact, as to one of the parties it is an adoption. The parallel 
breaks down on a few particular instances, but it's the closest 
thing we could find. Courts do get involved in adoption, and the 
Legislature has created some law about adoption. 
The defense of this, I think, is perhaps that, while the 
enforceability of the contract is a difficult issue, it seems to 
me that if people are forced to go to a court, appear in a court, 
they'll take the whole matter more seriously and they'll realize 
there are legal consequences to breaching a contract. 
I have no answer for some of the questions -- nobody has 
answers for some of these questions -- except to say that it 
would be judicially supervised, which, when the choice is no 
supervision, seems to me to make more sense than no supervision, 
no policy input from the Legislature or the courts, and the 
activity continues, unabated, with no protection for anyone. 
That's the justification, I think, for this more complex system. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. You've framed the issues 
very well. Thank you very much. We appreciate your hospitality 
and appreciate your being at the hearing. 
Next, Marilyn Berger and Nina Kellogg. 
MS. ~~RILYN BERGER: Yes, I am Marilyn Berger, president 
of Infertility Resources. I'd like to address you today on the 
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issue of surrogate as seen from the idea of the 
infertile couple and some of the that we have to go 
through 
My name, aga , is Mari Berger. I have a master's in 
counseling and guidance. I fertile woman, and I'm an 
adoptive mother of two. My son, Matthew, is six and he was 
adopted through L. A. County after a five-year wait and a 
four-month home study previous to placement, and a year home 
study after placement before the legalization took place. My 
baby is two. He was found independently and adopted through the 
services of Mr. David Leavitt, whom you will be talking with 
later. 
In my position as s of Infertility Resources and 
counselor, I have spoken to over 600 people in the last five 
years. 
CHAIP~N HARRIS: Are all these individuals who wanted 
children but were unable to have them? 
MS. BERGER: Right. Exact 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How they find you? 
MS. BERGER: Through their doctor8, through agencies, 
through Planned Parenthood ... 
CHAIR}~N HARRIS: I'm just wondering how people get 
access to information 
MS. BERGER: Not easi 
like money. We're a non-prof 
We have trouble advertising, 
organization. 
With Dr. Kel , over last four years -- the two of 
us have counseled probably over 400 people in my home. 
As you've been told, one out of six couples is 
infertile. Out of those one out of six, perhaps half of them can 
be helped through the services of a doctor, like Dr. Karow, to a 
birth child. The rest must go on to alternative means. 
On the other side f co , you have the problem that 
97 rcent of unwed bi mothers in s state keep 
the babies. 
ASSEMBLYt.1lAN STIRLING: How many? What percent.age? 
MS. BERGER: Ninety-seven percent of unwed teenage birth 
mothers, and, nationwide, accord to Time magazine last spring, 
it was 96 percent nationwide. That is why it is so difficult to 
find adoptable infants of any race. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: May I just ask ... ? 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Not that it's directly relevant 
to s subject -- in fact, it's not even indirectly relevant to 
ject. Is there any particular cause that vou would be 
aware of why that is happening? 
MS. BERGER: Well, back in ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Briefly -- I don't want to get 
off on another subject. Do you have an impression s to why 
that's occurring? 
MS. BERGER: Like, 25 years ago, when I was in high 
school, it was the thing for a teenage unwed mother to leave 
town, to have her baby, to give it up for adoption, and then come 
back. It was a very guilty thing. Society has changed. It is 
much more accepting of the unwed teenage birth mother. Society 
and high schools have set up programs for her, so that she is 
able to continue high school and still have her baby. 
Now, there are a great many children out there for 
adoption. I really want to address this issue because I think it 
is so important. Infertile couples want babies. We started out 
to make babies. I was on a great many infertility drugs for two 
and a half years. It is a long process; it is an expensive 
process; it is a hurting process. What we want, just as you do, 
is a healthy baby. 
There are a lot of older children out there. There are 
sibling groups. There are kids who have been battered. There 
are kids who have gone from foster home to foster home to foster 
home. It's a tragedy, but it's a tragedy that needs to be taken 
care of by all of society, and not to he the burden of the 
infertile couple. You don't need to be infertile in order to 
adopt. It is also my opinion that an adopting couple should be 
experienced parents if they are going to take on a child with 
problems. 
Now, as you've heard, these surrogate parenting groups 
are springing up all over the country because couples are looking 
for infants. It's time for you, the Legislature, to make a 
decis either to pass a law making surrogate parenting 
illegal or to consider the needs of all the parties who are 
concerned. 
The surrogate needs to be screened carefully. There 
need to be safeguards and standards and support for her, such as 
Dr. Kellogg provides. The infertile couple needs the same kind 
of protection. They need to be screened; they need to be 
supported; they need to have safeguards. There need to be 
standards because the result of all of this is a baby, and that 
baby deserves and needs the protection of the law, as well as the 
protection and care of loving parents. 
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The scenario of a baby being put in a foster home while 
the surrogate and the adopting couple fight it out over the 
custody means a loss to everybody. It doesn't matter who wins 
the legal battle; everybody loses emotionally. The child loses, 
especially, because he's been in foster care for four or five 
years. The foster mother loses. Whoever lost the suit loses. 
Even whoever won the suit loses because she hasn't had custody of 
the child for that number of years. 
There is an intense need, and surrogate parenting is 
going to go on, and it's up to you to decide whether it's going 
to go on under the protection of the law or whether it's going to 
go on surreptitiously. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you have any comments on the 
specific bill before us? 
MS. BERGER: Personally, I think that it's a fairly good 
bill. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Thank you. Yes, Dr. 
Kellogg. 
DR. NINA KELLOGG: My name is Nina Kellogg. I'm a 
psychologist, and I am a practitioner in the field of surrogate 
parenting. 
I brought with me three ladies who are very dear to my 
heart, so that you can look at them sitting at the table. We 
have Nancy, Sue, and Becky. These are three surrogate mothers. 
I think it is very important that they be seen. One of the 
reasons that it's important is to get out of the concept of "What 
kind of a lady can have a baby and give it away?" These are 
three ladies who have convinced me that it is possible. 
For me, this is the heart of the issue. The heart of 
the whole issue, I think, is the surrogate mother. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are they willing to testify or answer 
questions? 
DR. KELLOGG: Sure. Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Have all of you had children by 
fathers in a surrogate parent arrangement? 
DR. KELLOGG: They are in the process, at this point. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. You haven't had them yet. Is 
that right? 
DR. KELLOGG: Right. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Well, then, some of the 
questions I was go1ng to ask won't apply. 
DR. KELLOGG: Can I say just a couple things? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
DR. KELLOGG: In addressing the bill, and as a 
practitioner, I have some things that I would very much like to 
add. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Certainly. 
DR. KELLOGG: I would like to see added into the bill 
that there be a psychological support system built in for the 
surrogates. These ladies are going to spend nine months and more 
of their lives involved in the process. They will run into the 
slings and arrows of society that say to them, "What are you 
doing? You're crazy." I think it's enormously important, and I 
think this could be included within the bill, that there be 
psychological support built in. 
Now, I think ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: What does that mean to you? 
DR. KELLOGG: Well, the way I do it is that they are 
seen in an on-going group now, every other week, so that ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Who pays for that? 
DR. KELLOGG: The coup is now paying for it. I call 
them the adoptive couple -- the father and the adopting mother. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Is that part of the single fee 
ss, and they pay you? 
DR. KELLOGG: No. I'm being paid by the couple. 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: As well as the fees and expenses 
paid by the couple? 
DR. KELLOGG: Right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Whatever's negotiated, I 
understand, but ..• 
DR. KELLOGG: Exactly. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: We're going to get to ... 
DR. KELLOGG: But most of the fees are being paid by the 
couple. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: We're going to get to a point 
where, and it has happened ln every other area of the law, the 
court's going to, at some point, say, "Just because a couple 
doesn't happen to have substantial resources and therefore can't 
afford this, doesn't mean that they don't have the right to have 
a child, whether it be by a surrogate or in some other fashion. 
That has happened in the criminal law. That has happened in 
other areas. It is eventually, I think, going to happen in this 
area. 
Why should a couple who is poor not have the right to 
have a child through a surrogate parent, whereas one who has the 
money can do so? 
DR. KELLOGG: Let me tell you. Almost everything to do 
with infertility is unfair. It was unfair from the beginning ••. 
ASSEHBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I understand that. Let's 
get past that ••. 
DR. KELLOGG: No, no, no ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I appreciate that. I understand 
that. It's all unfair under those circumstances. 
DR. KELLOGG: Infertility work-up has always been far 
more available to those who can pay for it. Most of the 
insurance companies don't cover it. Right now, if you are poor, 
and you are infertile, you don't even get infertile care. 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: I know, but we're past that 
point. Abortions are granted, and we don't worry about whether 
they have a television set or whether they spend the money on 
something else. Medi-Cal pays for it. We get right down to the 
same issue here. You don't foresee that ever happening? 
DR. KELLOGG: Could be, but we're not past it, the way 
you're describing it, because Medi-Cal does not pay for 
infertility work-up. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: It doesn't now. 
DR. KELLOGG: It's going down hill now so I ••. 
ASSE.r.lBLYMAN STIRLING: I understand that . 
DR. KELLOGG~ ... think it's even less likely if you're 
poor ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I'm just talking about the 
general approach of whether or not -- now, you're talking about a 
psychological support ... 
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DR. KELLOGG: I feel very strongly, if it gets to the 
surrogate parenting can get within the realms of the 
of average fo , then I think that, whatever the 
(again, price), that this is a crucial 
You cannot, in my opinion, and I've been two years doing 
it now, a these ladies to do without a support system for 
them. However you want to arrange it, they should not be left 
there all by themselves to carry this load, with all of society 
on ir back. 
's where, I think, great problems will occur. I 
are much more likely to change their minds, in terms 
the child and giving it to the couple. 
I think the screening needs to be for the couple -- with 
my program, it is that way. The couple is screened as well as 
surrogate, and they are matched together and they meet each 
other. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Okay. Now, in certain 
licized cases, obvious , there is the pressure of 
concept, and therefore that is focused on the 
How does the publicity come about in our normal 
s , where one party dec s to change his or her mind? 
I'm talking about the pressure that you're talking about --
support systems. Where do the surrogates get that 
ssure? 
DR. KELLOGG: It's very, very simple. Most of my 
s are working women. If you are bearing a child, at a 
number of months down the line, you have the large 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: And they're not married ••. ? 
DR. KELLOGG: It doesn't matter. Nobody bears a child 
without being visibly pregnant. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But, if you're married, you don't 
same pre ce. 
DR. KELLOGG: You're a man, sir. Listen one minute from 
a woman ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What he's saying is that, if you're 
married you re pregnant, people are not going to know that 
someone else is the father of that baby. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: And they're not going to put 
pressure on you? 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
you. Let's not get crazy. 
They're not going to put pressure on 
We're not .•• 
DR. KELLOGG: Wrong. Here are the kinds of places it 
comes up. Married or single, my belly is out to here. My 
co-workers say, "Can we give a shower for you?" I have to say, 
"Whoops! I'm not keeping this baby." This is a surrogate 
baby ... " 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, don't tell me that. Just say, 
"No, you can't have the shower." (Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: You don't have to have 
psychological support for that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You don't have to go through an 
explanation. Nobody makes you have a shower. There's no 
constitutional right to a shower. (Laughter) Let's not get 
crazy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That's how far we've come, but 
he's absolutely correct. 
DR. KELLOGG: 
constitutional right. 
Yes, I'm sorry. 
(Laughter) 
You're right. It's not a 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Let's hope not. (Laughter) 
DR. KELLOGG: No, but, for instance, the other children 
of the surrogate -- her own children -- may get pressure. "Oh, 
your mommy is having a baby. What are you going to name the 
baby?" "We're not naming the baby." There are pressures that 
come within the parameters ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand that. 'Vve' re also hoping 
that people have some degree of discretion. You know, if you're 
telling people, then you obviously don't feel that there's 
something that you have to worry about in terms of pressure. 
DR. KELLOGG: I agree, but I just think that things come 
up •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
Understand this. I don't 
need for counseling, that 
get off on a tangent. 
I'm not sure. Let me interrupt you. 
think we're disagreeing that there's a 
there's a need for support. Let's not 
I think what Assemblyman Stirling is indicating is that 
there are obviously other considerations as well, in terms of 
economics, whether-or not the public policy may change to insure 
that other people will have the right regardless of their 
economic status. All of these ramifications have to be explored. 
We can't ignore them and say that they're not there and not to 
worry about them. That's all we're saying. 
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DR. KELLOGG: All right. I'll modify. I think optimal 
would be counseling all the way through. If not optimal, then I 
would think that you should have a requirement for counseling, in 
terms of the selection of the surrogate, so that you do the best 
possible to be sure that you have a stable person who is totally 
aware of the contract that she's entering into, and what its 
ramifications are and time length is. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I want to give you a couple of minutes 
to make an uninterrupted statement, and then we'd like to ask 
some questions. 
DR. KELLOGG: I see it as a triangle. I'm not very 
worried about the baby. Babies have been born, to a great 
extent, healthy and normal forever. 
I'm not very worried about the adoptive couple because 
adoption has occurred for generations, and that has worked out 
pretty well. 
The big question mark I have, both as a practitioner and 
as a woman, is whether surrogates -- ladies -- can indeed have 
babies and give them away and remain psychologically and mentally 
healthy. You have to do it to find out. 
Just as I make a lot of noise and I say this to you 
right now, trying to get this started --- if two and three years 
from now, down the line, as I have had an opportunity to work 
with any numbers that are significant and I find that we are 
damaging people, I will also make a public statement about that. 
But, you can't answer the question because we don't have the 
numbers until we do it. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Let me ask a question now, if I 
might. I said that I didn't have any for the surrogates, because 
I was going to ask originally, in the case of anyone who had 
already had a child, what the experience was like and whether or 
not they'd be willing to do it again. That's obviously an 
inappropriate question, as they've never had the child. But, let 
me ask this ... 
DR. KELLOGG: I have had two surrogates, though, whom I 
have followed from beginning to end and who have birthed the 
child and given it away, and they are in very good shape. We 
have had a number of surrogates who, at least initially, say, "I 
want my couple to know that, if they want a second child, I would 
be willing to do that." 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Let me ask a question, ladies, 
if I might, either individually or collectively, if all of you 
would like to answer it. We will stipulate that, certainly, 
there's a need for counseling and there's a need for support, but 
do you find that there are undue, severe pressures on you for 
having a child as a surrogate? I guess I just don't know how 
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many people get that involved, other than those people who know 
you personally, and I assume that your friends understand or 
they're not going to pry too much into your private life. 
BECKY: When I first thought about becoming a surrogate 
-- I'm Becky, by the way. Before I contacted the lawyers and 
Nina, I was very interested to find out, first of all, how my 
husband felt about it. Once I had his support, my siblings, my 
parents, my personal support group, the minister of my church --
people who I really care about, who are going to be in direct 
contact with me for the length of this whole experience -- I have 
found a lot of support. 
It has been helpful to me to be part of Nina's group 
because I'm then able to say, "Well, this is how I'm encountering 
my job situation" or "My children have this particular question 
that I've answered this way. Do you have any more information I 
can give to them?" 
The screening process we went through was just to ask 
whether I was I going to be an adequate surrogate or acceptable. 
Not only that, but I met my adopting couple, and we were able to 
discuss all the important issues, including what happens if there 
is a defect in the child -- birth defect or problems. Before 
contracts were signed or anything, this was worked out. How 
would they feel about taking the child if there was a Down's 
syndrome situation, or how would they feel about having the 
option to say, "We'd like you to abort"? All that was agreed 
upon when we met and talked, because •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Was it agreed upon contractually or 
agreed upon in theory? 
BECKY: It's in the contract, and also they needed to 
know what my feelings were about having an abortion, whether I 
would feel comfortable about carrying a child who was having a 
problem and delivering that child, and how they would respond to 
accepting that child. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
SUE: I'm Sue, and I just wanted to state that the 
support group is really necessary. It's really important to know 
that you've got people behind you because I find that there is 
pressure from society. 
When I tell people that I'm going to be a surrogate, the 
first question they say to me is "Oh, my God, can you really give 
the baby away?" There's a lot of pressure ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Why do you tell them? Do you go 
out of your way to tell them, or does it come up in the daily 
conversation? How does it happen that it's anybody else's 
business other than your close friends? 
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SUE: Because I'm really proud of what I'm doing, and I 
think a lot people need to know aoout because this is the 
way of the future and I'm real active in this program. I bel 
in telling about 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I'm not suggesting that it's 
something you should not be proud of, but is it a program? Is it 
developing into something that is being promoted and people are 
being enlisted to join the program? Is that what's happening? 
SUE: No, that's just me. It's just something that I 
believe in promoting because that's my belief. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: 
then you're doing it yourself. 
But if that brings on pressures, 
Are you not? 
SUE: Right, but that's why it's important to have a 
support group, you see. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: 
the advantage of legal counsel? 
SUE: Yes. 
One more question. Do you have 
Someone referred to attorneys. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Who pays for those services that 
you receive from counsel? 
SUE: We do. The surrogate pays for her own attorney. 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: When you negotiate the fee with 
the adopting parents and their attorney, then part of what you 
have to consider is that you're going to have attorneys' fees to 
pay also, right? Is that how it happens? 
DR. KELLOGG: It is how it happens, but I think it's the 
only way it could because if anyone else were paying their 
attorneys' fees then you'd have collusion •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I just was wondering how it was 
done. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, next witness. 
NANCY: I'm Nancy. The way I feel about the 
psychological aspects of it is that sometimes you just need 
someone to talk to who's involved in the program-- not another 
surrogate, but someone who can help you shuffle your feelings and 
find out exactly how you feel about what you're doing, and -- the 
pressures don't bother me because I don't care what anybody says. 
I'm proud of what I'm doing. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a question. ~\Thy are you 
doing it? Why are any of you doing it? My wife doesn't want to 
be pregnant. (Laughter) 
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lly, I don't NANCY: I've had four kids, and, 
think there's anything more beautiful in the 
wake up in the morning and see that baby 
whole than to 
"evil eye" out of his I 
the right to go through that and to have 
giving me 
has 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So your basic reason is that you 
that those persons who aren't able to have children should be 
able to have one and you're willing to lend you body to that 
effort. 
NANCY: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Do you all have the same 
reason? 
SUE: Yes. I firmly believe in the statement that she 
made, and that's the reason that I'm doing it, though I do not 
have children of my own. I made that choice. I firmly believe 
in creating a child for an infertile couple because they 
desperately want one and I can provide it for them. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So, basically, you're all 
missionaries, and your purpose is strictly to do good things. It 
may sound like a hard question, but I really want to know. 
BECKY: Four years ago, when I started thinking about 
this, one of my sisters was having an infertility problem. At 
that time, I was working for a group of obstetricians who were 
weekly hearing from couples who were not able to have children of 
their own. 
The unfairness of it seemed very strong to me, and the 
fact was that I was able to have children so easily and carry 
them, and didn't interfere with the rest of my life. I worked 
to the day before I delivered. It seemed to me that, since I 
lt complete with my own family and did not want any more 
ldren and was able to do this so easily, would be my way of 
giving a gift. It's hard to put into words because it's an 
emotional response and a state of mind. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How much does the fee play in your 
willingness to undertake this pregnancy? 
BECKY: It's very nice, in this day and age with 
lation and the struggling of raising three ldren of our 
own. It will come in handy ••. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Would you say the 
ultimate deciding factor in terms of your will 
Obviously, you're not doing this just for the 
at all insinuating that, but I'm trying to get 
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I'm not 
Also, what kind of minimum 
in order to convince you 's 
hassle and soc 1 pressure? 
BECKY: It's my 
five to ten thousand dollars. 
is necessary 
all the 
a year's worth of involvement in this who 
inseminations, then the carrying of the child, 
is 
approximately 
with the 
delivery, and 
recovery. It's nice. I am providing a 
you're going to look at it -- you know, 
look at it. Money is not the factor 
mostly, though. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand. 
for somebody, if 
there are many ways to 
's controll this 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But when you talked about -- and 
please don't misunderstand -- I'm not playing with you here 
but it is a basic issue. When you're talking about the 
unfairness of a couple not being able to have a child, what about 
the unfairness of a couple not being able to have a child but who 
cannot afford the fee? How do you deal with that issue as it 
relates to your saying that the money is not the basic factor? 
Suppose some poorer couple asked you, and they just couldn't pay 
a certain fee. How would the fairness of that feel to you? 
DR. KELLOGG: I think that can be addressed in another 
way. If you have a limited number of babies available, if those 
who have the funds would choose to use a surrogate as their 
process of acquiring a child, then you would have a smaller 
number competing for those babies that are available through 
other methods. 
Now, in my interviewing of surrogates -- and I guess 
I've interviewed between 30 and 50 surrogat.es -- I find that for 
almost all of them, there has been a duality of motivation. It 
would be ridiculous to say that the money was not a motivator. 
But, I have found none ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: There's nothing wrong with 
that .•• 
DR. KELLOGG: ... that did not have the other motivation 
as well and did not see themselves as doing a very magnificent 
thing -- "being part of a miracle" is the way I put it. But, 
I ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me rush this along because I don't 
think you can answer Mr. Stirling's question, but I would just 
like to make the point that I think Mr. S ing's question is 
very valid. 
I think that, if you look at the logical extension of 
what we've heard, there's a constitutional right for a man to 
have a child and for a woman to have a child. If you look at 
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abortion as one situation that has developed and become 
widespread at one time, abortion was in the closet and done in 
back rooms alley ways. It became increasingly accepted as a 
legitimate r of a woman. Now we've gotten to point where 
public policy, luding constitutional law, dictates that a 
woman has a right to an abortion, whether or not she can pay for 
it. It's been consistently upheld by the courts, and that's one 
of the real biting conflicts between the Legislature and the 
courts because the Legislature constantly refines and limits 
abortion rights but the courts constantly expand them. I'm 
thinking that we need to address this as it pertains to 
surrogates at some point. Perhaps you can't address it, but I 
think it's a legitimate question. 
DR. KELLOGG: I think it is. 
There is one way I -- something slipped into my act, and 
I've kept it because there are two sides. There is the AID, 
the donor insemination if the man is infertile. There is the 
surrogate on the other side of the coin if the woman is 
infertile. However, what I've found is that on one side it takes 
minutes. On the other side, it takes nine months. 
By the way, the donor who gives his sperm to the sperm 
bank is paid. I don't know whether you know that. He is paid 
less, but then it takes less of his time. 
isn't 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: That's just a biological 
? (Laughter) 
DR. KELLOGG: That's right. 
UNKNOWN : But he can make a lot of depos 
(Laughter 
DR. KELLOGG: Yes, you can make a of depos s in 
nine very seriously, you see, we so-called 
"borrow" the egg, we must borrow with it the incubator. That, of 
course, is the difference in the whole thing. It's an enormously 
involving thing on their part. 
I don't know what is the right amount of money. When we 
set up the program, we didn't know what was the right amount of 
f s were already out in the field. How do 
you pay somebody -- what amount is a fair amount for ten or 
eleven or twe or fourteen month's involvement on someone's 
time? If you break it down that way, it doesn't sound quite as 
big as when it in a lump sum, I think. 
The lives are terribly interrupted. They spend a lot 
of time in and out of the doctor's offices. Insemination doesn't 
seem to go easily. 
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I don't 
you. Someone 
what 
got to come 
amount 
a 
I 
answer on one. 
I know agency 
determine the factors -- the 
adoptive parents and match them 
mother. Does that happen at all 
DR. KELLOGG: Yes. It certain does, as 
possible. It's funny. One time we were accused of racist, 
and I just did a double take because, in a real sense, we 
were probably the least racist -- the anything -- because 
we are sort of making children to order. Right now, in case you 
know a Chinese surrogate, I'm looking one; I just want you to 
know that I'm looking ... 
look. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Wait just a 
(Laughter) 
1 11 
DR. KELLOGG: The thing that is kind marve 
this system is that the people can have some say about how 
child will look. For instance, if the wife of the couple is 
a 
feet one inch, we're not going to get a six-foot tall surrogate 
for her, or if she's very fair, we're not going to get someone 
with an olive complexion. There is much more than that, but 
sometimes with the private adoption, if the couple has been 
looking for a year or a year-and-a-half, they hardly find a young 
lady who matches their wants and say, "Just a minute, I'm going 
to put you on hold and find five others and see which one's best 
looking." They usually say, "Eureka, I have found my baby!" 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But there is some of that 
consideration in this area. 
DR. KELLOGG: Also, some we can are 
very exciting. We can establish, to a extent, whether 
we're talking about a bright woman. We can discover whether 
we're talking about someone who is psychologically pretty sound. 
We can talk about whether she's going to take sically good 
care of herself through the pregnancy, how she's going to eat, 
what sort of drugs and stuff. From le's of , 
there is some reassurance that this child of irs that will be 
coming is going to be born by a woman cares how she is 
bearing their child. They find this very significant and very 
helpful. 
Another role that I serve is that I 
Although my surrogates meet once ir 
delivery -- and most of the surrogates have 
into the delivery room -- the coup can call 
say, "Hey, Dr. Kellogg, is she still 
properly? Is she going to give us our 
place -- a year is a very long time have 
hanging out there and waiting. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRI : One final que 
ASSEMBLYMAN Rave 
the been , 
combinations or upon something the case 
learned years later -- hearing defect, 
therefore, you were the person who put 
-- and, 
? I mean 
happens in other areas? 
DR. KELLOGG: Well, I hear what you're saying. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I'm just wondering. Is that 
foreseeable? Is that a possibility? 
DR. KELLOGG: I think it's a possibility, and our 
numbers are not significant. I don't know whether you're 
married, and I don't know whether you have children. I think all 
of us who are biological parents or any other kind of parents 
take a chance when we have a child. You don't have a guarantee 
the way your baby is coming out. 
ASSEr.mLYMAN STIRLING: Oh, I appreciate that. 
DR. KELLOGG: My sense of most of these couples -- as 
long as we're totally as straight as we possibly can be with them 
-- is that we're not going to run into that. They want to be 
parents, but they're willing to be realistic parents. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I think that may be a little naive 
because I think people develop expectations, particularly if you 
go back to your earlier comment about being able to pick and 
choose and say, "Well, you know, I want the baby to kind of look 
like this, and so on and so forth." People develop those 
expectations. It's a contract, and they've pa for it, as 
opposed to just taking their chances with a natural circumstance. 
They have a s where they want everything exactly like 
expected to be, and if not ... 
MS. BERGER: Mr. Stirling, may I answer something from 
an adoptive s point of view? 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Be as f as can. I've 
kind of led us off in a different direction than the Chairman may 
want to go, so I ize, but ... 
attempt 
Jewess. 
A great 
son has 
hair. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, that's fine. 
older son was a 
The rth 
was a lot of mixture on the birth 
deal of American Indian is included; 
very almond s. He's a gorgeous child. 
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An 
was a Poli 
father's side. 
, my older 
He has dark 
• 
My baby 
average height. 
the Anaheim Rams as a 1 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: How 
(Laughter) 
Ra s? 
was 
him on 
years. 
then! 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: They'll be back in Oakland way before 
(Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: You have to understand that 
Chairman is from Oakland. (Laughter) 
MS. BERGER: In other words, I think ..• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Don't waste money buying season 
tickets for next year. (Laughter) 
MS. BERGER: Our idea of average and her idea of average 
must have been about a foot apart. Hey, we got two gorgeous 
sons! It doesn't matter. They're our kids. 
DR. KELLOGG: But, the interesting thing -- and I've 
been watching them both since birth -- you know what people do? 
People look for the similarities, rather than see her very 
dark-haired son and her very blond-haired son -- they are 
different in coloring -- the thing that people say is "My, 
have such two large babies." So people will reach that 
is comfortable. People don't want freaks; they really want 
acceptable people. That's what they go for. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, ladies, I want to thank all of 
you for the insightful testimony that 've given. Certainly 
that which comes from personal experiences is most helpful. We 
can get all the technical data we want, but it's hard getting 
some particular insights from people who are actually 
experiencing the difficulties of dealing with this. I apprec 
your willingness to come forward and share your experiences. 
Thank you. 
DR. KELLOGG: Thank you very much. We are available 
when you need us. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. All right. May I have 
Karen Lane, David Leavitt, Theodore Eckerman, and Francis 
Pizzulli? 
MR. PETER JENSEN: Mr. Chairman, Assemblyman Stirling, 
I'm Peter Jensen with the State Bar of Californ I want to 
just briefly introduce our witnesses, if I could, and give you a 
little background. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Sure. 
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MR. JENSEN: We asked two committees to take a look at 
the issue re addressing today, our Committee 
and our Ethics Committee. The Ethics Committee is still seeking 
to investigate some of the issues s area, and 
we will have some for you at time 
We do have today, though, a witness from our Adoptions 
Committee, Karen Lane, and the chairman of that committee, John 
sner, who will answer specific questions for you. Happily, we 
are only focusing on those particular legal questions. 
The Adoptions Committee, Mr. Chairman, has been involved 
this issue several years and has investigated all of the 
literature -- general and legal literature -- in this area. It 
has specifically analyzed the legislation before you and can give 
you some specific feedback on the particular provisions therein. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'd like to mention one point. Ms. 
Young indicated to me an article, "Surrogate Mother's Motivation: 
Initial Findings" by Dr. Phillip Parker. [Exhibit I] It was 
sented in New Orleans in May of 1981 and is included among our 
hearing exhibits today. It gives some insight as to the 
motivation of the woman who would in fact be willing to carry a 
child to term for an adopting couple. In just reading it briefly 
whi the witnesses were testifying, I found that it does give 
some interesting perspectives on that issue. If anyone wants to 
enlarge own understanding of this, then I would certainly 
recommend the article. 
Now, me ask one question before your witnesses 
testify. Have you looked at this issue in light of this 
specific bill? If so, I would like your comments to include 
that. If not, then let us know that they are general comments 
that don't neces ly pertain specifically to the bill that is 
at hand. 
MS. KAREN LANE: I'm Karen Lane, repre the State 
Bar Committee on Adoptions, and our comments are both general and 
specific. We have responded almost part by part to Assemblyman 
Roos' bill. Many of the modifications in the bill have been at 
our direction, and we will continue to comment here. 
The Committee on Adoptions does support legislation 
which would approve surrogate parenting. We feel that the direct 
benefit is that it would permit parties to get the protections by 
virtue of that law and also get out from under prohibitions 
that exist, as has been pointed out earlier this morning. 
f and really, I would like to 
begin -- has to do with the fact that all morning long, we have 
really heard a very interesting direction the testimony. 
Everything that has been pointed out so has been from the 
standpoint of one program: one surrogate foundation. I will 
that without knowing more about it, I will defer that the 
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expertise and the 
reputable and 
not just izing s 
is not going to be a one-program Cali 
we have to be extremely careful to 
bill goes into effect that allows any 
with much less expertise, to be involved. 
adoption in general -- there are very few 
expertise in adoption as a part of the 
handles an adoption here and there; 
ramifications in doing so. 
of answers 
California, 
s to 
California who have 
ld. Every attorney 
would know the 
With that as a beginning, I would 1 to point out some 
of the problems that may occur in expanding s to anyone who 
will be involved. One of the indirect bene s that doesn't have 
to be addressed by the act itself is that, in keeping with what I 
just said, by having an act like this, many attorneys may feel 
more comfortable getting involved. This should bring down the 
excessive fees; there would be more "competition." I'm not 
talking about advertising. We'll get to that-- either I or Mr. 
Leavitt will talk about that. I think that excessive attorneys' 
fees should come into play because of more involvement by people. 
One of the important things that I note in the bill 
itself, and the committee would like to point out, is that much 
of the bill is treated in a contract environment. We would very 
much, and have recommended this before, like to see the bill 
treated from an adoption procedure standpoint. One of the most 
important things that we just will not go along with is who and 
where. We feel that jurisdiction should only be assumed over 
California petitioners, just like it is in any other adoption 
situation. I do not believe that we are intending to open up 
California to anyone in this whole country, luding Michigan, 
to have those people come here, sign a contract, make a baby, 
then turn around and go home. Who oversees ? We strongly feel 
that ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How do we 1 
understand. I know what you're saying. 
that? I don't 
MS. LANE: By saying that the j sdiction is assumed by 
where the petitioners reside. If they are California res , 
fine; they can file here. Every adoption petition in this state 
can only be filed in the jurisdiction the petitioners 
reside. We cannot file if a couple from Kentucky wants to adopt 
a California baby. They do not file the petition in 
California. It's not a California court that oversees the whole 
process; it's a Kentucky court, and they have to comply with 
Kentucky laws. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm not sure this is that simple, but 
I'm listening to you. Go ahead. 
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1 
waiver, but I don't think that there should be a waiver. Again 
you are not dealing all the time, or can project that you are 
dealing, with a program or group that has se. As 
young ladies pointed out, they may or may not have retained 
separate counsel. At the , the attorneys who are probably 
approaching them are the adopting parents'. I think it is 
adversary in that they really have much more of an interest. How 
can one contract be objectively handling the situation for both 
parties? 
Even more particularly, there are a couple parts of the 
bill that just have no clarity and absolutely need it. The issue 
of insurance. How much insurance, for ~vhom and why? Monetary 
compensation -- how open-ended are we going to be? Does that 
mean if I have $100,000 -- and want to spend it -- I can go find 
someone for $80,000. When I say "competition within the legal 
field," I am not implying that this should be advertised as the 
highest bidder. I really do not believe that there should even 
be a prohibition waived as to advertising for this, any more than 
we can solicit in California and advertise for a mother already 
pregnant. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me make sure I understand. You're 
saying there should or should not be any •.• 
MS. LANE: I think there should not be advertising any 
more along those lines ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, I'm talking about a limitation on 
fees; I want to make sure I understand that. 
MS. LANE: I feel that there should at least be a 
ceiling. I think that it certainly stands to reason that you can 
have a surrogate who doesn't want a lot of money, and that's who 
you're really looking for. Many times, what I'm sure will happen 
in the future, is a couple will come and say, "We found a mother 
who wants to be our surrogate." It's not going to be vli thin a 
program, where you build your surrogate mothers, you build your 
clients, and you match them together. It's going to be very much 
like an adoption opportunity. "We found a pregnant woman, and 
she's like us." Now what happens? The prospective surrogate 
comes to the attorney. That's where it may start. 
Actually, as far as the nine-month screening process --
yes, it may be wonderful, but she's relinquishing before she's 
even inseminated. All her rights have to be established before 
the psychological screening, because she already-- it's too 
late. That's an issue there. I do feel that at last separate 
counsel will insure some protections. 
Again, as to monetary compensations -- perhaps a 
ceiling, or at least to set up more particularly what we are 
looking at, so that we don't start playing a real money game 
here, which I don't think it was intended to be. Again, this 
could direct that it is. 
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rebuttable s 
the father. But 
that the husband should at least, we're compromise 
sign that he is aware of the situation because no matter what 
happens, it could still fall that the re il s back to 
What if she comes out here and the husband is in 
Louisiana and doesn't even know what she's do You're dealing 
with family relationships, and I think, at least, should be 
mutual awareness, even if he is not going to to consent to 
she does so we don't have legal actions later, where he 
comes in and says, "But, I'm the father; I know it and want to 
prove it." That would be helpful. Aga , wouldn't 
happen with this foundation; but, you know, the lems that 
occur in all kinds of law are not from the 
what they're ing anyway. That's an unfortunate 
We're trying to protect us all. 
We are trying to have some kind of overs 
social service. We changed an order in the bill 
is filed with the court, it should be 
be some social service or even court process, 
conciliation court, which oversees the kind of unique 
would be lved here. 
to 
We are again depending on what 
sure about the need 
what would take place 
1 
soc 1 workers 
motivation and 
many of our m 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Yes. 
MR. JOHN R. BEISNER: Before we go to Mr. 
John Beisner, of the State Bar 
One icular point that I would to 
of the comments that have 
indicated a contract to 
I don't think we conceive of 
ld. conceive s as a contract 
The would become the respons 
regardless of the health of the child. 
The 
it indicates 
point indicated is 
a contract approved 
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include. So, inference, if nothing else, is that 
contract as presented to court is approved at that first 
court hearing. We're basical suggesting that that 
to be fi so that the court does not get into the approval 
process of the contract at the initial presentation of the 
petition to the court -- the initial review 
The court would then become involved. The court wou 
retain j sdiction of the interpretation of the contract through 
the initial petition up to the finalization of the adoption. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a question. There is, 
obviously, an analogy between a so-called traditional adoption 
and a surrogate adoption. It doesn't necessary follow complete 
down -- in fact, it doesn't follow completely down the line. We 
have very detailed rules for normal adoptions. Do you think this 
legislation should be general or should it be even more detailed 
than the bill that's before us? 
MS. LANE: I believe that the committee feels that it 
should be as detailed as possible. If we don't have the answers 
to as many of the problems that could arise, then it would be 
worse to have a bill that doesn't deal with that. 
One of the things that we would, again, like to avoid is 
a dual kind of jurisdiction. We feel that the family court --
the adoption court -- should be the one to oversee it all and not 
take this as a separate contract action. "Well, heck, we lost 
the family senseJ let's go over to contracts and just sue on 
breach of contract." 
I think it's important to set out who has jurisdict 
and what procedure should be followed. 
MR. BEISNER: We have realized that, basically, there's 
no way that we're going to put a bill together to cover all the 
problems. There can't be a bill put together to cover all the 
problems because, as you have indicated, you ask a question which 
leads to additional questions, as opposed to a determination of 
answers. As more things get added, obviously, more questions are 
going to be asked. The point, we feel, is that, in general, we 
realize that surrogate parenting is a fact and is going to go on. 
We do believe that there should be legislation. We believe that 
the legislation should be so that the courts are involved in the 
control of the system and as early as possible, preferably prior 
to insemination. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you think the legislation is timely 
or premature? 
MR. BEISNER: Timely. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Leavitt. 
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. Cha 
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I have 
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are an appropriate method of curing some of 
infertility, and there really is no reason 't 
, a nagging that we are opening up a 
Pandora's box of problems that are just horrifying. I have been 
trying, as I am sure you have, to reconcile these two 
considerations in my own mind. 
I've to a number of seminars. I 've heard 
everybody talk who's ever talked on the ect, and we have had 
hearings and meetings the State Bar committee and all the 
rest. My feeling is that it is premature to draft legislation. 
As chairman of a maior committee, I am sure vou are of 
how difficult it is-to draft good legislation in ;ny field, and, 
in this field, consequences of the proposed legis ion just 
cannot be divined. 
I with the State Bar Committee on Adoptions that, 
than s a contract s we are 1 
a quasi-adoption situation. There are one or two iples of 
the adoption law that I think are applicable I think one 
of the reasons that there is the of the notion of a 
surrogate fear of the that in 
adoption f we recognize it as proper, even 
and moral and ight, for a woman who is ace lly pregnant to 
place her with a suitable cannot have 
so that that couple can adopt the ld, give it a and 
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together But underlying the adoption 
Penal Code, which says that, whi you can 
expenses of the girl who places her child for adoption, you can't 
buy the baby. I think that we are struggl with the 
notion of buying the baby, on the one hand, and giving a gift of 
life, on the other. 
Now, we have had sses Dr. 
We had this very lovely surrogate mother 
motivation. She had three children; she 
thinks everybody should have the j of 
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-46 
us many ago 
is a woman who 
babies, who ls at 
feels 
s is 
similar to an adoption, that is 
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In the surrogate parent situation, we are running into 
the problem of paying a fee for a service akin to a baby. It is 
clearly against the law to pay a fee for a baby, and I think the 
hang-up here is paying the fee for the service. I find that 
"over the line." I see no objection to defraying the reasonable 
expenses of the mother. I'm not saying, necessarily, that I 
disagree with the payment of the fee, I just -- that's where I 
get hit in the gut, the idea of the fee being paid for the 
service of making a baby. 
This leads me to one of the major objections to the 
bill. I think that something must be built into any legislation 
that is going to set up certain qualifications for surrogate 
mothers. I think, for example, they absolutely must be over a 
certain age, which is a mature age. I believe they ought to be 
required to have another child first. I don't think that's an 
unconstitutional requirement because it is rationally and 
reasonably related to a proper public purpose, and that is that a 
woman not get herself into something she maybe doesn't 
understand. I think that the experience of giving birth is such 
a unique experience in the life of a woman that it may safely be 
said that a woman who has never given birth before cannot 
intelligently and knowingly enter into a contract to do it and 
know what she is doing. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: If we do not in fact eliminate the 
legality of a fee in these contractual relationships, then would 
you agree that you ought to put limits on it? Is that a prospect 
that would logically follow in terms of your ... 
MR. LEAVITT: 
years, and my thinking 
unquestionably you can 
you might replace lost 
My thinking isn't clear. I have devoted 
is still not clear. I think 
pay legitimate expenses. Unquestionably, 
income. A modest -- I don't know. 
You see it's the line between something you are 
purchasing, a marriage and an assignation. I mean I don't want 
to characterize it that way because it is something different 
from that. One of the things that bothers me, as Mrs. Lane has 
said, is that you are going to have Surrogate Mother magazine, 
which is a compendium of pictures, of cuties who, for a price, 
will get pregnant. I don't think we want in California, or 
anywhere else, to make a life's career for some women of having a 
baby for nine months and three months vacation and then another 
baby. They can spend a lifetime having babies, $25,000 a year. 
I am not sure that that's a proper occupation for us to license 
or regulate or permit in California. 
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I can example, again with Surrogate Mother 
magazine se thea 1 agents -- are we going to 
license parent agents? Fellows who 11 go out with a 
string of women and negotiate for them? The commercial 
aspects s just scare me to death, and act self is 
utterly silent as to who can be a surrogate. The idea of 
psychological screening -- that is kind of a pat phrase which is 
in the statutes -- but what in the world is psychological 
screening? I don't have to tell you in litigation we find 
psychiatrists on fifteen sides of every issue. You can prove 
anything if you get the right psychological counselor, and it 
sn't help here. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt and ask all three of 
you who have test1fied thus far whether or not you feel there is 
any constitutional problem. I was asking about married women in 
terms of their ability to serve as surrogate mothers and whether 
or not there were any legal limitations, i.e., the husband or 
whatever. Do you think it's clear? 
MR. LEAVITT: Stanley v Illnois [405 U.S. 645 (1972)] 
says that the father of a child has certain constitutional 
rights. The non-father of the child, I don't think has 
constitutional rights to that right. Of course, we talk in 
California of "presumed" fathers in Section 7004 of the Civil 
Code. Presumed fathers are usually actual fathers. You can 
rebut the presumption if he is her husband but not the father. I 
don't think that is a right of constitutional dignity. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Beyond that though, you would not see 
any rights that the husband of the surrogate mother would have as 
to this whole transaction? 
MR. LEAVITT: I don't see that the Constitution would 
prevent the Legislature from dealing him out. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You don't think he would have legal 
rights for consortium or anything? 
MR. LEAVITT: I think the Legislature could deal him 
out. The Legislature has dealt out alienation of affections and 
a few of those old torts, you know, and I think they can deal 
that one out also. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, that answers my question. 
MR. LEAVITT: One thing that Mr. Handel presented to the 
Committee describing s contract absolutely disturbs 
I can imagine. Mr. Handel said, "Well, we 
have a contract that says if the surrogate changes her mind, we 
are going to sue her for damages, punitive damages, emotional 
distress." How in the world can any lawyer in the entire state 
of California permit an unpregnant woman to sign a contract that 
might set her down in that courthouse for five years, jury 
trials, s, s' fees, agony and distress? 
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I mean, until you have been a party in a lawsuit, you 
could never know how horrible it is. Justice Cardozo, I think, 
once said that, next to his own funeral, he would a 
party in a lawsuit. How in the can we have some young 
woman, who is trying to do something noble, at risk that if her 
circumstances change, if something comes out of left field that 
she didn't anticipate and she can't go through with it, she is 
going to be tied up in the courts forever and God knows where she 
can get the money to pay the damages or the attorneys' fees. I 
think that's wrong. 
The State Bar Committee on Adoptions has opposed, and I 
agree, the idea of specific performance -- that babies should be 
dragged from their mothers' custody kicking and screaming, no 
matter what kind of a contract they signed. We have had a law in 
this state for years that the grown-ups cannot bind the child on 
a waiver of support, for example. The child himself has an 
independent right to have his support and custody and welfare 
considered by the court. 
Another thing that really bothers me here also is 
this doesn't talk about the paramount interest of the child. 
Fundamental to all our child custody laws is the paramount 
consideration of the welfare and best interests of the child. 
This thing just ignores it completely. 
For example, suppose the husband gets the surrogate 
pregnant and his wife dies. Suppose he's sent off to prison. 
Under this bill, if the surrogate wants to keep the child, she is 
liable for damages to the husband whose wife died and who doesn't 
have a mother for the baby. No court can really interfere. I'm 
not really sure that we should have a bill that utterly ignores 
the interests of the baby, and yet that's what does. 
So, I think it is premature. We're making babies. What 
this bill says, in effect, is that we are going to make babies 
that weren't there before. Intentionally, we're going to make 
new people and they are going to have entire lives to live, 
either as burdens on society, benefits to their parents. They 
are going to have to mature, be educated, be supported. Somebody 
once said it costs a hundred and some odd thousand dollars to 
raise every single child. And, we are going to make one, and I 
don't think we dare make one unless some very serious questions 
have been answered. I haven't even heard approaches to the 
answers this morning. 
CHAIR¥~N HARRIS: Yes, sir. I appreciate your 
testimony. Thank you. 
MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Eckerman, please. 
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expanding at a very rapid rate. I have heard no reference to the 
situation I understand, and I'm assured by gynecologists 
that is coming along the line) wherein a woman makes an 
election to have a child, where she perhaps may have some 
birth-bearing impediment but the physicians extract egg from 
her ovary. is fertilized, perhaps by her husband, and in 
turn is placed in a surrogate. That is going to be one of the 
next steps in s legislation. Of course, it s not into 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I was ask myself what would happen 
if the adopting parents were killed an automobi accident 
prior to the birth or the delivery of the baby? I was just 
wondering about estate matters and other kinds of things. This 
is really getting complicated. 
I appreciate the testimony, sir . 
Mr. Pizzulli and Ms. Bernhard. 
MR. FRANCIS C. PIZZULLI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
giving the Bioethics Committee an opportunity to present their 
views today. I might first specify that these are the views 
the Bioethics Committee solely and not those, at this time, of 
the Los Angeles County Bar Association. 
I want to preface several things here. First, we do 
have a report today, and we would request that that be made 
of today's hearing record. [Appendix A] 
CHAIR}~N HARRIS: Before you te fy, would you 
introduce yourself again, even though I did it, just for the 
record? 
Sure. Francis Pizzulli and Linda 
Bernhard, me, the cs Committee. This 
an inter-disc linary committee composed not only of lawyers 
physicians, philosophers, and soc 1 scientists. 
There are questions, I think, that you, Mr. 
is 
but 
Chairperson, have raised today that we would like to put our 
comments in context and those primarily being: Is this 
legislation premature? Are there constitutional problems? 
are we to have in terms of remedies? 
What 
As we understand this bill, two primary facets of it 
involve authorizing remedies for enforcement of the surrogate 
contract, either through specific performance or for damages, 
and, in cases of custody dispute, that instead of Section 4600, 
which applies in all custody disputes outside of this -- which 
looks to the best interests of the child to determine who should 
get that child -- the provisions of this contract would govern. 
I might qualify that the interests of the child are not to be 
considered absent extraordinary circumstances, wh are not 
specified in the bill. We believe , without these 
provisions, the bill as currently constituted really loses all 
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the provis b 11, that we are many courts 
wrest away a newborn child from a natural give it to 
someone so on the is of a contract. ink the reason 
that the best sts of child standard is excluded is 
probably because in normal situations the child would be left 
with the only human being that it is bonded to at that point in 
time, absent a finding that the surrogate mother has suddenly 
become a very unfit mother, which presumably would not have been 
found ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Would the court require the return of 
the fee? 
MR. PIZZULLI: We believe, and I would like to point 
out, there s an area which is appropriate for an analogy. I 
think Mr. Leavitt was suggesting it. There are existing statutes 
which we think provide guidance in this area. They are Civil 
Code Sections 43.4 and 43.5. They say that there is no cause of 
action for a breach of a promise to marry, and that applies not 
only to breach of contract remedies. For example, in the mid 
'50s, the California Supreme Court said, "Well, if someone really 
jilted someone and fraudulently promised to marry them, we may 
consider a tort remedy for fraud." I suppose the proponents of 
this bill are saying intentional infliction of emotional distress 
in punitive damages. Now, 1959, Legislature stepped in 
immediate to correct that and enacted Section 33.4, which said 
, even if fraudulent promise to marry or promise 
to cohabit, 11 is no cause of that may lie. 
Of course, the logical extension of a 
a promise to cohabit, which is a euphemism in a 
sexual relat , is a promise to bear a child. I 
questions should be asked is, if we don't 
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even area. 
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received as a re of a 
, if an expensive 
And, I would assume that if an analogy 
fees s were given to the 
the baby, that perhaps there is a rest 
"resti " meaning non-enforcement of 
se to marry, 
part for 
think one of 
low breach 
ld in this 
the cases under 
property 
For 
it 
, if 
decided to 
We that, because of these with the 
remedies and also the constitutional problems (and I guess has 
-52-
been perceived earl ) , 
there is a requirement 
court can actually 
do not suggest that 
abort, or a 
the child, for example, 
we have to ask ourse s 
money damages as penalties Is it constitutional 
her to keep the child if that is something 
originally? Probably, I would suspect, 
forms of penalties for the exercise of 
therefore we have const ional problems 
scovers that 
hand 
to have 
to now require 
't bargain for 
those are still 
to , and 
One thing I would like to stress, because I th as 
Assemblyman Roos prefaced this bill, he referred to existing 
alternative lifestyles. What we perceive is a fference between 
a laissez-faire situation, in which we permit people to make 
promises to marry, which they can then breach -- to have 
surrogate parenting contracts, which they can then breach. That 
is one thing. It is another thing for the State to step in, 
affirmatively promote and authorize a program, and regulate it 
because, once it does that, is state action and that's when 
you start raising constitutional issues. 
One, for example, raised earlier by the Chairperson and 
other people, is what if we have a single person who wants to 
avail themselves of this way of having a baby. Reference was 
made to feminists who go to sperm banks. We believe that there 
are serious constitutional issues in this bill restricting or 
precluding single people from having access to that technology. 
Under cases such as Eisenstadt v Baird (405 U.S. 438 (1972)] and 
other ones, the developments of the concept are that first 
married peop have the right to contraceptives and then single 
people have the right to contraceptives, and in intimate 
decisions regarding whether to bear or beget a child, the Supreme 
Court has not found a great distinction between married people 
and single people up to this point in time. So that, while under 
existing pol single people may do s, once this slation 
comes in, ch only allows infertile couples to have , we see 
a constitutional problem there. 
Therefore, among other reasons, we think it advisable to 
perhaps consider a Michigan approach, which is, to the extent 
that people do perceive a criminal prohibition on this sort of 
thing, maybe the thing to do is to erase criminal sanctions but 
perhaps reconsider whether the State, at this , ought to 
involve itself in such detail or such abnormal remedies in a 
field, which even, I think, Dr. Kellogg said that they still need 
time to study what these surrogate mothers -- psychological 
attributes. We need long-term studies. She said, "We need to be 
able to it to find out the information." I that. 
However, perhaps, the legislation should wait 
information and sociological study is uncovered. 
There are several other minor points sented in our 
paper. I believe, again going to the constitutional ssue, the 
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ses a of issues there. 
I bel the other points we have to raise have 
covered were discussed somewhat by s 
idential of records, separate counsel, the matter of fees, 
whether it should be handled by the Department of Social 
Services, and whether in fact there should be a relation in 
connection the fees as to how much the middle le, 
lawyers or , get as opposed to the surrogate. 
There is one final question. It is not clear to 
Bioethics Committee at this time whether in fact it is all that 
easy to just make an exception under the baby-selling statutes 
s practice. That would obviously be the eas st solution 
to permit to go on whi we gather more information, I 
think the enforcement stance is now that no one is being 
prosecuted. Probably it is not a very abusive situation. 
Surrogate Parent Foundation has seemed to have acted in a 
non-abusive way. But, I do believe that Mr. Leavitt's comments 
are very cogent, and that is Section 273 of the Penal Code is 
concerned about economic coercion -- going to court, women 
are desperately in need of financial resources and have something 
to give; that is, a child. I am not sure that the pol s 
behind there can so easily be accommodated by allowing surrogate 
where is a substantial fee paid the services. 
to our original presumption, and 
problem with the approach of 
We do not see this as a for 
s. s is motherhood, and those are 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Ms. Bernhard, would you 1 
MS. LINDA BERNHARD: No, I think he's 
bases I would have mentioned. 
to add 
all of 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You are the best witness today! 
{Laughter) 
Let me thank you all very much for 
more witnesses in 
at this point is to break 
five s. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We 11 
the hearing. now go to our 
Those witnesses are ssor Herbert 
William Levada. Would you come forward, 
afternoon session of 
of witnesses. 
Monsignor 
gentlemen? 
I also want to introduce my colleague, Assemblyman 
Alister McAlister, from my county as well as Santa Clara County. 
He has joined us for the afternoon session. 
PROFESSOR HERBERT T. KRIMMEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I'm Herbert Krirr~el. I'm a professor of law at Southwestern 
University School of Law, where I teach jurisprudence and 
bioethics. 
I'd like to thank the Committee for inviting me to 
appear and testify before it, and in deference to the limited 
time which the Committee has to hear oral testimony, I prepared a 
written statement on Assembly BilJ 3771 which I now wish to offer 
for the record. [Appendix B] Consequently, I will confine my 
oral remarks to a brief outline of just two of the major points 
raised in my written statement. I will first address what I 
believe to be the primary ethical problem with surrogate 
parenting, and second, I will identify what I believe to be the 
negative social effects of legalizing such arrangements. 
The primary ethical question with the use of the 
surrogate mothering arrangement is: Is it ethical for someone to 
create a life with the intention of giving it up? This is the 
essence of the surrogate mothering arrangement since the 
surrogate mother provides her ovum to be fertilized and enters 
into the agreement only with the understanding that she is to 
avoid responsibility for the life she creates. It is a 
separation of the decision to create a child from the decision to 
parent that I think poses the major ethical barrier to surrogate 
parenting; that is, the child is conceived in order to be given 
away. The child is not conceived because he's wanted by the 
surrogate mother, but because he can be useful to someone else. 
In other words, fundamentally, surrogate mothering agreements 
involve a change in the motive for creating children, from a 
desire to have them for their own sake to a desire to have them 
because they can provide some other benefit to the surrogate 
mother, normally a monetary one. 
Now, why is so terrible if the surrogate mother does 
not desire the child for its own sake when under Assembly Bill 
3771 there will be an infertile couple eagerly desiring to have a 
child and to be its parents? The problem is that this may not be 
an entirely accurate statement. Most of these surrogate 
mothering arrangements may work out just fine. The child will be 
born normal, and the infertile couple will want But what 
happens when unforeseeably the child is born deformed? Although 
Assembly Bill 3771 mandates that the infertile couple take the 
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mothers and the le couples to these very problems. Both 
groups were troubled with the issue of what to do with the 
deformed The infertile coup s voiced the concern -- "Do 
we have to that?" The surrogate mother said re 
"Well, we don't want to be stuck with it." It was quite c 
that both groups were anxious not to be responsible for the 
undesirable child if at all possible. It is just human nature 
that, when one pays money, one expects value. Things that one 
pays for have a way of becoming viewed as commodities. 
Unavoidable in surrogate mothering arrangements are questions 
such as "Did I get a good one?" Indeed, we see s lar behavior 
manifest itself with the adoption of children. 
Surrogate parenting agreements are concerned with more 
than just the desire to have a child. They are concerned with a 
desire to have a certain type of child. But aren't these the 
same concerns voiced by parents anyway in the normal course of 
having children? I think not. No one doubts or minimizes the 
pain and disappointment parents feel when they learn that their 
child is to be born with a birth defect. Why is it different in 
a surrogate mother situation? The reason is that, in the 
surrogate mother situation, it is possible that neither party may 
feel responsible and both sides may feel they have a legitimate 
excuse not to accept responsibility for the child. The surrogate 
mother might blame the biological father for having defective 
sperm, as might the infertile couple blame the surrogate mother 
a defective ovum or for improper care of the fetus during 
pregnancy. The fact that the matter is settled by legislation 
doesn't prevent there being disputes in court about whether the 
contract has complied th. point is the infertile 
le des a normal child -- not this child in any condition 
-- and the surrogate mother doesn't want it in any event, so both 
sides will feel threatened by the birth of an undesirable child. 
bruised fruit in the produce bin of a supermarket, this 
child is more likely to become an object of avoidance than one of 
desire. 
In ion to this moral problem, are several 
social problems which I think surrogate mothering will cause. 
Among them are the pressures that it will p on the family 
structure. For example, when the child is given up to the 
infertile coup , there are more ies af than mere 
and le coup ld is also 
removed from surrogate mother's have 
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eloquently when asked, "I wonder how many grandchildren I 
have that I've never seen or been abie to hold or cuddle." 
Another area agreements will pose 
problems are 11 result from the 
asymmetry a relationship couple will have 
toward the child. The wife has no biological relationship to the 
child, whereas the husband is also the 's biological father. 
Won't this unequal biological claim on the child be used as a 
wedge in child rearing arguments? Can't we imagine the husband 
being liab to say, "Well, he's my son not yours?n What if the 
couple eventually is divorced? Should custody in a subsequent 
divorce between the adopting mother and the biological father be 
treated equally and simply as a normal child custody dispute, or 
shauld the biological relationship which the father has be given 
greater weight? Assembly Bill Section 3771 does not answer these 
questions. 
Finally, another social problem which could arise from 
the legalization of surrogate mothering arrangements is the undue 
pressure put upon poor women to use their bodies in this method 
to support themselves and their families. Analogous 
exploitations of the poor have arisen in the past with the use of 
paid blood donors, and occasionally the press reports someone 
desperate enough to offer to sell an eye or some other organ. I 
believe that there are certain things which should be viewed as 
too important to be sold as commodities. Hopefully, we've 
advanced from the time where parents raise children from 
profitable labor or found themselves forced to sell them. 
In conclusion, I urge the California Legislature refrain 
from legalizing surrogate mothering arrangements by the passage 
of this or any other bill, primarily because it violates 
important ethical and moral pr iples but also because of the 
social problems that it will cause. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: First of all, if it's happening 
anyway, then why shouldn't we look at that reality and attempt to 
at least make sure that there's a rational process, that there 
are some safeguards, that it doesn't happen helter skelter with 
no logic or no provisions for it? 
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL: Mr. Chairman, the two objections I 
made -- one is to the soc1al ramification -- I think certainly 
careful legislation can help alleviate these problems. 
Concerning the ethical problem, that of divorcing the desire to 
have children from the decision to have them I think is something 
which cannot be remedied by proper legislation. In response to 
your question-- "but it's happening anyway" .•. 
CHAI~1AN HARRIS: That's one of the real constant 
entreaties that we've had, that ... 
PROFESSOR KRI~illEL: I guess the best analogy I can draw 
to that as an answer is that the fact that we accept an 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Although that is one of the arguments 
that's made on behalf of legalizing other intoxicants. 
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL: Yes, it certainly is. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You just reject that. I understand. 
I just want to make sure that's what you're saying. 
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL: That is what I'm saying. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. McAlister, do you have any 
questions? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ALISTER McALISTER: You and I obviously 
share generally a sort of a common approach to cultural and moral 
questions, but, to pursue the Chairman's remarks just a little, 
we know that surrogate motherhood is a reality. There is a 
certain amount of it going on. That may trouble you and me, but 
it is going on. When thes~ children are born, there are then a 
variety of legal questions that arise as to their fate and who's 
responsible them and who's not. From what the proponents of 
this legis , at least, tell us, they apparently see a kind 
of legal jungle there -- a lot of unanswered legal questions --
and they would like to resolve some of those things. At least, 
that's my understanding of their viewpoint. If we don't pass 
legislation, I guess we're going to have a development of a 
certain common law surrogate parenthood, aren't we? Because once 
the child is , then the courts are going to have to decide 
who has what igations to it. 
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL: I dare say the proponents to the 
11 are somewhat concerned about that since the one case on 
point, Doe v Kelley, came up clearly against surrogate mothering 
arrangements as contrary to sound social policy. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I don't know if we can say that it 
clearly came out against it. I'm not sure that we are in common 
agreement in terms of that being the conclusion. 
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL: Well, the judge seemed to consider 
to be baby-selling in the most classic sense. That's only one 
court, obvious 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: I wouldn't want to do anything 
to encourage society faces a real quandary in 
this, as a things though when there are 
ices that occur. How we cope then with that reality? 
Are we better off to say 's illegal -- "We'll have as little to 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. McAlister, there's something I'd 
like to add too that an individual mentioned earlier this morning 
during the course of testimony. It was the situation where you 
have an infertile couple where you take both sperm and the 
egg from that couple and implant it in the surrogate mother so 
that she is simply carrying the child physically but in fact the 
child is the product of the adopting parents or the natural 
parents and you run into those same arguments in that case. 
PROFESSOR KRI~·rnEL: I think the ethics of that are 
somewhat different. That's somewhat more like artificial 
insemination by the father. The fact that •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But you do run into a lot of the same 
legal arguments from the standpoint of who actually is .•• 
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL: You certainly do. I think that you 
face somewhat different ethical problems though. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Obviously, if a child has more 
than two parents, they have a complex life ahead of them. 
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL: Indeed. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Monsignor. 
MONSIGNOR WILLIAM J. LEVADA: My name is William Levada. 
I'm the director of the California Catholic Conference, which is 
an office mainta by the Cathol bishops of California to 
conduct liaison with the agencies of the state government. 
I've given written testimony, which I will not read 
entire , to the members of the Committee, and I submit it for 
the record. (Appendix C] I have other copies if it's useful to 
you. 
My purpose is to address the question that is posed in 
Ms. Young's document prepared for the Assembly Judiciary 
Committee -- "should the California Legislature give its approval 
to surrogate ing arrangements as a matter of public 
policy?" In fact, the bill in the third paragraph states that 
the Legis f and declares that surrogate contracts are 
in accord with sound social policy. In developing this 
rationale, seemed, as I understand from the testimony you've 
heard this morning, many of the people, or most of the people, 
address themselves to the technical issues involved. I will not 
do that. The question of sound social policy, however, as it is 
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It seems to me that the sound social pol ought to 
and give legislative emphasis to support the basic and 
fundamental of society, the family, which is constituted by 
marriage contract entered into by husband and fe, 
committing themselves to undertake a role which is both 
individual and social and provides for the generation and 
nurturing of ldren by which the continuance and development of 
s society are ensured. In our view, the surrogate mother 
concept, the altruistic motive of providing children for 
le couples notwithstanding, contains elements which tend 
rather than strengthen the institutions of marriage and 
society and therefore should be judged contrary to 
upon moral and ethical grounds. It is my 
s fundamental attitude towards marriage and 
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The generative or procreative purpose of marriage seems 
to be violated with regard to the child who issue from this 
surrogate procedure. It's difficult to see how children produced 
this way could avoid being labeled a commodity, a product 
whose natural mother surrendered them for economic 
considerations. Present adoption laws have cons stently and 
correctly sought to diminish and even exclude the mercenary 
aspect of adoption procedures which would treat children as a 
commodity or product. This rationale which is based on our 
primary ethical or moral consideration regarding marriage and 
family is one which we also support. 
I will raise four other issues that have moral 
implications not connected essentially with this rationale. They 
are the concern for the child, adoption, the potential impact on 
young surrogate mothers, and other economic considerations. In 
commenting on a concern for the child, we note that in this 
process the likelihood of a psychological separation of 
responsibility, both on the part of the father whose child is 
being borne by a woman who is not a part of his marriage and 
fami relationship and on the part of the mother who does not 
to keep this child as a part of her family unit, the 
1 relationship and responsibility for the children 
are weakened. We believe that this, together with the desire to 
a child without any possible de -- a child who is as 
as one can arrange -- opens the door to a variety of 
testing procedures and contractual statements which will further 
the push toward aborting undesirable infants. It is not 
neces for me to restate, I don't think, the position of the 
Catholic Church on the sacredness of every life and its 
oppos to abortion, but it would certainly be a concern with 
regard to the present legislation that this legislation would 
contain e that would encourage the extension of abortion 
in our soc 
to adoption, seems to us that, while 
traditionally been the source of ldren for 
s and enables them to fill desire 
responsibilities of a family, the State's 
primary legalized adoption is the provision of homes 
for chi are unwanted or whose parents are unab to 
provide the rearing and education. It is not the State's 
primary concern to provide children les who are infertile 
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the proposed legislation shows 
sensitivity to this social concern, we believe that this 
practice inherently tends to place women in a role of being 
exploited by hiring them to bear a product child and in this way 
lves become part of a potential chain of sons who 
ly contribute to the possible exploitation of ldren as 
well. 
F lly, economic considerations -- I've already alluded 
to the mercenary aspects of the surrogate mother contracts as 
would view the children in question possib as a commodity 
favoring an impersonal context with this most personal 
activities -- marriage and family. The economic aspects 
se serious questions about the wisdom of the proposed 
lation s surrogate contracts would be available only to 
ly well-to-do. Figures c s morning 
I've read range the area of $25,000 for 
contract procedure. It may whether the 
of contracts benefitting such a small element of 
not to involve j 
se contracts and attendant legal 
which would seem to many to be a bias against the needy 
allocation of ted state financial resources. 
Thank you much for al me to 
answer. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You view 
sanction, as opposed to simply a matter 
recognize that these things are happening. 
I appreciate your testimony. It was very helpful. 
I'd like to now call forward John 
The American Civil Liberties Union 
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Let me say, first of all, that there is a fundamental 
policy issue here of whether or not surrogate parenting contracts 
should be zed the state of California as lawful 
contracts. a substantive question of law; the Judicial 
Council takes no position on that one way or the other. However, 
AB 3771 goes far beyond that, specifying certain procedures for 
the court to follow in terms of proceeding with surrogate 
contracts and approval of the petitions that are supposed to be 
filed with the court. 
First, a technical matter, the bill specifies that 
superior court jurisdiction exists and that it is within the 
family law department of the superior court. The Judicial 
Council opposes any legislation that specifies a particular 
department having jurisdiction over a matter, and we think that, 
if it is to be in the superior court, it should simply state that 
alone. The bill further provides that it would have 
jurisdiction ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why is that? Is it because you don't 
want us to deny you the flexibility of assignment? 
MR. DAVIES: Yes, and I think the example that I have 
here ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What about adoptions? There was an 
analogy made earlier that adoptions go to family law court. Why 
shouldn't these? 
MR. DAVIES: Well, there are certain counties that have 
one-judge courts, and they have no departments. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Couldn't we, obviously, amend the bill 
to make an exception for those counties where there is only one 
judge in the court. 
MR. DAVIES: We certainly could. The bill, however, 
provides that all proceedings and actions pursuant to the act 
shall be in the family law department. That could include, since 
the bill also specifies that the contract must provide for legal 
and equitable remedies, that actions for monetary damages for 
breach of contract will be in the family law department and that 
injunctive relief to order someone to have an abortion would be 
in-the family law department. We think that the law and motion 
calendars and the regular civil calendars are appropriate places 
for some of those actions. 
We also have a fundamental question regarding whether or 
not there is a case or controversy in existence under the 
provisions of this act. We have a contract of sorts provided for 
in the act that has no force or effect until approved by the 
court -- until the court has taken some action on the petition. 
At that point, there is no accrued legal, enforceable right. 
There is no other type of contract in which the court becomes 
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for 
have 
don't think there is any urgency associated with giving a 
calendar priority. I would also like to point out that, if you 
remove it from the court process until you actually have a child 
in existence, at birth, you get rid of this problem and there is 
no need for calendar priority. 
We think there are a number of reasons for having a 
process that we have proposed as amendments to the author in a 
general fashion, that would simply provide for establishing the 
medical standards that were referred to this morning and legal 
standards for lawyers to follow. Leave it with the lawyers and 
the physicians to ensure that the statutory standards are being 
complied with in the formation of the contract and its 
implementation, and then provide that upon the birth of the child 
you go into the appropriate court for adoption proceedings. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Your opposition then, 
basically, is not to the subject matter but rather to the content 
of the bill at hand. Is that it? 
MR. DAVIES: That's correct. As to the fundamental 
policy issue, the Judicial Council views that as a substantive 
law matter and takes no position. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Fine. Thank you, Mr. Davies. 
Yes. 
MS. SUSAN NASH: Mr. Chairman, my name is Susan Nash. I 
am here on behalf of the Women Lawyers' Association of Los 
Angeles, and I would like to address some of the fundamental 
substantive issues. 
I have a written statement, which I will submit for the 
record, and let me just say at the very beginning that we 
strongly oppose this bill and we don't pretend to have answers 
for all of the questions that have been raised. [Appendix E] 
What I would like to do today is just point out a couple of the 
things that we think are the major problems ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are you opposed to the subject matter 
or the content? 
MS. NASH: We are opposed to the idea that these 
contracts be enforced in the way that the bill provides. We 
recognize that there should be some legislation. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay So then you are opposed to this 
bill rather than the subject. 
MS. NASH: Right. 
The first problem that we have with the bill is its 
focus on only two of the four people involved. We have heard a 
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s. 
The other lopsided aspect of this bill is the manner in 
which it ignores the interests of the child. By providing that 
the contract shall prevail over the provisions of Civil Code 
4600, which states that custody of a chi must be 
according to the child's best interests, the bill 
the person who is most direct affected by the contract 
s most helpless. While we recognize that the freedom to 
contract is very important, we believe that contractual rights 
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, is statement 
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MS NASH: We are to the of the slature 
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MS. NASH: Let me try and clarify that. We believe very 
strongly ••. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I guess, usually, I have an 
expectation that the idea of women renting their bodies is also 
considered the idea of women controlling their bodies and doing 
with them what they want basically. That's why I was asking 
about that. I understand the second point, but I just wanted to 
make sure I was clear on your first. 
MS. NASH: Well, let me just address that briefly. We 
believe, very strongly, that women should be able to use their 
bodies the way they want to, and we've gone on record stating 
that position with regard to prostitution. But, it's one thing 
to say that women have the right to use their bodies any way they 
want to, and it is another thing to encourage and endorse another 
method for women to use their bodies to make money. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. 
MS. NASH: We can't deny that women have historically 
used their bodies to make money, but we can certainly say that 
the Legislature has never taken the step of endorsing this 
ancient profession. I don't think we need this sort of 
endorsement here. Furthermore, we believe that, once the 
Legislature involves itself in deciding which uses of womens' 
bodies are and are not sound social policy, women will lose the 
right to make voluntary choices of this and other types. 
The third problem that we have with the bill is the idea 
that the court should be involved in monitoring these kinds of 
contracts, not only from the point of view which was just 
presented by the Judicial Council, but also from the point of 
view that once we get the courts involved at a very early stage, 
we have the possibility that the courts will be issuing interim 
orders as to how a woman ought to manage her pregnancy. As with 
the Legislature, we feel that the courtrooms are not a place for 
governing this type of decision. 
The last problem that we have with the bill is the whole 
idea of specific performance. I think that it may very well have 
been intended that the specific performance provisions only apply 
to an order by the court that the woman give up her child after 
its born. It's certainly not clear from the bill that that's 
what "specific performance" means. I don't think that it's clear 
from Roe v Wade that specific performance could not be directed 
at decisions that would be made by a woman during the time that 
she is carrying the child. It is very possible, or at least one 
could make the argument, that a woman, by entering into this 
contract, is waiving her constitutional rights under Roe v Wade. 
We think that, as long as there's any possibility that specific 
performance is applying to that sort of decision, we would be 
unwilling to accept a bill of this nature. 
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implications that I think go along with it. 
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anything of value for 
prevent commercialism from affecting 
her relinquishment. We feel 
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One thing that we feel very strong about is 
psychological and moral implications and ramif 
surrogate parenting. Part of that is coming from, 
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product of this, and that is the child. How would the 
surrogate parenting feel? 
I don't think the issues are much dif 
normal adoption." One of the hardest things for 
trying to understand why they were relinquished. 
I think, for an adoptee, there are problems. I 
at the issues in adoption and have something to go 
ramifications and the implications of surrogate 
going to be down the road. I think that's the moral a 
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think ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: If we remove the fee, s 
care of that problem for you? 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why not? 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. Next witness. 
HS. SUZANNE RUBIN: My name is Suzanne Rubin. I am the 
branch coordinator for Concerned United Birthparents here in Los 
Angeles, which is a national organization representing 
birthparents. I also am a member of the Los Angeles County 
Adoption Council. I am soon to be a representative of Concerned 
United Birthparents on the California Association of Adoption 
Agencies. I am a birthparent who searched, found and has been 
reunited with my daughter. I am also, and I learned this about a 
year and a half ago, the product of artificial insemination by an 
unknown donor. I am in the process of searching for my 
sperm-donor father. I am also the first person in the world to 
start litigation in regard to AID from the child's standpoint, 
myself being the child, although I am now thirty-three years old. 
Professionally, I'm an accountant. 
Many of the issues that Concerned United Birthparents 
takes with the surrogate contracts and the surrogate legislation 
have been echoed by many of the people who have been up here, 
particularly Mr. Pizzulli, Mr. Krimmel, Monsignor, Ms. Schurnmer. 
Our major concerns have to do with the child. They 
to do with the birthparent. They have to do with adoption and 
what adoption means to a family unit, what it can mean. For 
those of us who are involved in adoptions, we see the 
repercussions, twenty, twenty-five, thirty years down the line. 
Adoption is not a simple procedure. I also echo the 
point that adoption was a way to find homes for homeless 
children. Adoption was never meant to be a way to supply 
infertile couples with children. We are very, very aware of 
those couples. Those of us who work in the community can't help 
but be aware of the issues and can't help but be aware of the 
pain and the anguish of not being able to have a child and to 
want a child. However, we would like to state that we don't 
think that the decisions in terms of who is to have a child are 
entirely mortal decisions. Some of those decisions are out of 
our hands, and part of living each of our lives is to come to 
terms with what is and what our limits are as human beings. We 
do not see parenthood as an absolute right. We see it as a gift. 
We see any child as a gift. It's not something that every person 
deserves because they want it. Whether you are a natural parent 
or an adoptive parent, you have been given a great gi and a 
precious gift. 
Some of our other concerns have to do with unresolved 
infertility issues, which are also major issues in the adoption 
community. We see adoptive parents, who have been parenting for 
fifteen, twenty, thirty years and have still not come to terms 
with their infertility. These issues have a tendency to warp and 
to cause great difficulty to the child of such a union. They 
affect parenting abilities and in very subtle types of ways. 
These kinds of issues, if they aren't unresolved, will affect the 
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adoptee's feelings about where they came from, their origins, 
their place in life, and their reason for being. 
In terms of infertility issues and adoption, these are 
concepts which have been gone over and over, and they're 
published in thirty years of adoption research. The idea that we 
don't know what happens when a child feels that they were 
unwanted by the birthparent is ludicrous. We do know. We do 
have statistics. We know what happens to adoptees. We see the 
results statistically. Traditionally, they are not good. We see 
adoptees struggle with the issues of identity, the issues of 
feeling that they were abandoned by their birthparents, the 
issues of "Why me?" and the issues of "Do I really fit in my 
adoptive family?" These are all continuing issues, and they are 
lifetime issues for the person who is adopted. They don't have 
easy answers, and some of these issues are tremendously 
difficult, and this is even when the birthparents had a loving 
relationship, wanted the child, loved the child, lost control of 
the situation, where the decision was taken out of their hands. 
In most cases, birthparents do not wish to surrender children. 
They fight very hard to keep them. 
Even with these considerations, adoptees carry lifelong 
feelings that they were rejected, that they were abandoned. 
These are dreadful things to feel. Having a happy, 
well-balanced, terrific, nourishing, loving adoptive home does 
not completely take away those feelings. We see adoptees who are 
in wonderful family situations, who are very devoted and 
tremendously bonded to their adoptive families, but that doesn't 
take away the pain that we hear and that we see. For those of us 
who are involved with adoptees and birthparents and adoptive 
parents on a daily basis, we hear the same kind of pain over and 
over and over again. This is not something that's new. This is 
something that is documented, and it's part of adoption. It's 
part of the package. 
Now, the problem with surrogate parenting is that we're 
further complicating that package. What we're doing -- we have a 
birth mother who willfully conceives -- essentially contracts out 
to bear a child which she does not want. The question is how 
that child feels about his or her origin -- about his or her 
conception, knowing that his or her own flesh and blood mother 
never wanted them to begin with. She was short of cash. Now, I 
would ask anyone in this room ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I don't know if that's an assumption 
you can make, and I certainly don't want you reaching that 
conclusion for anybody other than yourself. 
MS. RUBIN: I'm saying that that is a very big 
consideration in surrogate parenting. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. 
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MS. RUBIN: I don't 
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CHAIR}ffiN HARRIS: Well, I'm neither Jewi nor 
MS. RUBIN: Well, I am. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm not trying to argue with you. 
Just let me say this -- I want you to state your I just 
don't want you to make that a universal view all of us 
MS. RUBIN: What I'm saying is that, to 
is produced, it matters. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Fine, I accept that. 
MS. RUBIN: One of our other concerns 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, Ms. Rubin, I'm sorry 
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Mr. Fields. 
MR. HOWARD FIELDS: My name is Howard F lds. I'm 
adoptee myself, and I'm here because of my professional 
in AB 3771 because I am an attorney and I'm also an 
the ALMA Society, known as the Adoptees' Liberty Movement 
Association. AL~ffi is the country's largest organization of 
adoptees, birthparents, and other individuals, all of whom 
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legislation would do this by requiring the infertile wife to 
adopt the child of the surrogate parent. Adoption proceedings 
will take place as they have for many years. However, because an 
amended birth certificate will issue, adoptees on reaching the 
age of 18 will still be denied the truth of their origins. We 
therefore have to strenuously oppose this legislation which 
further restricts the rights of residents of the state to know 
their hereditary background. 
Studies have shown that adoptees have a higher rate of 
psychological problems than the population in general. This is 
manifested by the percentage of adoptees who've undergone some 
form of counseling or other therapy -- a percentage greater than 
the population as a whole. Some authors have attributed this 
fact to the denial of essential information concerning the 
adoptee's background. It's not uncommon for the receipt of the 
knowledge of the background to have a cathartic effect vastly 
changing the adoptee's life. 
One of the major problems, as I see it, with AB 3771 is 
that the system of encouraging lies is continued. As long as 
sealed records remain a reality, the Legislature's concern for 
"the best interests of the child" is a hoax. If the Legislature 
is in fact concerned with the best interests of a child, then 
it's time to take an appropriate stand and include in this very 
novel legislation a guarantee of the right of a child to know who 
he is and upon age 18 to have the right to a copy of the original 
birth certificate as well as the contract. Other than that, I 
find it a courageous piece of legislation. These are my personal 
views, and I still think that the child has to be taken into 
consideration and he has the right to know who he came from. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me say, first of all, that I agree 
with you as to the right of the child to know. Assemblyman Bruce 
Young carried legislation on this issue that passed through the 
Assembly but failed in the Senate, about the right of an adoptee 
to know who his natural parent or parents were. I think that's a 
correct piece of legislation and it's certainly one that we need 
to consider. 
By the same token, I'm sure that being adopted does pose 
special problems, and I certainly want to be the first to admit 
that that's the case, but also there are a number of children 
with their natural parents who are subject to child abuse and who 
wish they could be adopted. I think psychological abuse and 
psychological problems in a universal sense always have to be 
looked at with a concern about children, their welfare, and the 
quality of life that they endure. However, I just don't want to 
have a universal statement that all children who are adopted or 
children who are born of surrogate mothers are so psychologically 
burdened that they can't function properly or that they are 
unhappy. I just don't want anyone to reach that conclusion. 
MR. FIELDS: I didn't even state that •.. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I didn't say that you did; that was my 
statement beyond what you said. I said I agreed with you as to 
the need for a child to know who his parents were, and that's all 
I was saying in agreement. 
MR. FIELDS: The only thing the child of a surrogate 
parent contract is going to know is that he was sold, and I think 
he, or she, has the right to know a lot more than that because 
there's a lot more to a person than just being born. It's where 
you came from, and I think that the adoptee has the right to know 
that. I'd love to see this legislation have some amendment, to 
try and slip in the right to knowledge of your heritage. We're 
going this far; we can go a bit farther. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: There're probably some ethical 
implications that would suggest that, certainly, as it relates to 
health and other kinds of concerns. For an individual to know 
something in his biological background may in fact be vital to 
his continued health. 
Mr. McAlister. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Is it possible to say whether 
adoptees who are not aware of the fact that they are adoptees 
have these psychological problems that you've mentioned? 
MR. FIELDS: I'd like to mention something about 
personal background. I didn't know I was adopted until I was 26. 
I'm 31 now, and it did affect me. It affected me only because my 
parents by not telling the truth -- it does affect the entire 
relationship. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: I'm talking about those adoptees 
that don't know that they're adopted. 
MR. FIELDS: What about them? 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Do they have the psychological 
problems that you've mentioned? 
MR. FIELDS: I don't think I'm qualified to state, to 
tell you the truth. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: In other words, you weren't bothered 
until you knew. Is that right? 
MR. FIELDS: Oh, you know. If an adoptive father and 
mother don't tell the truth, the truth of how they got you, 
there's no way that they can maintain that lie for many years 
without the child thinking that something's not right there. 
It's too big of a lie to hold on to. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You just didn't force the issue until 
you were 26. Is that what you're saying? 
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MR. FIELDS: Oh no, I forced the issue. They 1 All 
I'm saying is .•• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You told me you didn't find out unt 
you were 26. 
MR. FIELDS: That's correct. Finally, at age 26, I 
confronted them for the umpteenth time .•• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You forced the issue by the 
were 26 then? 
MR. FIELDS: Yes. Up to that time, they said, "No." 
But what I'm saying to Assemblyman McAlister is that, even if the 
parent doesn't tell, it's very difficult to maintain that secret 
for all those years without the child thinking that something's 
amiss there. 
CHAIID1AN HARRIS: Would any of you like to add anything 
else or react to what's been said? I want to give everybody a 
chance to react to some of my remarks. 
MS. RUBIN: I would like to reiterate what Mr. s 
said in terms of not knowing. I did not know until I was over 3 
that I was not aware that my birth father was not in fact man 
I grew up with. I would also like to say that in my case l 
has also warped the relationship. There are very few children 
who are deceived about things like that. I would also 1 to 
say that the vast majority of adoptees are told. The adoptees 
who are growing up now are told very early. They are aware 
they are adopted. They grow up with the knowledge, and 
issues of not telling -- I know I've got two adoptees si 
here, both of whom learned at relatively much older ages than is 
recommended that they were adopted. I suspect they've both 
strong suspicions all along. 
MR. FIELDS: I'll say that the knowledge of the 
worked wonders on the relationship. 
MS. SCHUMMER: I also am an adoptee and I found out 
later -- not quite as late. When I was 18, I found out. In 
answer to the question, I always knew. I just recently reun 
a family of five siblings, the youngest being 49 years He 
was never told he was adopted, but he always knew. He 
something was amiss. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. I appreciate all of 
testimony. 
We're going to conclude this hearing at this po For 
anyone who has any additional testimony which he's like to t 
in writing, we'll leave the record open ten days. 
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I want to tell you that, regardless of whatever 
disagreement that I might have had on this issue in terms of the 
testimony of individual witnesses, all of the testimony has been 
helpful and all of it will be reviewed very careful 
at this legislation either for purposes of amendment, 
whatever because this is a serious subject -- one that we 
not have had the hearing on if we were not concerned with getting 
as much information and diversity of viewpoint as we could get. 
The Committee, obviously, is going to be 
ann we'll have additional members on it. One of the 
representatives of the State Bar informed me that, , 
are going to be only 15 lawyers in the Assembly so terms of 
the final makeup of this Committee, the issue is not to be 
looked at simply from the standpoint of legal issues also 
from the standpoint of other concerns. I'm sure that the 
Committee will review this record carefully and aware of 1 
the concerns that have been raised here today. 
Again, I'd like to thank all of you for 
participation. This will conclude the hearing. 
# # # # # # 
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contract as to the custody of the child shall prevail over the 
provisions of §4600 -- "the best interests of the child" standard 
absent "extraordinary circumstances." Parts I-II. These 
objections to tNO integral enforcement provisions of the bill --
provisions Nhich motivate various other provisions regarding the 
content of the contract and the procedure for its execution and 
approval -- leave us unable to suggest any simple modifications 
of the bill. We believe that it may prove helpful to compare 
existing statutes (Cal. Civ. Code §§43.4 - .5) Nhich preclude all 
breach of contract and tort remedies (~, fraud) for breach of 
promises to marry or to cohabit, (though permitting restitution), 
and §273, Cal. Penal Code, Nhich expresses a policy against 
economic coercion in "black market baby sales". Additional 
ramifications regarding the surrogate's constitutional right to 
decide to bear a child or to abort should also be revieNed in the 
context of §7511. 
The Bioethics Con®ittee also has criticisms on other 
specific provisions of the bill. Part III. In sum, the 
bill does not strike an adequate balance betNeen the rights of 
the infertile couple and the rights of the surrogate, and the 
interest of the child not sufficiently addressed. This imbalance 
of protection in the sensitive area of family rights and custody, 
exacerbates the inherent situation of unequal bargaining poNer, 
particularly Nhere the surrogate is a person participating solely 
for needed finances. 
I. THE REMEDIES PROVISION OF §7511 IS AGAINST EXISTING 
SOCIAL POLICY AND IS CONSTITUTIONAI;LY-SUSPECT:---
-----------------------------·-
The thrust of leading proponents of the bill is fairly 
clear. Specific performance, or the threat of such equitable 
relief coupled Nith suits for large damages for breach of 
contract and for infliction of emotional distress, are sought to 
give -the infertile couple a superior legal position. They 
contend that this is not a question of sale of children, but 
simply a commercial transaction regarding the rental of a NOmb. 
The statement of these proponents' philosophy is revealing as 
Nell as problematic: motherhood simply is not a mercantile 
exchange. 
A critical problem area is in the case of a surrogate 
mother NhO Nants to keep her neNborn child. Excluding cases of 
in vitro fertilization Nith the adoptive mother's egg, the 
surrogate mother is both the natural and genetic mother of the 
child. The bill NOUld empoNer the court to Nrest a Nay her 
child, not because it NOUld be in the best interests of the 
child, but simply because of the provisions of a consensual 
agreement outside of the bonds and covenants of marriage. 
Indeed, in the absence of neNly discovered evidence of unfitness, 
at the earliest stages of birth the bonding betNeen a natural 
mother and her child militates toNards her retaining custody of 
the child for the best interests of the child. 
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In the converse situation, .vhere the infertile couple no 
longer .vants the child -- .vhether on grounds of a genetic or 
birth defect, that the surrogate's pregnancy .vas unhealthy, that 
the baby looks less like the adoptive father than the surrogate's 
sexual partner, or for other reasons -- specific performance to 
require them to take the child is unavailable as an impermissible 
enforcement of a personal services contract. Thus, unless the 
surrogate mother changes her original intention of giving up the 
child, the child is in a situation .vhere neither natural father 
nor mother desire custody. This .vould impose a cost burden on 
the state, as .vell as a burden on the child. 
The problem of judicial enforcement is heightened by 
use of contractual provisions requiring the surrogate mother to 
regulate her health care (~, smoking or alcohol consumption) 
during the pregnancy. These provisions of a contract invite 
judicial supervision over personal matters that courts are 
neither .vell-equipped nor desirous of engaging in. In contrast, 
in the typical family situation, judicial intervention is sought 
only at the extreme situation .vhen a parent is deemed unfit to 
raise a child based upon affirmative acts of abandonment and 
sanctionable neglect in supervision. Enforcement of contractual 
provisions contemplated by the proponents of the bill, ho.vever, 
.vould involve courts in revie.ving personal matters that .vould 
cover a far .vider spectrum of human activity, .vhich on its face 
may be neither good, harmful nor value neutral. 
In a third context, involving the decision to abort, the 
contractual remedies of both damages as .vell as specif 
performance create constitutional problems as .vell as social 
policy problems. These problems .vould arise principally .vhen 
either (1) the surrogate mother .vants to abort the child or, (2) 
the infertile couple .vants the surrogate mother to abort for, 
say, fear of a genetically disadvantaged child as discovered by 
amniocentesis testing. Enforcement of the infertile couple 
contract rights in each situation .vould directly conflict .vi th 
the surrogate mother's Roe v. Wade rights to decide .vhether to 
abort her fetus. 
While the bill does not make specific performance 
mandatory, the threat of it is a po.verful club to .vield upon the 
surrogate mother, .vho is presumed to be the party in the inferior 
bargaining position. For the proponents of the bill clearly 
intend to raise the specter of damage suits as a means of 
enforcing the contracts. The threat to a surrogate mother of 
la.vsuits brought by la.vyers for the infertile couple -- .vho might 
be the same middlemen .vho originally solicited the surrogate --
may be a more effective means of obtaining specific performance 
of the contracts then seeking such relief directly from the 
courts. The situation is fraught .vith unequal bargaining po.ver 
and dual agency issues. 
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In addition to arguments based on natural laN and 
tradition, the Constitution, and considerations of judicial 
supervision and enforcement, Ne believe another relevant source 
of policy is contained in Civil Code §§43. 4 . 5. Section 
43.5 (d) states: "No cause of action arises for: (d) 
Breach of promise of marriage." We believe that there are some 
parallel considerations regarding the scope of remedies for 
breach of promises to bear a child and to marry, both matters 
going to the heart of the institution of the private and 
autonomous nuclear family. 
Moreover, it appears that the Legislature has acted tNice 
in the related area of promises to marry. The apparent dilution 
of the policy of §43.5(d) in Langley v. S~huma£ker, 46 Cal. 2d 
601 (1956) authorizing tort, as opposed to breach of contract, 
remedied for fraudulent promises to marry, NaS decisively 
remedies by the 1959 enactment of §43.4: 
A fraudulent promise to marry or to cohabit 
after marriage does not give rise to a cause 
of action for damages. 
Property transferred as a result of a fraudulent marriage promise 
can be restored, hoNever, on the theory of preventing unjust 
enrichment, Nithout the necessity of enforcing the promise. See 
generally Boyd v. Boyd, 228 Cal. App. 2d 374 n.2 (1964) 
Of course, peopJe still have the freedom to promise 
marriage to other people and to later decide to go through or not 
go through Nith the promise. Absent, perhaps, an extraordinary 
abuse of the anti-babyselling statute policy (Cal. Penal Code 
§273), infertile couples and surrogate mothers are similarly free 
to enter into surrogate parent contracts. One question might be 
Nhether contracts to bear a child, Nhich are from at least one 
perspective a deeper extension into the family sphere, ought to 
be treated similarly to promises to marry, or Nhether Civil Code 
§§43. 4 and 43.5 (d) should be repealed and for surrogate parent 
contracts to be made similarly enforceable. On the other hand, 
the differences betNeen promises to marry and to bear a child may 
be sufficient to justify different remedies for their respective 
breaches. 
Similarly, Ne beJieve that Cal. Penal Code §273 Nill also 
profit from comparison. To the extent that §273 ibits 
adoptions Nhere the primary motivating factor encouraging an 
actual parent to relinquish parental rights is financial gain, 
(See Comment, Contracts to BearaChild, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 611, 613 
(1978)) 1 and tO regulate blaCk- Irla-rket baby SaleS 1 it appearS that 
a specific exemption as provided for in §7515 of the bill for 
surrogate parent contracts might be inconsistent Nith the central 
policy of §273. This may depend on Nhether §273 is intended to 
apply to natural parents. If, for example, §273 does not 
prohibit a divorced Nife from obtaining custody of a child of her 
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ex-husband's, Nhere she had no prior custody rights, by means of 
offering him, say, $5,000,000 in order to save his car dealership 
teetering on the verge of bankruptcy, then §273 may Nell not 
apply to surrogate parent contracts.* If that is the case, a 
laissez faire approach to surrogate parenting might Nell enable 
the Legislature to obtain additional evidence and long term 
studies on the effects of surrogate parenting before considering 
giving its imprimatur to this practice. 
II. SECTION 7518 IS UNSOUND BECAUSE THE ESTABLISHED 
STANDARD OF "BEST-INTEREST-OF-THECHILD1'-SHOULD 
PREVAIL ALSO nfASURROGATEPARENTING SITUATION. 
Proposed Section 7518 Nhich NOUld dispense Nith the 
provisions of section 4600 requiring the use of the standard of 
"best interest of the child" in custody disputes absent undefined 
"extraordinary circumstances," underscores our concerns Nith the 
imbalance of the bill Ni th respect to surrogate mothers and 
children vis-a-vis infertile couples. 
Section 4600 is clear in its intent to use the interests of 
the child as the focus of a custody dispute. The bill, hoNever, 
endoNS the donor-father Nith greater rights vis-a-vis the natural 
mother than NOUld exist in a dissolution of marriage situation, 
solely by virtue of the surrogate parenting contract. We are not 
persuaded that public policy supports this distinction. 
III. COMMENTS ON VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE BILL. 
A. Section 7502 (a). 
"Infertile couple" is defined, in part, as one Nhich has 
been unable to conceive for one year prior to the date of the 
execution of the contract. This appears to be a standard Nhich 
is not tailored to the specific purpose of alloNing infertile 
<:;:ouples to become parents. It is not too difficult for a couple 
to go a year, through the use of artificial birth control or 
other efforts, Nithout becoming pregnant. It is instead a 
Naiting period to apply for the bill, rather than a medical 
standard for determining infertility. As such, it appears to 
invite abuse. We NOUld recommend that only the standard of 
determination of infertility by a licensed physician be used. 
This NOUld, hoNever, not necessarily resolve the issue for 
homosexual couples. 
* We believe~-1t-unlikely that Cal. Penal Code §181 regarding 
involuntary servitude and sales of persons is applicable to the 
surrogate parenting context as it appears to apply to forced 
labor Nhich is not Nhat is contemplated for the child. 
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The affirmatively stated restriction of the bill to 
infertile couples, as opposed to fertile couples and infertile 
individuals (i.e., infertile single #Omen) raises constitutional 
equal protection issues not present in a laissez faire context. 
The notion of the nuclear family unit does not appear to be at 
the core of the bill, #hich seeks to enforce a procreative 
relationship that goes beyond such a unit. Similarly, the bill, 
#hich authorizes but does not mandate specific performance of the 
surrogate parenting contract, Nithout requiring surrogate mothers 
to be married #omen, impliedly contemplates that in some 
situations a single surrogate mother #ill retain custody of the 
child. If such is the policy, may a single infertile #Oman be 
precluded, say, from using sperm from a sperm bank to inseminate 
a surrogate mother so that she may obtain a child through 
germinal choice? 
c. Section 702(b) 
There is no requirement that the surrogate be either a 
married #oman or a #Oman #ho has previously had children. We 
believe that a study of psychological attributes of #Ould-be 
surrogate mothers might benefit any comprehensive legislation in 
this field. 
D. Section 7504 
We agree that the surrogate mother should be represented by 
separate counsel. We presume that the surrogate may often be an 
individual Ni th limited financial resources. The question of 
state subsidized counsel should be examined. 
E. Section 7505(b)-(cl 
The deletion of these provisions regarding confidentiality 
of records and the identities of the surrogate and the infertile 
couple should be examined in light of analogous adoption la#s. 
F. Section 7 50 6 (}?.}_ 
This section provides for medical evaluation of the 
surrogate mother and the husband of the infertile couple, but for 
psychological screening only for the surrogate. It is unclear 
#hether the suitability of the adoptive home #ill be examined as 
in traditional adoptions. 
With respect to psychological screening of the surrogate, 
#e believe, as indicated above, it might be useful to study 
potential surrogates to analyze #hat are acceptable motivations 
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for being a surrogate, and thereby determining Nhat 
psychological health the screening is to test for. 
G. Section 7506(e) 
We agree that a reasonable monetary 
required to be paid to the surrogate mother. 
ho#ever, are given, particularly in relation to 
attorneys and other middlemen or brokers #ill rece 
H. Section 7509 
The reasons for the deletions in the Legis 
Digest and in Section 7509 of the phrase 
insemination" and its substitution #ith " 
unclear. One apparent reason for this change might 
the scope of the surrogate arrangement to include 
artificial insemination but also insemination by more 
methods. This leaves the bill open to needless cr 
some quarters as condoning adultery. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Bioethics Committee thanks the Judie 
giving it the opportunity to express its vie#s on 
No. 3771. If the Judiciary Committee seeks an 
procreation policies, or to legislate a different 
issue, the Bioethics Committee #ould look #ard 
#hatever helpful resources it has the capacity to 
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APPENDIX B 
J.. 
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR HERBERT T. KRIMMEL" 
REGARDING THE PROPOSED "SURROGATE PARENT ACT" 
** ASSEMBLY BILL 3771 
(CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 1981-1982 REGULAR SESSION) 
In its letter to pro spec ti ve witnesses, the Assembly 
Judiciary Committee outlined several questions that it hoped 
might be answered by the testimony before the committee. 1 
This statement shall primarily address two of those ques-
tions: 
"1. Should the California Legislature give 
its approval to surrogate parenting arrange-
ments as a matter of public policy? and 
2. What long-range impact will surrogate 
parenting contracts have on children con-
ceived by such an arrangement and on parties 
who have entered into the contract?" 
My statement will deal with what I believe to be the 
ethical and social problems of surrogate parenting. And, 
since I believe that these problems are ones which no bill, 
however carefully drafted, could remedy, my comments will 
primarily be concerned with the general problems raised by 
surrogate parenting arrangement, as opposed to the parti-
cular problems raised by this bill. I will leave for others 
the task of objecting to specific provisions within this 
bill. In summary, this statement will outline the ethical 
and social policy reasons against allowing surrogate parent-
ing arrangements, and my conclusion will be that the people 
of the State of California should not sanction or legalize 
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such arrangements by the passage of Assembly Bill #3771 in 
this or in any other form. 
My remarks will be divided into two sections: First, I 
will address what I believe to be the primary ethical problem 
with surrogate parenting arrangements, and second, I will 
identify what I believe to be the negative social effects of 
sanctioning or legalizing such arrangements. 
I. The Primary Ethical Problem of Surrogate Parenting 
Arrangements 
The primary ethical problem with the use of surrogate 
mothering arrangements lies not with the family that wants 
the child begotten by such means, but rather with the surro-
gate mother herself: whether the surrogate mother, who 
serves as ovum donor, may donate germinal material and avo 
parental responsibilities for the life she creates. 2 In 
other words, is it ethical for someone to create a life wi 
the intention of giving it up. This seems to be the essence 
of both surrogate mothering arrangements and of artificial 
insemination by donor (AID), because it is clear in both 
situations that the person who is providing the germinal 
material does so only upon the assurance that someone else 
will assume full responsibility for the child they he 
create. 3 
To understand this primary ethical problem posed by 
surrogate mothering arrangements, it is helpful to begin by 
inspecting the roles that the surrogate mother performs. 
2 
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First, she acts as a procreator in providing one of 
to be fertilized. Second, after her ovum 
ized by the sperm of the man who wishes to 
she acts as host to the developing fetus, 
and protection while the newly conceived 
ops. In this second role as host I see no 
moral objections to the function that the 
performs. I think that her actions are 
a foster mother or of a wet-nurse. These act 
morally objectionable when then natural mother c 
form these roles any more than it is wrong 
employ the use of others to help them in educat 
or otherwise parenting a child. Of course, 
extreme cases, the abdication of parental re 
for a child does raise serious moral issues 
limiting surrogate mothering arrangements to 
couples as Assembly Bill 1F3771 does, 4 this 
the essence of that moral principle. 
Contrariwise, I believe the first role, 
above, which the surrogate mother performs, that of p 
germinal material to be fertilized, poses a 
problem. The surrogate mother provides her ovum 
into a surrogate mothering arrangement, only 
standing that she is to avoid responsibili 
she creates. It is this separation of 
create a child from the decision to parent it 
poses the major ethical barrier to surrogat 
3 
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That is, the child is conceived in order to be 
The child is conceived not because he is wan s 
procreator, but because he can be useful to someone 
In other words, at its very fundament, surrogate mo 
arrangements involve a change in motive for creating 
ren: from a desire to have them for their own sake, to 
desire to have them because they can provide some o 
benefit, normally a monetary one. 5 The surrogate mo 
provides the ovum creates a child with the intent to 
abdicate the parental responsibilities attached to 
generation of children. Can we view this as ethic ? 
answer is no. In order to elucidate this point I 
present an analysis of the contexts under which 
mothering arrangements might occur, carefully inspect 
possible analogous situations and our attitudes toward 
One context in which surrogate mothering 
might be used is that of the single parent. It is cl 
that both AID and surrogate mothering arrangements 
used by unmarried individuals as a means of having chil 
Although Assembly Bill 1f3771 presently limits the use 
surrogate mothering arrangements to infertile couples, 
is no technological barrier to prevent the te 
being used by single parents. In other words, a 
woman might use AID, or a single man might use a 
mothering arrangement, if they wan~ a child but do not 
to be burdened with a spouse. 6 The use of surrogate mo 
ing arrangements, or of AID, by the single parent 
4 
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intentionally deprive the child of a mo or 
This, I assert, is fundamentally unfair to the 
In response, however, one might point to e 
or to the death of a parent, as situations 
is deprived of one parent and must rely sol o 
upon a single parent. The comparison, however i 
site. Unlike divorce or the death of a 
child may find himself with a single 
unfortunate, unintended, and undesired results of li 
surrogate mothering arrangements in the single 
text, intentionally creating children knowing 
be deprived of a parent, is the intended and s 
It is a far different question to ask what one 
make the best of a bad sitaution when it is 
than to ask whether one may intentionally p 
the same result. 7 
It may be objected by some that since a 
pregnant if she wishes whether or not she is 
since there is little that society can do to 
from creating children with the intention to 
t 
a father, why should we be so concerned wi s 
using surrogate mothering arrangements aus 
might want a child and not a spouse? But on 
to say that women can intentionally plan to 
is not to say that it is moral. Also, we note 
will hold the father liable in a paternity ac 
identify and find him, which evidences some soci 
5 
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that people should not be able to abdicate 
ties that they incur in the generation of 
why do we condemn the reckless male c 
bial sailor with a pregnant girl in every port? 
Society does not view as moral and up 
who creates a child and then abdicates the re 
to that child which we attach to, and associ 
creation. But, it may be objected, this 
the context which surrogate mothering arrangemen s 
pate. What is proposed by Assembly Bill 1F3771 is 
will be a transference of responsibility 
of, the child from the surrogate mother to 
father and a stepmother, the wife of the b 
who will adopt the child. 
Consequently, let us now discuss the e 
mothering arrangements in the context of 
taken into a family where there is both a mo 
father. Again, surrogate mothering 
pose parallel ethical questions to this extent: 
gate mother transfers her parental responsibilitie 
wife of the biological father, while with 
relinquishes his interest in the child to 
biological mother. In both cases we have 
a child in contemplation of transferring the re 
,.for that child to a new parent. The surrogate 
situation is more dramatic since the trans oc 
the child is born, while in the AID situat 
6 
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not yet even in being at the time of the ins 
Nevertheless, in the context of the ethical point we 
discussing, that of creating children for the 
transferring them, they raise the ethical issue. 8 same 
question remains, is it ethical for a surrogate mo 
create a child for the purpose of transferring it to 
wife of the biological father. 
At first blush this looks to be little dif 
the typical adoption, for what is an adopton other 
transfer of responsibility from one set of parents to a 
set of parents? 
The analogy, however, is misleading for two reasons. 
First, it is difficult to imagine anyone conceiving 
for the purpose of putting them up for adoption. 
such a bizarre event were to occur, I doubt if we 
upon such behavior with moral approval. Most adopt 
arise from entirely different contexts: either that o 
undesired conception that is brought to term, or where 
parents desired to have the child, but find that 
unable to provide for the child because of some un 
circumstances developing after conception. 9 
The second objection is even if surrogate mo 
arrangements were to be classified as a type of adop 
this still would not answer the question of the morali 
surrogate mothering arrangements, because not all of 
of children for adoption are necessarily moral. For 
would it be moral for one to offer one's three-year o 
7 
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adoption because one was bored with it? 
for a couple to offer for adoption their newborn 
because what they wanted was a boy? 
Therefore, even though surrogate mothering 
may in some superficial ways be likened to 
must still frankly address the issue of whether it 
to separate the decision to create children 
to have them. I would answer no. The reason 
should be intentionally created is that it is 
procreator for its own sake, not as a means to 
of some other end. Even though one of the 
altruistically as trying to bring happiness to an 
couple; nevertheless, the child is still 
surrogate. She creates it not because she desire 
b h d . h. f . 10 ecause s e es1res to get somet 1ng rom 1t. 
But why, it might be asked, is it so 
surrogate mother does not desire the child i 
when under the proposed surrogate mothering 
there will be a couple eagerly desiring to 
and to be its parents? The problem with this 
that it may not be entirely accurate. This 
illustrated in the following section dealing 
consequences of surrogate mothering arrangements; 
ally, the reply to the above argument is that ola 
ethical principle that one ought not to create 
unless one desires that child, causes a fundament 
in how we look at children -- instead of viewing 
8 
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gifts from God, to be desired in their own right, we 
come to view them as commodities. This thesis, I 
best illustrated by examining what might go 
surrogate mothering arrangement, and most important 
viewing how the various parties to the contract may react 
the disappointment of their expectations. 
purpose of the next section of this statement. 
This s 
II. Social Problems of Surrogate Mothering Arrangements 
One of the best ways to appreciate the importance 
the ethical problem identified in the first section of 
statement is to view the social consequences which may 
because of surrogate mothering arrangements. As was 
out in the first section of this statement, surrogate mo 
ing arrangements are designed to separate in the 
surrogate mother the decision to create a child 
decision to have and raise that child. The cause of 
disassociation is some other benefit she will rece 
often money. 11 In other words, her desire to create a 
is born of some other motive than the desire to be a 
What are the potential social results of this disassoc 
of creation from parenting? 
First and foremost I fear that because of this 
ciation the child will come to be viewed as a 
manufactured thing. The following will illustrate 
think that this probably will come about. 
percent of the surrogate mothering arrangements may 
9 
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just fine; the child will be born normal, and the 
12 
'11 . B h h h parents w1 want 1t. ut, w at appens w en un 
the child is born deformed? There are many de t 
cannot be discovered prenatally by amniocentesis or 
means, and therefore, it is just a matter of time be 
situation arises. Similarly, the death of the b 
father before the birth of the child, or mul tip 
triplets, etc., pose similar inevitable situations 
adopting parents may be unhappy with the prospect of 
the child or children. Although Assembly Bill #3771 
that the adopting parents take the child or chi 
whatever condition they come, 13 provided the 
mother has abided by all the surrogate mothering 
ment's contractual provisions, the important point 
discussion is not that the matter has been settled l 
tively or contractually, 14 but rather with the atti 
both the surrogate mother or the adopting parent migh 
toward the deformed child. 
When I participated at the Surrogate Parent 
tion's conference last year, 15 I was struck by the atti 
of both the surrogate mothers and of the adopting t 
these very problems. Both groups were very troubl 
this issue of what to do with a deformed child. The 
parents voiced the concern "Do we have to take that? n 
the surrogate mothers said in response, !!Well, we don't 
to be stuck with it."16 It was quite clear that bo 
were anxious not to be responsible for the "undesi 
10 
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s 
s 
!! of the surrogate mothering 
What does this portend for 
s just nature that 
ts value. Things that one pays 
viewed as commodi es. Unavo l 
mo arrangements are questions as: 
one?" Indeed, we see similar behavior 
adoption of ldren. 
is no shortage of Black, Mexican 
re or older children seeking homes; 
bi 
attractive, intelligent-looking 
parenting arrangements are cone 
just the desire to have a child. 
desire to have a certain type of 
it may be objec Aren't 
parents anyway the normal 
I think not exactly. No one 
and disappointment parents 
ir ld is born with some gene 
feet. Why, it might be asked, is 
mother situation? 
mo situat it is 
l re le, and both s 
a legitimate excuse to not as 
s 
ld. The surrogate mother l 
cal father for having 11 defective as 
s blame the surrogate mo 
11 
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!! 
ovum" or for improper care of the fetus 
The point is that the adopting parents sire 
h 'ld t h. h 'ld . d. . 18 d c 1 , no t 1s c 1 1n any con 1t1on, an 
mother doesn 1 t want it in any event. So, both s 
feel threatened by the birth of an "undesi le 
Like bruised fruit in the produce bin of a supermarke 
child is more likely to become an object of avo 
one of desire. 
I certainly don't question the fact that parents 
natural course of having children might doubt whe 
would want a child if the father died before its bi 
who was born defective, or where there were mult 
but nevertheless, I think that parents in the 
are more likely to accept these contingencies as a 
fate. I don 1 t think that this is the case with 
mothering arrangements. After all, in the surroga 
ing arrangement there is someone outside the mari 
tionship for the adopting parents to blame. 
is the surrogate mother who has been hosting this 
along, and it is she who is delivering it. 
looks far more like a commodity than the child 
in the natural course within the family unit. 
It ce 
A second social problem, which I believe arise 
the first, is the fear that surrogate mothering 
will fall prey to eugenic concerns. 19 As I s 
surrogate mothering arrangements deal with more 
desire to have a child, they also fundamentally 
12 
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desire to have a certain type of child. This is evidenced 
by surrogate mothering contracts which typically have clauses 
requiring genetic tests of the fetus and require the surro-
gate mother to have an abortion (or keep the child herself) 
if the child does not meet these test. 20 
In the last decade we have witnessed a renaissance of 
interest in eugenics. This renewed interest, coupled with 
advances in biomedical technology, has created a host of 
abuses and new moral problems. For example, genetic coun-
seling clinics now face a dilemma: The same procedure, 
amniocentesis, which identifies whether a fetus suffers from 
certain genetic defects, also discloses the sex of a fetus. 
Genetic counseling clinics have reported that even when the 
fetus is reported as normal, a vastly disproportionate 
number of mothers abort the child because it is female over 
those who abort a normal male child. 21 Genetic testing for, 
and abortion of, normal fetuses based upon the desire to 
have a child of a certain sex is one example of the results 
of viewing the child as an item of manufacture, a commodity. 
Again, while this and similar evils may occur whether or not 
surrogate mothering arrangements are allowed by law, to the 
extent that they are part of the milieu which promote the 
view of children as commodities, it certainly will enhance 
these problems. I am not saying that there is anything 
wrong with striving for betterment, as long as it does not 
result in intolerance to that which is not perfect, 22 and it 
is the latter attitude which I fear will become prevalent. 
13 
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A third group of social problems which I 
result from sanctioning surrogate mothering 
involves the pressures that it will place 
structure. First, as was noted earlier, there 
technically to prevent the use of surrogate mo 
single males desiring to become parents and, 
females can already do this with AID or even 
Even accepting that Assembly Bill 1F3771 limits 
surrogate mothering arrangements to infertile c 
nevertheless it still imposes other pressures on 
structure in our society. Most obviously, in 
trudes another person into the marital communi 
not think that society is ready to accept ei 
parenting, nor quasi-adulterous arrangements, as 
course. 
Another stress on the family structure arise 
the family of the surrogate mother. When the chi 
up to the adopting parents in the surrogate mo 
rangement, there are more parties in teres ted 
than merely the surrogate mother and the adopting 
The child is removed not only from the surrogate mo 
also from the family of the surrogate mother. 
interests to be considered. Do not the s l 
child have an interest in the fact that their li 
brother has been "given" away? 24 One woman, the mo 
man who had often donated sperm for artificial ins 
expressed these emotions quite eloquently: she 
14 
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wonder how many grandchildren I have that I have never seen 
and never been able to hold or cuddle." 25 
Another area in which surrogate mothering arrangements 
will pose problems are the intrafamily tensions that will 
result from the asymmetry of relationships which the adopt-
ing parents will have toward the child. The adopting mother 
has no biological relationship to the child, whereas the 
adopting father is also the child's biological father. 
Won't this unequal biological claim on the child be used as 
a wedge in child-rearing arguments? Can't we imagine the 
father being liable to say, "Well, he is my son, not yours," 
etc. What if the couple eventually is divorced? Should 
custody in a subsequent divorce between the adopting mother 
and the biological father be treated equally and simply as a 
normal child custody dispute in any other divorce, or again, 
should the biological relationship which the father has to 
the child be given greater weight~ It should be noted that 
these questions do not arise in typical adoption situations 
since both parents are equally unrelated biologically to the 
child. Indeed, in adoption there is symmetry. The surro-
gate mother situation is more analogous to second marriages, 
where one party has children by a prior marriage which are 
adopted by the new spouse. Certainly, since we have prob-
lems with asymmetry in second marriage situations, we can 
then anticipate similar problems of asymmetry arising in 
surrogate mothering arrangements. 
15 
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The fourth social problem I see 
mothering arrangements is t 
deprived of a certain amount f 
age. This problem is analogous to 
have, and that children conceived by arti 
by a donor have, where they are l 
their biological parents which could 
medically. Another less popularly 
danger of half-sibling marriages, 26 where 
surrogate mother unbeknownst to himself 
half sister. The only way to avoid s 
pense with the confidentiality of these 
as in both the case of adopteds, and 
con~eived through AID, this may give unwan 
child to the natural parent. 
A fifth social problem ch 
legalization of surrogate mothering 
undue pressure put upon poor women to 
this method to support themse s 
Analogous problems have arisen in the 
paid blood donors. 28 And occas l 
someone desperate enough to o 
other organ. 29 I believe 
which should be viewed as too rtant 
modi ties. Hopefully we have advanced 
parents raised children for profit le 
themselves forced to sell their i 3 
16 
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While many of the social problems I have outlined in 
this second section of my statement have analogies to other 
present-day occurrences, every addition is hurtful. 31 
Legalizing surrogate mothering arrangements will make these 
problems more frequent occurrences. And, due to its more 
dramatic nature, is more likely to cause stress on our soci-
ety's shared moral values. 32 
III. Conclusion 
Does the marginal increase in joy that an infertile 
couple might have in raising a child with a biological 
relationship to the husband, when. compared with the joy that 
they would experience in raising a "less desirable" adopted 
child who has no biological relationship to either the 
husband or the wife, outweigh the potential pain that they, 
the child, or others might suffer and the social costs and 
problems that the legalization of the surrogate mothering 
technique might well engender? I honestly do not know. I 
don't even know on what hypothetical scale such interests 
could be weighed and balanced. But even if we could. And 
even if they did. I still would not be able to say that we 
could justify those ends, by these means; 33 that ethically 
it would be permissible for a person to create a child, not 
because she desired it, but because it could be useful to 
her. 
Edmond Cahn has termed this ignoring of means in the 
attainment of ends as the "Pompey syndrome": 
17 
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I have taken the name 
Pompey, who appears in Shake 
and Cleopatra in an incident 
from Plutarch. Pompey, whose 
control of the seas aroung I 
negotiate peace with the 
Mark Antony, Octavius Caesar, 
and they meet in a roistering 
Pompey's ship. As they carouse 
Pompey's lieutenants draws him 
whispers that he can become lord 
world if he will only grant 
leave to cut first the moo 
then the throats of the 
pauses, then replies in these 
Ah, this thou shouldst have 
And not have spoke on't! In me 1 t 
villainy; 
In thee't had been good se 
Thou must know tis not my 
that does lead mine honour· 
Mine honour, it. Repent 
tongue 
Hath so betrayed thine act; 
unknown 
I should have found it a 
done, 
But must condemn it now. Desis 
and drink. 
Here we have the most 
moral syndromes, the one most 
of so-called respectable men 
society. To possess the end 
responsible for the means, to 
fruit while disavowing the tree, 
being told the cost until someone 
paid irrevocably; this is the 
and the chief hypocrisy of our time. 
I urge that the California Legislature 
legalizing surrogate mothering arrangements 
of this, or any other bill, primarily 
important ethical and moral principles, 
the social problems it will cause. 
18 
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FOOTNOTES 
Professor of Law, Southwestern Universi 
675 South Westmoreland Avenue, Los Ange 
90005. 
School 
es, Cali 
** As amended: 5/18/82, 6/17/82, and 8/2/82. 
1 Hearings before the California Assembly Committee on 
Judiciary, Los Angeles, November 19, 1982. 
2 The ethical objection to surrogate mothering 
arrangements which is made in this first section of 
statement is identical to one of the e c object 
to the use of artificial inseminatin by a donor ( 
The common ethical objection to both techniques is 
it is wrong for someone to provide germinal material 
with a design to create a life, and then seek to avo 
responsibility for the life thus created. In this 
respect, the distinction between AID and surrogate 
mothering arrangements is only one of degree and not 
one of kind, in that the AID father's abandonment of 
interest in the child takes place far earlier than 
surrogate mother's transfer of possession of the 
While the latter appears to be more dramatic, the core 
ethical issue remains identical to both. 
Consequently, it might be objected that since AID 
arrangements are now legal in the State of California, 
why ought not surrogate mothering arrangements also 
made legal? First, this objection does not address nor 
answer the question of whether either are ethical. 
ethics of these techniques must be inspected indepen-
dently of whether they are presently legally autho 
or not, and that is the task of the rst section o 
this statement. 
Second, if AID and surrogate mo 
are not ethical, in that they anticipate 
of parental responsibilities for the life created, 
argument as to the legali of AID is still no justi 
cation for making surrogate mothering s 
legal, except in the terests of some 
symmetry. For example, the fact that 
unfortunate consequence of the misuse o 
of alcohol, 26,000 deaths on the 
to drunk drivers, is no imperative to 
of other intoxicants. Therefore, even if one cone 
that AID and surrogate mothering arrangements pose 
certain identical ethical issues, and even given the 
fact that AID is legal, this is not per se a reason 
legalize surrogate mothering arrangements. As will 
pointed out later in this statement, surrogate mother-
ing arrangements and AID also raise soci problems 
which are not always identical in impact or nature, 
it will be argued that surrogate mothering arrangement 
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because of their more dramatic nature 
produce more severe social problems 
3 To this extent, re es 
surrogate mothering arrangements o 
such as Genesis 16, which deal with 
children by his handmaid, Hagar, 
which deals with the duty of a man to 
to his dead brother by his sister-in-1 
It is quite clear that when Abram cone 
Hagar, he had done so only after his 
given Hagar to him as a second wife 
Similarly, Deuteronomy 25:5-6 so 
tion where the woman becomes a wi 
so-called surrogate mo is not a 
but an extension (albeit polygamous) 
unit. In the biblical tradition, s 
way relinquishes control or responsibil 
child they create; and therefore, 
such biblical passages and present-
mothering arrangements are incorrect. 
Moreover, if the proponents of 
arrangements wish to take biblic au 
analogies, they should well look to 
story of Hagar and Ishmael: how they 
Sarah after Sarah gave birth to Isaac 
The family animosity of thousands of 
with us today as the sons os Ishmael 
the sons of Isaac (the Jews) still 
ties getting along. The problem of 
which might be created by present-
arrangements is dealt with more 
Section II of this statement. 
4 §7505(b); AB377l, p. 3 11. 16,29. 
5 
6 
That the lure of financial gain is 
reason that women are willing to be 
is evident from the reported accounts 
See, ~' Womb for Rent, Los ~ngeles 
Sept 21, l9~A~Col. 1; Lew1s, 
Surrogate Mothers Pose Issues 
Los Angeles Daily , 
Moral and Legal Problems of 
Times, Nov. 10, 1981, V, , . 
Who Have Babies For Other Women, 
gg-(April 1981); See so Doe v Kell 
of Wayne County Michigan (1980) 
on Human Reproduction and Law I 
See, ~' C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. 
E2I (1977); Why She Went to 'Nobel 
Child, Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 
Col. 4; Womb For Rent, Los Angeles 
Sept. 21~8~A~ol. 2. 
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7 The morality of identical results (e. 
are often distinguished based upon whe 
is invited by, or involuntarily thrust 
Legal distrinctions following and based 
ethical distinction are abundant. The 
defense provides a notable example. Se 
Reproductive Technologies: Ethical Issues 
pedia of Bioethics 1454, 1459 (W. Reich, 
Snowden and G. Mitchell, The Artificial 
(1981). 
8 See, note 2, supra. 
9 The story of Moses in the bullrushe 
2:1-10) provides a dramatic example. s 
to give him up in order to save him from 
Pharoah's army. According to the Bible, 
however, did not abandon him, but found a 
his wet nurse after the baby was found 
by Pharoah's daughter. 
10 To sanction the use and treatment o 
as means to the achievement of other goal 
as ends in themselves is to accept an e 
horribly tragic past, and to establish 
an incredibly dangerous future. Already 
reported the decision of one couple to cone 
for the purpose of using it as a bone marrow 
its sibling. (L.A. Times, April 17, 1979, 
Col. 1). And the bioethics literature con 
seriously considering whether we should c 
beings to serve as an inventory of spare 
organ transplants (L. Tribe, Channeling 
Through Law, Part IV (Biomedical Technology 
Reproduction) (1973); Note, The Brave World: 
the Law Bring Order Within Tradi 
Precess?, 4 Suffolk L. Rev.~8~9~4-,~9~0~1--~02 
The New Biolog~ and the Future of Man, 1 .. , 
Rev.-z73, 302 (19b&); Castel, Legar-lmplications __ 
Biomedical Science and Technology in the Twenty-First 
Century, 51 Canadian B. Rev. 119, IL7-rl973)), and 
articles which foresee the use of comatose 
in Karen Ann Quinlan-type situations as 
blood banks and manufacturing plants 
(Nelson, Maintaining Dead to Serve as ~B~~-~-~~·~~ 
Proposed: Logical, Sociological Says, 
Feb. 26, 1974, §II, at 1, Col 2; Jonas, 
Stream: Comments on the Definition and ~-~~~ 
Death, in Philosophical Essays: From 
Technological Man, 132-140 (1974)). 
is willing to proceed down this road is 
it is clear that the first step to all 
is the acceptance of the same principle 
attempted to use to justify their medic 
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11 
12 
13 
14 
at Nuremberg War Crimes s: that human beings 
may be used as means to the achievement of other worthy 
goals, and not so as ends them-
selves. (L. Alexander, Science Under ctator 
~' 241 No. 2 The New of Medicine 39 
(1949); United States v. Brandt, Tri of the Major War 
Criminals, International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg, 
14 November 1945-1 October 1946. 
See, note 5, sulra. That the motive of monetary 
can quite readi y cause this disassociation in some 
people is illustrated by the reported case of the 
couple who attempted to trade their 14 month old son 
for a three year old black and silver Corvette valued 
at $8,800. Will, ~ Baby as ~Trade-in on ~ Car: Paren-
tal Love May Be ~ Lemon, L.A. Times, Sep . 1~1980, 
II, p.J Co1-:l. The so called 11 baby bartering statute" 
Cal. Penal Code §273 -- which AB 3771 makes inapplicable 
to qualifying surrogate mother contracts (§7515; AB 
3771 p.6 11.31-35) -- evidences a concern that this 
phenomenon is not all that uncommon. 
Assembly Bill 3771 uses the terminology "infertile 
couple 11 (§7502(a), AB 3771, p. 2, 11.17-22) to refer to 
the biological father of the child and his infertile 
wife who will, pursuant to the surrogate contract, gain 
custody of the child from the surrogate mother. Because 
the technique of surrogate mothering could be used in 
the future by single parents, and also by fertile couples, 
I have employed the use of a more general term, adopting 
parent(s), in discussing the social problems engendered 
by surrogate mothering arrangements. 
§7506(h); AB 3771, p. 4, 1. 38- p. 5 l. 1. Assuming 
one were to allow surrogate mothering arrangements, it 
is not clear to me why Assembly Bill 3771 mandates that 
the adopting parents must bear all of these risks instead 
of allowing the parties to contract for themselves who 
should bear them. Not all adopting parents are risk-
takers, and not all surrogate mothers are risk-averse. 
One might well imagine the situation where the surro-
gate mother would prefer to take these risks for a 
higher -- a sort of warranty, if you will. 
This assumes, of course, 
judicially enforced. 
t such provisions would be 
15 "The 1981 Inaugural Symposium on Surrogate Parenting 11 , 
e Parent Foundation, Inc., Los Angeles, 
a, November 7, 1981. 
16 so, Womb for Rent, Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 
' r91IT,AJ".--
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baby be given ied: 11 
good. If it's a gi an it and give Jef 
[her 2 year old half brother} away.'' Womb Rent. 
Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Sept. 21, 
25 From an interview with the mother of a medical student. 
26 Regarding how this has posed an accelerating problem 
for children conceived through AID, see, ~' Curie-
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Cohen et al., Current Practice of cial Insemina-
tion ~--Donor in the United States, 300 New Eng. J. 
Med. 585-89 (1979). 
The former provisions of Assembly Bill 3771 which 
provided for such confidentiality have since been 
deleted by amendment. (AB 3771, p. 3, 11.4-12). 
See, ~' R. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From 
Human Blood to Social Policy (1971). 
See,~' (UPI), ~an Desperate for Funds: Eye for Sale 
at $35,000, L.A. T1mes, Feb. 1, 1975, §II, at 1, co~.; 
TAP), 100 Answer Man's Ad for New Kidney, L.A. Times, 
Sept. ~ 1974, §I, at ~ col.~ 
See generally, Slavery, Serfdom and Forced Labor, 16 
The New Encyclopedia Britannica E51, esp. 854, 858, 865 
(15th ed 1974). 
See, note 2 (last~), supra. 
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Reflections on Medical Ex}erimentation in Humans, 
98 Daedalus 1R7-393 (1969 ; Shapiro and Spece, On 
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APPENDIX C 
I want to thank the committee for providing the opportunity to 
testify on a question which, while having only a limited application 
in terms of the number of people who may be directly affected, has 
broad implications for the good of society as a whole. The proposed 
legislation states, "The Legislature finds and declares that surrogate 
contracts are in accord with sound social policy." Speaking for the 
California Catholic Conference, representing the Catholic Bishops of the 
State of California, I want to suggest that legislation to regulate con-
tracts providing for surrogate mothers to supply children for infertile 
couples is not sound social policy, because it offends against the sup-
port that such policy should give to the basic institutions of marriage 
and family in our society. Sound social policy should protect and give 
legislative emphasis to support the basic and fundamental unit of society, 
the family, which is constituted by the marriage · contract entered into 
by husband and wife committing themselves to undertake a role which is 
both individual and social and provides for the generation and nurturing 
of children, by which the continuance and development of this society 
are ensured. In our view, the surrogate mother concept--the altruistic 
motive of providing children for infertile couples notwithstanding--
contains elements which tend to weaken rather than strengthen the insti-
tution of marriage and family in our society and therefore must be 
judged contrary to sound social policy on moral and ethical grounds. 
By means of the marriage contract, husband and wife make a commit-
ment to each other which creates a moral obligation to nurture the new 
family unit which they have established; by it they gain the recognition 
of society to guarantee to them certain rights and responsibilities 
toward each other and toward the children who may result from their 
union of love. Such a fundamental attitude toward marriage and family 
is based upon a reasoned view of human nature, a view which· is consis-
tent with and supported by the Judeo-Christian tradition, which has so 
powerfully shaped the Western democratic aivilization of which we are 
the inheritors . 
The Judeo-Christian tradition has explicitated the moral and ethical 
aspects of the human values involved in this fundamental societal in-
stitution of marriage and family, and permits us to assess in ethical 
terms what fosters or weakens this institution, and hence what should be 
judged sound social policy. This tradition has classically pointed out 
-112-
Archdioceses of Los Angeles and San Francisco 
Dioceses of Fresno, Monterey, Oakland, Orange, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Jose, Santa Rosa, and Stockton 
Page 2 
Interim Hearing, November 19, 1982 - Surrogate Parenting 
the twofold aspect of the marriage relationship: it is both unitive 
(see the passage in the book of Genesis 2:23 in which Adam says, 
"'This one at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh, this one 
shall be called "woman" for out of "her man" this one has been taken.' 
That is why a man leaves his father and mother clings to his wife and 
the two of them become one body.") and generative or !?recreative (see 
Genesis 1:27, "God created man in His image; in the d1vine image He 
created him; male and female He created them. God blessed them, saying 
'Be fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it ~ '") . 
The Judea-Christian tradition has held the family in highest 
esteem from ancient times. Some 2500 years ago Isaiah likened 
the relationship between God and the Jews to that of a mother 
and child: "As a mother comforts her son, so will I myself com-
f0rt you, and you shall find comfort in Jerusalem" (Isaiah 66:13). 
In the Christian dispensation, the mystery of God is revealed in 
terms of filial relationship, Father to Son. The deep spiritual 
significance of the family stands forth when Scriptures liken the 
relationship of husband and wife to Christ and His Church. This 
view of marriage has deep meaning in today's society. The Ameri-
can Bishops, speakinft in their pastoral letter "Human Life in 
Our Day," hold that 'For the believer, the family is the place 
where God's image is reproduced in His creation. The family is 
the community within which the person is realized, the place 
where all our hopes for the future of the person are nourished." 
The Second Vatican Council, too, spoke of the family mission and 
ministry: "The family has received from God its mission to be the 
first and vital cell of society." (National Conference of Catholic 
Charities "Policy Statement on Family"; 1977) 
In our opinion the surrogate mother arrangement adversely affects 
the place of marriage and the family in today's society, because it 
violates the Unitive and generative or procreative dimensions of mar-
riage and hence modifies the essential meaning of the marital, familial 
relationship. 
The unitive aspect of the marriage relationship is violated by the 
introduction of a third party into the relationship in which the couple 
(even if infertile) has committed themselves to each other. While it 
is true that the presence of this third party may not be a physical 
presence to the couple, it is certainly a psychological presence for 
the nine months .in which the surrogate mother is bearing the child of 
the husband insubstitution for the wife to whom that husband has com-
mitted himself to create a bond of love and become "one flesh" for the 
purpose of creating that family for which their mutual love may provide. 
Through artificial insemination the husband has, in fact, drawn into 
the circle of that bond an outside party. The violation is perhaps more 
significant in the case of the surrogate mother herself, who has intro-
duced into her relationship with her husband a child which comes from 
a party outside their union of maritial love. Because of this violation 
of the unitive aspect of the maritial bond, we judge the use of arti-
ficial insemination by donor, in this as in other areas,. to be morally 
wrong. 
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Secondly, the surrogate mother arrangement separates the generative 
or procreative aspect of the marriage relationship from the unitive, 
insofar as the child to be conceived and borne is not the fruit of 
the mutual love of husband and wife. It further has implications for 
the generative aspect of the marriage/family relationship by prevent-
ing the natural bonding between mother and child during pregnancy and 
infancy, a bond of such great importance for the future of the child. 
Of course it goes without saying that,.were the surrogate mother 
procedure to involve single persons on either side, that is on the 
side of the biological father as sperm donor, or on the side of the 
surrogate mother, the violation of family and marriage values would be 
even more clear. But in fact, as the study of the proposed legislation 
by the staff of the committee allows us to infer, there are no in-
herent reasons why the surrogate mother contracts should be limited to 
married persons unless one has a philosophical and moral commitment to 
society's right and responsibility to foster the institutions of mar-
riage and family. 
It seems to us that the generative or procreative purpose of marriage 
is further violated with regard to the child who would issue from this 
surrogate procedure. It would be difficult to see how children pro-
duced through this procedure could avoid being labeled as a commodity 
or product whose natural mother surrendered them for economic consider-
ations; present adoption laws have consistently and correctly sought 
to diminish and even exclude the mercenary aspects of adoption pro-
cedures which would treat children as a commodity or product. 
For the above reasons we believe that it would not be appropriate 
for the legislature of the State of California to adopt legislation 
codifying and regulating surrogate mother contracts, because such 
codification into law could not do otherwise than weaken that protection 
and guarantee that it is society's right and duty to provide for the 
institutions of marriage and family. In a word, such law would in our 
view be the opposite of sound public policy. 
The California Catholic Conference believes that surrogate mother 
legislation would also be unwise because of its potential impact on 
other areas which have ethical implications for our society. These 
areas are~ (1) concern for the child, (2) adoption, (3) impact on 
young surrogate mothers, and (4) economic considerations. 
(1) Concern for the Child 
The impersonal nature of the surrogate mother arrangement 
increases the chances that the child's own best interest may 
be ignored in any conflict that arises. The father is re-
lated to the developing infant through technologically-conducted 
artificial insemination rather than through the exchange of 
human love, and further has no lasting relationship with--and 
in most cases may not even know--the mother of his child. 
Changes in his circumstances (business reverses, impending 
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the children in question as a commodity, by ing an 
impersonal context for most personal of human activities: 
marriage and family. The economic aspects considered from 
another point of view also raise serious questions about 
the wisdom of the proposed legislation: since the surrogate 
contracts would be available only to those who are relatively 
well-to-do (the popular literature suggests $25,000 as a 
normal estimated cost to the couple requesting the procedure), 
it may be questioned whether the regulation of contracts 
benefiting such a small element of society would not prove 
to involve expenditures for judicial review of these contracts--
not to mention the attendant legal and medical costs--which 
would seem to many a bias against the needy in the allocation 
of limited state financial resources. 
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate our view that the proposed 
legislation is not sound social policy; furthermore, it would seem 
a more reasonable procedure to await judicial determination of the 
questions posed by surrogate parenting before attempting to decide 
whether and what kind of statutes may be necessary to regulate certain 
technical legal aspects of the practice in such a way as to exclude 
favoring the practice as sound social policy. 
Reverend Monsignor William J. Levada, S.T.D. 
Executive Director 
California Catholic Conference 
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Member of the Assembly 
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November 15, 1982 
Re: AB 3771 - Surrogate Parent Act 
Dear Assemblyman Roos: 
This is in regard to your bill AB 3771, as amended in 
Assembly August 2, 1982, and the interim hearing of the 
Assembly Judiciary Committee set for November 19, 1982, in Los 
Angeles. 
This office previously expressed concern with certain 
provisions of AB 3771, as amended, in correspondence to your 
office and at the Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committee 
hearings on the subject. Testimony has been requested by the 
judiciary committee staff for the upcoming Los Angeles hearing. 
The issue of whether to sanction surrogate parenting 
is a fundamental public policy issue and a substantive law 
matter. Accordingly, the Judicial Council takes no position on 
that aspect of the proposal. 
The present version of the bill does present several 
issues of direct concern to the Administrative Office of the 
Courts, however. 
A. Superior Court Jurisdiction 
Proposed Section 7503 (p. 2, ls. 32 to 36, inclusive) 
specifies that the "department of the superior court to which 
proceedings under the Family Law Act ... ordinarily are 
assigned shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings and 
actions" pursuant to the act. 
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The Judicial Council opposes specifying in statute 
that any cause of action be within the jurisdiction of a 
specified ''department" of the superior court. Under your bill, 
the potential types of cases which could arise would vary from 
adoption of the surrogate's child to a breach of contract 
action for money damages. 
Effective court management is best served by providing 
that jurisdiction over actions under the act lies in the 
superior court generally. No further specification is 
necessary or desirable from a court management perspective. A 
breach of contract suit for monetary damages should not be in 
the family law court, as I am sure you recognize. 
B. No Case or Controversy 
There is no existing type of contract, other than 
settlements of existing actual pending legal disputes, in which 
the courts become involved in the approval or implementation of 
contract terms. 
Contracts are entered into by the respective parties, 
subject to statutory substantive law restrictions, e.g., 
certain contracts must be in writing, must provide a period for 
revocation, or disclose certain information, such as interest 
rates. 
It is not until a dispute arises that a cause of 
action exists. Dispute resolution of an actual case or 
controversy is the function of the courts. 
Oversight of contract drafting and implementation is 
not a case or controversy but rather is the proper subject 
matter for attorneys in assuring compliance with the law in 
drafting and implementing contracts between parties. 
This long established principle of courts addressing 
only cases that have an accrued enforceable legal right is 
contradicted by provisions of the bill for court oversight of 
surrogate parenting contracts. Specifically, proposed Section 
7505 provides in part that, "the court shall determine ... 
whether the requirements of this part have been satisfied" in 
the contract agreement. This in essence is precedent to an 
enforceable right accruing, and not within the definition of 
court jurisdiction. 
"Jurisdiction over a particular case is the 
power to hear and determine that case . . . " 
16 Cal.Jur.III Section 43, p.76, citing 
Central P.R. Co. v. Board of Education 43 C.365; 
Spencer Creek Water Co. v. Vallejo 48 C.70 
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"A 'case' is a question before a court of justice or in an action or suit at law or in 
equity. . • In this, its generic sense, 
the word includes all cases, special or 
otherwise." 
1 Cal.Jur.III, Actions, Section 4, p 434 
"An action cannot be maintained until the 
cause of action accrues. 
Adams v. Albany 80 F.Supp.876. 
"The term 'accrues' as applied to a cause of 
action means to arise, to become or present 
an enforceable demand. 
1 Cal.Jur.III, Actions, Section 4, p.434, fn. 48. 
Section 7505, subdivision (c) lists requirements 
which, if met, require court approval of the petition, which 
includes the executed contract (7505 (b) (1)). Prior to this 
"approval" there is no present and enforceable demand of a 
legal right. Therefore, no case is presently before the court 
to be heard and determined. 
Also, Section 7506 specifies that a contract "approved 
pursuant to this part" shall include, "but not be limited to" a 
specified list of items including: relinquishment of all 
parental rights by the surrogate natural mother; custody at 
birth to the adopting parents of any child born to the 
surrogate under the contract; consent to adoption by the 
adopting mother; medical evaluations; financial arrangements; 
and "that legal and equitable remedies be available in the 
event of brea h". (Section 7506, subdivisions (a) to (h)). 
C. Res Judicata and Specific Performance or Recission of 
Contract 
Two serious and fundamental legal issues are raised by 
this proposed scheme. First, prior approval of the contract by 
the court is presumably a judgment. If not, it is without 
legal significance. If it is, then it is a binding 
adjudication of all the terms contained in the agreement. 
A prior judgment is controlling as to all subsequent 
adjudications of those same contract clauses. Consequently, a 
future challenge to a provision of the contract could not be 
readjudicated; the prior judgment controls. This is the 
principle of res judicata. 
A contract provision calling for aborting a fetus 
shown to be genetically defective or, conceivably, aborting a 
fetus if tests show it to be of a particular sex, therefore 
would be enforceable (subject to constitutional standards). 
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More generally, providing for "e itable remedies" 
connotes the availability of the specific performance remedy 
e.g., enforcement of the waiver of "parental rights" by the 
surrogate natural mother, on the one hand, and forced 
acceptance of custody of the child at birth by the surrogate 
parents, on the other hand. These could be specifically 
enforced, even if a party changes his or her mind subsequent to 
entering the agreement. 
This could mean placement of a child with parents who 
do not want the child, or aborting a child wanted by the 
natural mother. 
Similarly, if fraud existed in the formation of the 
contract, such as the wife's infertility being falsified, 
presumably the contract could be rescinded, eventhough the 
impregnation had been completed. 
Constitutional Question of Privacy 
A constitutional question is also raised with respect 
to the surrogate mother's constitutional right to privacy. 
This right includes the right to elect to abort or continue a 
pregnancy during the first trimester. 
Presumably, exercise of this right would constitute a 
breach of the contract for which monetary damages would be the 
remedy. The bill, however, provides for a contract permitting 
an equitable remedy, raising the prospect of a writ of 
prohibition against a physician or hospital from performing an 
abortion or child birth services in various situations. 
Calendar Priority and Preference 
The Judicial Council opposes imposition by statute of 
restraints on internal court calendar management procedures. 
This approval process contemplated by the act precedes 
impregnation. Therefore no compelling urgency exists to 
granting surrogate parenting cases calenaar priority (Section 
7505 (d)) and Section 7508, subdivision (a)). 
Statutory Remedy 
These issues can be resolved by appropriate amendments 
to AB 3771. This office would be pleased to assist you and 
your staff in making AB 3771 unobjectionable. 
Generally, this would entail deleting the prior court 
review process, thereby reserving court action to adoption 
procedures after the child is born. Substantive law 
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requirements to preserve the medical and other standards for 
surrogate contracts drawn by attorneys and followed by 
hospitals and physicians would govern the contract terms and 
implementation of the act. 
Also, the availability of specific performance or 
recission versus money damages as available remedies should be 
addressed. 
Please call if this office can be of assistance in 
this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Ralph J. Gampell 
Diject~ 
- / w . 
. 
I B 
JWD:mmf 
0384W 
\ J hn W. Davies 
~ A~ sis tant Director 
----
cc:v/Ms. Lettie Young, Consultant, 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
Mr. John Donough, Consultant 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
Mr. Jim Prosser, Minority Consultant 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
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STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF 
APPENDIX E 
THE WOMEN LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
THE SURROGATE PARENT ACT, AB 3771 
I am here on behalf of the Women Lawyers' 
Association of Los Angeles to express our strong opposi-
tion to the proposed Surrogate Parent Act. In our view 
the major defect of this bill is its focus on only two 
of the four people involved. The circumstances of the 
childless couple seeking to avoid lengthy adoption 
procedures and to have a child by at least one parent 
are both sympathetic and understandable. However, in 
attempting to facilitate these couples' resolution of 
their problem, the bill grossly overlooks the interests 
of both the surrogate mother and the child. By providing 
for specific enforcement of a surrogate mother's promise 
to relinquish her child upon birth, the bill encourages 
and endorses contracts based on an unequal relationship. 
The bill aids men and those women who are able to afford 
to pay for the services of a surrogate mother. It 
proclaims that these contracts are enforceable without 
regard for the surrogate mother and the economic reasons 
which may have motivated her decision to enter into such 
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a contract. The bill states in no uncertain terms 
that a mother may be forced to give up her child, even 
though it is extremely doubtful that a court could or 
would specifically enforce a couple's promise to take 
a child. Obviously, such an order would not be in 
the interest of anyone involved; the point is simply 
that the circumstances of the surrogate mother and 
the possible hardships she will face if the couple 
reneges on its end of the deal--for example, lack of 
child support--are not considered. 
The complete neglect of the interest of the 
child is another facet of the bill's lopsided nature. 
By providing that the contract shall prevail over the 
provisions of Civil Code § 4600, which states that the 
custody of the child shall be awarded according to the 
child's best interests, the bill ignores the interests 
of the person who is most directly affected by these 
contracts and yet is the most helpless. The freedom 
to contract, though an important one, must surely give 
way to the needs of an innocent third party. 
The second major problem with this bill is 
the legislative declaration that ''surrogate contracts 
are in accord with sound social policy." In our view, 
the Legislature is thereby approving both the idea 
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of women renting their wombs and the imposition 
of a regulatory framework on womens' bodies, a frame-
work which the state has no right to impose. As 
women lawyers we firmly believe that every woman 
should have the right to use her body in the manner 
in which she chooses. However, it is one thing to 
recognize a woman's right to use her body in such a 
way; it is another to encourage women to adopt yet 
another method of making money off their bodies. 
Although women have historically made money through 
such use, the Legislature has never before taken the 
step of actually endorsing this ancient profession. 
Moreover, we believe that once the legislature 
involves itself in deciding which uses of womens' 
bodies are or are not "sound social policy," women 
will lose the right to make voluntary choices of 
this and other types. 
Along the same line, and with regard to the 
third major problem with the proposed bill, we cannot 
condone the idea that the courts should be involved 
in monitoring these kinds of contracts. The provisions 
for court supervision of the contract are unnecessary; 
when and if an action is brought to enforce such a 
contract, the courts can provide whatever protection 
is proper at that time. As with the legislature, the 
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courtrooms are not a place for governing a woman's 
voluntary choice to do as she pleases with her body. 
The last major problem with the bill--and I 
say major because time does not permit me to point out 
the many smaller but still important defects in the 
bill--are the numerous questions which arise as a 
result of the bill's provisions for court-ordered 
specific performance. Though it may be intended that 
this provision only apply to an order requiring the 
surrogate mother to relinquish her child, the bill 
certainly does not impose any such limitations. 
Consequently, the possibilities are endless. We cannot 
accept any type of bill which would allow a court to 
issue directives and orders concerning a woman's 
decision as to whether and how to carry a fetus to 
term. Even if this provision was or could be limited 
to the court's order after the birth of the child, 
we cannot accept the notion that a newborn child 
can be taken from its natural mother pursuant to 
a court order in much the same way as a tractor 
or truck is taken from a delinquent debtor. 
Having said all of this, we as women lawyers 
also recognize that surrogating parenting is a reality, 
for better or for worse. In order to ensure that a 
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woman's right to control her body is respected, we 
would support a bill which would remove the 
uncertainty regarding the applicability of various 
penal code sections. At this point, we can go no 
further in saying what other provisions such a bill 
should include, mainly because the whole question of 
surrogate parenting gives rise to so many hypothetical 
situations and so many policy issues that at this 
stage there is simply not enough information to cover 
all the uncertainties. We can say, however, that any 
bill should take care to respect not only the right of 
a woman to control her body and to make decisions 
regarding childbirth, but also the rights of the child--
the person whose interest seems to have been most 
ignored. To this end, the Women Lawyers Association 
would like to offer the services of its legislative 
drafting committee in coming up with an alternative 
bill, and we are willing to work with the bill's 
sponsors in any way we can to ensure that the needs 
of all of the parties to the contract are considered. 
-5-
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TO: :tvlembers of the Assembly Judiciary Committee 
FROM: Lettie Young 
RE: Hearing on Surrogate Parenting Contracts 
On Friday, November 19, 1982, the Assembly Judiciary Committee 
will hold a hearing on the topic of surrogate parenting 
contracts. The hearing is scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. in the 
Auditorium of the Whittier College School of Law, 5353 West Third 
Street in Los Angeles. 
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with background 
information for the hearing. Related materials have also been 
included in the hearing booklet. 
AB 3771 (Roos) , which would legitimize contracts for surrogate 
parenting, was presented to the Committee earlier this year, 
whereupon it was assigned to interim study. 
Please refer to the enclosed analysis of AB 3771 for information 
on surrogate parenting and a discussion of that proposal. 
This memo discusses two additional issues: case law and proposed 
legislation in other states and the surrogace's waiver of the 
constitutional right to privacy. 
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Case Law and Proposed Legislation in Other States 
Although California has established no legal precedent on 
surrogate parenting ~rrangements, some authority has developed in 
other jurisdictions. Such case law has generally dealt with the 
issue of payment to the surrogate. 
In Michigan, an action for declaratory iudgment was brought to 
determine the constitutionalitY of state statutes prohihitinq an 
adoption2based upon the exchange of money in the surrogate mother 
context. The court held that those laws are not void for 
vagueness and that the right to adopt a child for payment is not 
within the constitutional protection of the right of privacv. It 
also held that the state has a compellinq interest to regulate 
adoptions in order to prevent babv-selling: "Mercenary 
considerations used to create a parent-child relationship and its 
rsic] impact upon the family unit strikes [sic] at the verv 
foundation of human society ~nd is [sic] patentlv and necessarily 
injurious to the community." Since the Michigan Supreme Court 
denied a hearinq in the case, the plaintiffs have filed an appeal 
with the United States Supreme Court. 
Another Michigan case holds that the Michigan Paternity Act may 
not be used as a pro~edural device to validate a contract for 
surrogate parenting. According to the court, that law was not 
intended for determining the paternity of a child conceived in a 
surrogate parenting arrangement. The case is currently on 
appeal. In both Michigan cases, the court deferred to the 
legislature to address the matter. 
1
rn the one known California case, the surrogate mother 
refused to relinquish parental rights to the child. She had 
received neither a fee for her services nor medical expenses. 
The contract couple, who were New York residents, requested 
custody of the child. Pursuant to an out-of-court settlement, 
the surrogate kept the child, and the husband (the child's 
biological father) was acknowledged on the birth certificate as 
the natural father. Thereupon, the case was dismissed without 
prejudice. The settlement, however, left the question of future 
custody and visitation rights unresolved. Hearings in the case 
were closed, and the case file has been sealed. 
2 Doe v Kelley, 6 FLR 3011 (BNA), 106 Mich. App. 169, appeal 
denie~No. 67308. 
3
rd. at 3013. 
4svrkowski v Appleyard, 8 FLR 2139 (BNA). 
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In Kentucky, the state attorney general issued an advi 
opinion declar~ng surrogate parenting contracts to be il 
unenforceable. Citing Kentucky law which prohib s 
for adoption, the opinion states that "the strongest 
against surrogate parenting in Kentucky is found in 6 policy against the buying and selling of children. 
also relies on state statutes which prohibit a parent 
consenting to adoption and voluntarily terminating 
rights until five days after the birth of the child. 
attorney general has also filed a civil action 
of illegality and an injunction against 
Associates, Inc., a Lou~sville firm that 
couples and surrogates. A ruling in that cas 
anc 
ling 
In addition to California, a few other states con idered 
proposals to recognize contracts for surrogate paren Those 
states are Michigan, Alaska, and South Carol (Copi s of the 
bills are included in the hearing booklet.) To date, none of the 
proposals has been reported from committee, and passage s vear 
appears unlikely. 
Waiver of a Constitutional Right 
Among the many issues raised in surrogate parenting arrangements 
is whether the surrogate's right to have an abortion may be 
waived by contract. For example, the surrogate, for whatever 
reason, may breach the contract by aborting the fetus, or the 
couple, rather than accepting a child with a physiological or 
genetic defect, may require the surrogate to undergo an abortion. 
It is unclear whether a surrogate who desires an abortion within 
prescribed constitutional limits can be legally prevented from 
obtaining one. In Roe v Wade, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the right to privacy, as protected by the Ninth 
Amendment, encompasses a 8woman's decision uhether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The court held, moreover, that the 
5 7 FLR 2246 (BNA). 
6
rd. at 2247. 
7cornmonwealth v Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., No. 
81-CI-0429 (Franklin County Cir. Ct., Div. 1, filed January 27, 
1981). 
8 410 u.s. 113 (1973). [See also other decisions in vlhich the 
court has upheld the right of privacy to decide whether to 
procreate and rear children. Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 u.s. 438 
(1972); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965); Skinner v 
Oklahoma, 316 QS. 535 (1942)] 
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right can 0 be regulated only pursuant to a compelling state 
interest.J Subsequently, the court also ruled that a woman may 
decide to have an abortion irrespective of the consent of her 
husband ~O' in the case of an unmarried minor, the consent of her 
parents. It is therefore uncertain whether parties who are 
merely in a contractual relationship with the surrogate may 
override her decision to obtain an abortion. 
Under the doctrine of waiver, some coTititutional rights may be 
relinquished prior to their exercise. However, it remains 
unclear as to wheth~~ all constitutional rights can be 
irrevocably waived. There has been, as yet, no specific 
determination on whether a woman can irrevocably waive her right 
to have an abortion even if she does so in a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary manner. 
To facilitate the discussion at the hearing, witnesses have been 
asked to address the following questions: 
9 In Roe, three stages of pregnancy were outlined with respect 
to determining the state 1 s interest in abortion. During the 
first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the woman 
and her physician. In the second trimester, the state, in 
promoting the health of the mother, may regulate the abortion 
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. 
After the stage in which the fetus becomes viable, the state, in 
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may 
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is 
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. 
10Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52 (1976). 
11 1 h . h . . l b . d . For examp e, t e r1g t to a Jury tr1a may e wa1ve 1n 
both civil and criminal cases. Criminal defendants may also 
waive other procedural protections, including the right to 
counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right to appeal. 
Parties in a civil action may be found to have waived their right 
to an adjudication, either before or after the dispute arises, 
e.g., through a confession of judgment or an arbitration 
agreement. 
12For example, the freedom of religion may be waived, but the 
waiver is not irrevocable. Thomas v Indiana Employment 
Security Division, 101 S. Ct. 1425, (1981); Sherbert v Verner, 
374 u.s. 398 (1963). In these and other cases, conctitions and 
qualifications upon governmental privileges and benefits have 
been invalidated because of their tendency to inhibit 
constitutionallv protected activity. Contracts between private 
individuals which impose unconstitutional conditions, in 
comparison, may be void as against public policy. 
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Should the California Legislature give its approval to 
surrogate parenting arrangements as a matter of public 
policy? 
What statutory protections, if any, should be provided 
for persons entering into a surrogate parenting 
contract? 
What statistical information is currently availab 
regarding surrogate parenting? 
Should the established standard of "best interests f 
the child" prevail when there is a dispute between 
biological mother and the contract couple over a child 
conceived pursuant to a surrogate parenting contract? 
What long-range impact will surrogate parenting 
contracts have on children conceived by such an 
arrangement and on parties who have entered into the 
contract? 
What impact will surrogate parenting contracts have on 
the adoption program in California? 
What other considerations should be discussed before 
enacting legislation on surrogate parenting? 
If you would like more information regarding the hearing, please 
contact me at (916) 445-4560. 
-131-
EXHIBIT B 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 2, 1982 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JUNE 17, 1982 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 18, 1982 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1981-82 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 3771 
Introduced by Assemblyman Roos 
April 6, 1982 
An act to add Part 9 (commencing with Section 7500) to 
Division 4 of the Civil Code, relating to surrogate parenthood, 
and declaring the urgency thereof, to take effect 
immediately. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 3771, as amended, Roos. Surrogate Parent Act. 
Existing law does not provide a procedure for the approval 
of a petition incorporating a contract in which a woman 
agrees to be aFtifieially inseminated by the sperm of a man 
whose wife is unable to bear a child and to relinquish all legal 
rights to any child resulting from that insemination to the 
husband and wife, upon its birth, and for enforcement of such 
a contract. 
This bill would so provide, as specified. 
It also would take effect immediately as an urgency statute. 
Vote: %. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of Cahfornia do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. Part 9 (commencing with Section 7500) 
2 is added to Division 4 of the Civil Code, to read: 
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1 PART 9. SURROGATE PARENT ACT 
2 
3 7500. This part shall be known and may be as 
4 Surrogate Parent Act of 1982. 
5 7501. In enacting this part, it is the intention of 
6 Legislature to facilitate the ability of infertile couples to 
7 become parents through ffl:e use of a suFrogate 
8 establishing a pwcedure f& ffl:e execution of a contract 
9 determining ffl:e rights anEl obligations of ffl:e parties f.e an 
10 agreement f& ffl:e services of ft surrogate. become 
11 parents through the employment of the services of a 
12 surrogate. 
13 The Legislature finds and declares that contracts 
14 executed in accordance w#h ffl:e provisions of ~ t*lfl: 
15 surrogate contracts are in accord with sound social policy. 
16 7502. As used in this act: 
17 (a) "Infertile couple" means a husband who is capable 
18 of producing viable sperm and his wife who has been 
19 determined by a licensed physician to be incapable of 
20 conceiving or carrying a child to term without significant 
21 risk to her life or who has been unable to conceive for one 
22 year prior to the date of the execution of the contract. 
23 (b) "Surrogate" means a woman who consents to be 
24 artificially inseminated by a man who is the husband of 
25 a woman described in subdivision (a) and to carry any 
26 child that she conceives by that man. 
27 (c) "Surrogate contract" means an agreement 
28 between the infertile couple and the surrogate which 
29 determines the rights and obligations of each of the 
30 parties to the agreement, consistent with the provisions 
31 of this part. 
32 7503. The department of the superior court to which 
33 proceedings under the Family Law Act (Part 5 
34 (commencing with Section 4000) of Division 4) 
35 ordinarily are assigned shall have jurisdiction over all 
36 proceedings and actions pursuant to this part. 
37 7504. The infertile couple and the surrogate shall be 
38 represented by separate counsel. 
39 7505. (a) Upon the verified petition of an infertile 
40 couple and the surrogate, the court shall determine, 
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1 based on affidavits or other documentary evidence, 
2 whether the requirements of this part have been 
3 satisfied. 
4 W Unless the infertile couple ~ the surrogat:e 
5 asseRt ffi e: meeting & etfte.f. disclosure, the identity ef the 
6 surrogate sfte:H fief ee disclosed fe the infertile couple, 
7 e:nd f±le identity ef f±le infertile couple ~ fief ee 
8 disclosed ffi .tfie surrogat:e. 
9 fet A:H records pertaining ffi .tfie proceeding ~ 
10 remain ~ f±le eettff e:nd ~ ee inspected enty a,.. 
11 eettff personnel ~ sueft e#te¥ persons ftS ffiftJ' ee 
12 designated ey eettff order. 
13 -tat 
14 (b) The petition shall include all of the following: 
15 ( 1) The original executed copy of the contract. 
16 (2) Evidence of the wife's infertility. 
17 (3) Evidence of the medical evaluation of the husband 
18 and of the surrogate. 
19 (4) Evidence that the infertile couple and the 
20 surrogate have retained separate legal counsel and that 
21 the opinion of counsel in each case is that his or her 
22 client's entry into the contract is voluntary and that the 
23 client understands the terms of the contract. 
24 ( 5) Proof that the funds described in Section 7506 have 
25 been deposited in an escrow account or attorney trust 
26 account. 
27 (6) Evidence that the surrogate is at least £H. 18 years 
28 of age. 
29 (7) Evidence of the marriage of the infertile couple. 
30 (8) Evidence of the ability of the infertile couple to 
31 care for the child. 
32 -fet 
33 (c) The court shall approve the petition if it finds that 
34 the requirements of subdivision -f6t ftt:we Been HTet; e:nd 
35 (b) have been met, a report recommending approval of 
36 the petitionhas petition has been submitted by an agency 
37 approved by the court to conduct a home study of the 
38 infertile couple, and the court has reviewed any 
39 criminal record of either the husband or wlfe and found 
40 that the offense committed by that person should not 
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1 affect his or her ability to function as a 
2 fft 
3 (d) petition pursuant to part shall given 
4 calendar priority and shall be handled expeditiously~ 
5 7506~ A contract approved pursuant to this 
6 include, but shall not be limited to, all of the 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
provisions: 
fat ~ #te auuogate agrees ffi relinquish parental 
rights ffi #te efti.kl. ffi #te infertile couple immediately 
aft:eT #te child's ~ 
(a) That the surrogate agrees to relinquish all parental 
rights to, and the custody of; any child conceived as a 
result of the insemination to the infertile couple 
immediately after his or her birth, and to consent to the 
adoption of any such child by the wife. 
(b) A requirement for medical evaluation of the 
surrogate and of the husband (in the case of the surrogate 
the medical evaluation shall include psychological 
screening) . 
(c) That responsibility for all medical expenses of the 
surrogate during pregnancy and a six-week postpartum 
period shall be paid in an agreed manner. 
(d) The provision of term life and health insurance for 
the surrogate and infertile couple for such term and in 
such amounts as shall be determined by the parties to the 
contract. 
(e) That reasonable monetary compensation shall be 
paid to the surrogate by the infertile couple in an agreed 
amount. 
(f) That the amount of payment shall be placed in an 
escrow account or attorney trust account prior to the first 
insemination of the surrogate; however, a portion of the 
amount, as agreed by the parties, shall not be deposited 
until the child's birth. 
(g) That legal and equitable remedies shall be 
available in the event of a breach of the surrogate 
contract by any of the parties. 
(h) That the infertile couple agree to accept custody 
of; and parental responsibility for, any child conceived as 
a result of the insemination immediately after his or he1~ 
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1 birth. 
2 7507. As a part of its determination pursuant to 
3 Section 7505, the court shall review all information 
4 submitted by the parties to the proposed surrogate 
5 contract and may order the submission of such additional 
6 information as it deems necessary to insure the ability of 
7 the parties to comply with the terms of the surrogate 
8 contract. 
9 7508. (a) Upon the court's approval of the petition, it 
10 shall retain jurisdiction in the matter until the entry of 
11 both a decree of adoption by the wife and a decree of the 
12 paternity of the husband with regard to any child 
13 conceived atJ a msult ef the aftificial insemination agfeed 
14 f6 in: pursuant to the contract. Notwithstanding any other 
15 provision of law, such a decree shall be entered within 45 
16 days of the birth of the child. The infertile couple shall 
17 have the right to custody and control of the child prior to 
18 the entry of such a decree. 
19 The fee established by Section 10619 of the Health and 
20 Safety Code shall be paid at the time of the entry of the 
21 decree of adoption. 
22 (b) The husband shall be presumed to be the father of 
23 any ch11d born to a woman who agrees to act as a 
24 surrogate pursuant to this part that was conceived during 
25 that period of time in which it was possible for her to have 
26 conceived as a result of insemination pursuant to a 
27 contract incorporated in a petition approved pursuant to 
28 this part. This presumption shall be a presumption 
29 affecting the burden of proof and may only be rebutted 
30 as specified in Section 606 of the Evidence Code, by clear 
31 and convincing evidence. A decree made pursuant to 
32 Section 7010 establishing a father and child relationship 
33 between the child and a man other than the husband 
34 shall be considred a rebuttal of this presumption. 
35 7509. A:ftifieal insemination 9fittl.l: no.f .ffilte plaee The 
36 surrogate shall not be inseminated prior to approval of a 
37 petition pursuant to this part. 
38 7510. During the performance of the surrogate 
39 contract, the court may require such additional 
40 information from, testing of, and personal interviews 
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1 with, the infertile couple and the surrogate as it deems 
2 necessary to insure compliance with the terms of the 
3 contract. All costs incurred in this connection shall 
4 borne by the parties, as ordered by the court. 
5 7511. Upon breach of a contract that is the 
6 a petition approved pursuant to this part, the court 
7 grant such legal and equitable relief as it 
8 appropriate, including specific performance. 
9 7512. At the discretion of the supervising judge of the 
10 family law department, proceedings pursuant to this 
11 part, except for the procedures referred to in Section 
12 7511, may be heard before an official of the family law 
13 department of the superior court designated by the court 
14 for this purpose. 
15 7513. Subject to the power of the court to transfer 
16 actions and proceedings as provided in Title 4 
17 (commencing with Section 392) of Part 2 of the Code of 
18 Civil Procedure, the county in which the contract is 
19 executed is the proper county for the filing of a petition 
20 pursuant to this part; and any proceeding in connection 
21 with that petition or the contract incorporated in any 
22 petition approved pursuant to this part. 
23 7514. The presumption contained in Section 621 of 
24 the Evidence Code, and the presumptions contained in 
25 Sections 7004 and 700-X shall not be applicable to a child 
26 conceived by a woman who agrees to act as a surrogate 
27 pursuant to this part during that period of time in which 
28 it was possible for her to have conceived as a result of 
29 artificial insemination pursuant to a contract 
30 incorporated in a petition approved pursuant to this part. 
31 7515. Payments made to a surrogate pursuant to 
32 subdivision (e) of Section 7506 shall be for the purpose of 
33 compensating her for her services and the making or the 
34 acceptance of such a payment shall not constitute a 
35 violation of Section 181 or 273 of the Penal Code. 
36 7516. The court shall not approve the withdrawal of a 
37 consent to an adoption made in connection with a 
38 contract incorporated in a petition approved pursuant to 
39 this part unless it finds that extraordinary circumstances 
40 require that approval in order to protect the best 
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1 interests of the child. 
2 7517. The provisions of this part shall control over any 
3 other conflicting provision of law. 
4 7518. In the event ol a dispute as to the custody of a 
5 child conceived pursuant to a contract incorporated in a 
6 petition approved pursuant to this part, between the 
7 surrogate and the infertile couple, the provisions of the 
8 contract as to the custody of the child shall prevail over 
9 the provisions of Section 4600, unless the court finds that 
10 extraordinary circumstances require that the provisions 
11 of Section 4600 shall control. 
12 SEC. 2. This act is an urgency statute necessary for 
13 the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, 
14 or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the 
15 Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The facts 
16 constituting the necessity are: 
17 In order that the provisions of this act shall be 
18 implemented to the maximum extent, it is necessary that 
19 it take effect at the earliest possible date. 
0 
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This bill would (1) specify the p.covisions that are to be 
included in surrogate parenting contracts and (2) authorize a 
court to approve and enforce such contracts. 
DIGEST 
This bill would establish the Surrogate Parent Act to 
situations in which a married couple and a woman enter 
contract for the woman to be artificially inseminated 
husband's sperm and to carry any child conceived to term, 
whereupon the child is to be given to the e. 
to a "surrogate contract" would be "inferti 
the "surrogate," as defined. Each party would 
separate counsel. 
Under the bill, a surrogate contract would have to , but 
would not be limited to, all of the following provisions: 
1. The surrogate's relinquishment of parental rights and 
custody immediately after the child's birth, and 
consent to the wife's adoption of the child. 
2. The infertile couple's acceptance of custody 
immediately after the child's birth. 
3. Medical evaluation of the surrogate and the husband 
and psychological screening of the surrogate. 
4. Responsibility for the surrogate's medical expenses 
during pregnancy and a six-week postpartum period. 
5. Term life and health insurance for the parties. 
6. Reasonable monetary compensation in an agreed amount 
to the surrogate, with placement of the money in an 
escrow or attorney trust account prior to the first 
insemination. However, a portion of the money would 
not be deposited until the child's birth. 
7. · That legal and equitable remedies would be available 
in the event of a breach of the contract. 
The bill would also require a court, upon the parties' petition, 
to determine whether they have complied with the provisions of 
the Act. Supported by affidavits or other evidence, the 
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petition would include, amcng c.Yi.:l":,:r :o, , __ ,; ldenc·e that the 
wife is infertile, the:.::. the surrog,:t/:: 2;t •'a::;::. 1.8 years cf 
age, and tha-c the couple is m<:u·;:·i 0.1"0 ab~,; tG care for the 
child. A report recommending appcoval t~e ~etit~on must be 
submitted by an agency approved by th<2 conr t. t.o conduct. a home 
study of the infert.ile couple. The c .. Jurt so review any 
criminal records of the husband wi.fe to determine 
whether a reported offense •,.,rould fc::-ct >:".L r ,":Jbi 1 i ty to 
function as parents. At any time, co~rt could order the 
submission of more information as it deerr r,,.:cessa:r.-y. 
Upon approval of the petition, the 
jurisdiction in the matter until 
by the wife and a decree of the 
days of the birth of the child. 
including specific performance, could 
as it deems appropriate, in case of 
The bill would i~mediate ei~ect a3 an 
would control over an1' other c-c)rtfl ~-ctir1g 1)\l 
STAFF COMHENTS 
e<Tee of adoption 
, within 45 
itable remedies, 
'd the court, 
contract. 
statute and 
s ~.on of law. 
1. This bill states that the proposed Suc:,Y; ?u.r·2nt Act. is 
intended to facilitate the ab:.11xy of i:lf•::>r:ciJ.e couples to 
become parents through the emp oymcnt of the ;sc.cvices of a 
surrogate. It also states 2 l islative finaing and 
declaration that surrogate contracts are in accord with 
sound social policy. 
The source of the bill, the Surrogate Par~nt Foundation, 
claims that the availability in s for ion is 
virtually nonexistent due to birth control, abortion, and 
the choice of many unwed mothers to their ldren. As 
a result, some infertile couples have t~ to, or want to 
participate in, surrogate motherhood jn o_ er to have a 
family. The source argu~s , oeG~us e surrogate 
arrangement has become a viable alternative method of human 
reproduction, legislation is nDw needed to authorize it. 
Concerned with charges of baby-s ling, coercion, inadequate 
legal representation or ~ sc:ree;y; , ive 
participants and their attor fear tha- surrogate 
contracts may be construed as ileg l sines no law 
affirmatively permlts the ,;..:- c:mE'nL, 
Surrogate motherhood is controversi.:;.l, pr.·es,;nting many 
legal, ethical, and public policy <pJ..c:st.ions. As a 
reproductive procedure, it may b~ 3r~6 to artificial 
insemination by a donor, i tseH' o .. ce rrH.:stionable but now a 
socially and legally acceptable ice us~d to help women 
with infertile husbands to c~ Surrogate contracts 
attract couples who have giv(::n the mat: 1>2r a great deal of 
thought and who are financially c~p ~ of entecing into the 
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arrc.ngeme;nt. The c 
adopt. A contr~ct th2n to 
adoption vJai~ing lists , nt c~1(: 
biolog1.cal. nexus to t:he ::..·.:..d. 
cost, some Cal:~.fornia c zens 
have ready entered into such 
births. 
-~ l2 or 0nwilling to 
~vc~d e delay of 
~:am::: r:J.::J~e, to e:stablish a 
te e controversy and 
v,;:.:r~,. srnal1 nwnber, 
w1. t.h com p 1 et ed 
Opponent.s of this bill claLm t"chll . r.::oezld . .:;t c::cagic 
impact on parti.es to a sur-roc:a·cc~ :;or:. ·<Ct, chi 1:1ren borne of 
this arrangE:~mei'\t, anrl soci ~t. l ctrfte ._ ·Tr-, cl aj.m that the 
proposal lishes , .. (, ~-a.r:y consideration 
in the creation of parent- ild relat In addition, 
the psychological and ethica: surrogate 
arrangements, opponents note, have y~ received 
sufficient study to justify codif c~t ou cf the surrogate 
parent concept at this t Th concerns such as the 
effect of surrogate parentinq ·)n thE: snrrogate' s other 
children who know that a br.othL~r or sisb'!r was given away; 
the surrogate's own lonq-t_err.1 dmotion 1 to the 
experience; and the child's a lity to cope vlith being the 
product of a surrogate parenting relatJ.on Opponents 
urge that serious study be given to SQr dte parenting 
before this bill is enacted. 
Should legislation be enacted to 1egit:irnize surrogate 
contracts and set forth guidelines for them? If so, should 
it be enacted now? 
2. This bill would expressly e U:1at payments pursuant to 
a surrogate cont are compensa~ the surrogate's 
services and do not constitute violation of baby-selling and 
payment-for-adoption statu·tes (Penal Code Se:::tions 181 and 
27 3). 
Current law makes the legal stat.us of surroga:ce parenting 
contracts uncertain. In so~e arrangem~nts, surrogate 
receives no financial compensation. Howe·Jer, where 
compensation is given, the fertile couple and the 
surrogate may be subject to prosecu~ion under felony and 
misdemeanor statutes. Penal Code Sect lHl makes it a 
felony to sell or pay for th Cc'-l::> cc;dy ci. a human being. 
Penal Code Section 273 makes i·t a r:n ::je.n~.:l:~nr to pay money 
to a parent, other than mat ~ted 0r necessary 
1 iv.:;,ng expenses, lll return fo:r pl .~<.c .. ':-j ,~: cni for 
adoption. Uhder the iracy pcovJ.s~ons of Penal Code 
Section 182, attorneys, physicians, others participating 
in surrogate arrangements might be in violation of 
Sections 181 and 273. Moreover, sirce Civil Code Section 
224p makes it a misdemeanor for someon2 other than a 
1 icensed adoption agency to a.dvert.ise .for adoption, 
attorneys who advertise in seeking surrogates may be 
prosecuted. 
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While these statut:es ar<:: inu:.n.ded to pronocc: t.he public 
interest in deterring baoy-sell and black market 
adoption, they may nonetheless cre2tt~ legal obstacles to 
surrogate renting. To date, ~? casss ln the surrogate 
context have been prosecuted by tne dttorney general or a 
district attorney. This bill wo~~d r6quire a surrogate 
contract to provide for "reasonaDl•::: P1onetary compensation" 
to the surrogate. The source, however, lieves that 
surrogate parenting is beyond the scope any baby-selling 
or payment-for-adoption st-at~lte be.cau~:>e the 
surrogate's services that are by the couple and she 
carries their child in her womb .::o.s a cn1stec~. 
Should the bill also include an exc 
Section 224p? 
ion to Civil Code 
3. This bill would authorize contracts in which a surrogate 
agrees to be artificially inseminated with the husband's 
sperm, to carry the child conceived to term, and to 
relinquish her parental rights and custody of the child to 
the husband. It assumes that the husband, as the biological 
father, will establish paternity and the fertile wife, as 
a stepmother, will adopt the child. (Civil Code Section 
226.9 permits a stepparent to adopt a chi where one 
natural parent retains custody and control of the child.) 
The bill would create a new presumption of paternity under 
which the husband would be t_he presumeJ father of a child 
born to a surrogate durin9 the t.ime which it. was possible 
for her to conceive as a result of the contract. The 
presumption would be. one which affects the burden of proof 
and rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. A decree 
establishing paternity in another man would be a rebuttal of 
the presumption. 
As stated in proposed Section 7514 of the bill, existing 
presumptions of paternity under Evidence Code Section 621 
and Civil Code Sections 7004 and 7005 vJon d be inapplicable 
in the surrogate parent context. Under Evidence Code 
Section 621, the child of a wife cohabiting with her 
husband, who is not impotent or steriler is conclusively 
presumed to be a child of the marriage. Recent amendments 
to Section 621 permit either the wlfe {¥Iith the 
acknowledgement of the child's biological father) or her 
husband to contest the pres~Ttption through a motion for 
blood tests, except in cases of artificial insemination 
performed with the husband's consent. Civil Code Section 
70D4 sets forth a series of rebuttable presumptions of 
paternity under the Uniform Parentage Act as adopted in 
California (Civil Code Section 7000 et 5'~·) Civil Code 
Section 7005 expressly denies any parental rights to a man 
whose semen has been used by a physician to artificially 
inseminate any woman other than his wife. The woman's 
husband is treated as the child's natural father. 
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To establish a parent and child relationship between a child 
and his or her natural father, an action may be brought 
under the Uniform Parentage Act. Although this bill would 
create a presumption of paternity for the surrogate parent 
context, it fails to provide a mechanism whereby a contract 
father would be able to acknowl paternity. Should the 
bill be coordinated with form Parentage Act in order 
to give a contract father ing therein to bring an 
action to establi 
4. This bill would permit court to grant legal and 
equitable remed , as it deems , when any party 
breaches the surrogate usual legal 
remedy damages lows specific 
performance, i.e., the actual carrying out of the contract 
in the manner agreed upon. Courts will compel and 
coerce specific performance a contract where money 
damages would not adequately compensate for its 
nonperformance. As a general rule, specific performance is 
limited to certain types of contracts, such as those entered 
into for the sale of land or unique property. Courts 
typically will not order specific performance to enforce 
contracts for personal services. 
The most obvious concern regarding a surrogate contract is 
its enforceability. This bill would require particular 
provisions to be included in the contract, with any number 
of other terms added to fit the parties' needs. Among the 
mandatory provisions would be the surrogate's agreement to 
relinquish her pare~tal rights and custody of the child 
immediately after the child's birth and to consent to 
adoption by the wife. In the one known case in which the 
surrogate refused to give up the child, the couple dropped 
the lawsuit before the court could rule on the matter. 
Thus, a surrogate contract has not, as yet, been tested in 
the courts. 
The bill would specify that, in the event of a custody 
dispute between the infertile couple and the surrogate, the 
contract would prevail over Civil Code Section 4600 unless 
"extraordinary circumstances" are found to require Section 
4600 to control. (Section 4600 provides that in family law 
proceedings, as between a child's natural parents, custody 
is to be granted to both parents jointly or to either 
parent, according to the child's best interests.) Likewise, 
the surrogate's consent to adoption could not be withdrawn 
unless the court fi.nds that "extraordinary circumstances" 
require withdrawal to protect the child's best interests. 
What types of situations would constitute "extraordinary 
circumstances"? 
If the surrogate decides to keep the child, would it be 
sound public policy to compel her to give the child to the 
Consultant L. Young 
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couple, absent 11 extraorC.inary circumstances"? If not 
considered paramount, should the natural mother's parental 
rights to the child be seen as co-equal to the contract 
father's rights? To what extent could the best interests of 
the child be protected? Would the child have to be 
represented by counsel? 
Other complications involving breach of the surrogate 
contract may be generated, depending on the terms of the 
particular agreement. For example, would a couple be forced 
to accept a deformed or retarded child? Would a surrogate 
be compelled to undergo an abortion if testing indicated 
Down's syndrome? 
Problems of supervision often accompany the remedy of 
specific performance. For example, if the surrogate 
breaches an agreement not to smoke or take nonprescription 
drugs during the pregnancy, could the court, as a practical 
matter, supervise specific performance? 
5. This bill would enable the parties to a surrogate contract 
to obtain court approval of the contract. It would also 
allow judicial oversight of the surrogate parent arrangement 
from the time a contract is executed. The court may order 
the parties to submit additional information upon filing of 
the petition and during the performance of the contract to 
ensure the parties' ability to comply with the contract 
terms. Given the individuals who decide, and are 
financially able, to enter into surrogate motherhood, does 
this proposal represent excessive protection? Should the 
court become involved in a surrogate arrangement only when 
there is an alleged breach of the contract and when the wife 
applies for a stepparent adoption? Would registration and 
regulation of surrogate contracts, as a device for 
preconception adoption, be better left to a social services 
agency than to the courts? 
6. The bill would make approval of the petition contingent on 
a favorable report submitted by an agency which the court 
approves to conduct a home study of the infertile couple. 
Should the agency procedure include psychological counseling 
of the couple? 
7. The provisions of the proposed Surrogate Parent Act would 
apply only to infertile married couples. Should fertile 
married couples and single persons be allowed to contract 
for a surrogate's services? 
8. Under this bill, no provision would be made for maintaining 
the confidentiality of court records. Should the records 
concerning a petition for approval of a surrogate contract 
remain sealed? 
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9. This bill would require a court, upon petition, to 
determine whether the sions of the proposed Surrogate 
Parent Act have been satisfied. Upon approval of the 
petition, the court wou retain j sdiction until the 
husband has established the wife has adopted 
the child. The bill does the court to issue a 
decree approving the is procedure intended 
to validate a surrogate contract so the issue of 
validity need not n any subsequent action 
based on breach contract? If so, should it be 
specified that 11 issue a decree declaring 
approval of es the surrogate 
contract? 
10. Under this bill, e fe would iate a 
stepparent adoption of conceived by the 
surrogate. The bill would e filing fee for 
the petition for adoption would be pa at the time the 
decree of adoption is entered. However, existing Health and 
Safety Code Section 10619 ires the filing fee to be paid 
when the petition is filed. Should this portion of the bill 
conform to existing law? 
11. The bill would require couns for to the 
surrogate contract to state an opinion his or her 
client's entry into the contract is voluntary and that the 
client understands the terms of the contract. If the 
attorney believes that the client is acting voluntarily and 
understands the contract provisions but the client later 
reneges on the contr~ct, would the attorney incur any 
liability to the other party? 
12. This bill would provide that the court, prior to approving 
the petition, would review any criminal record of the 
husband and wife for a finding on the ability of each to 
function as a parent. If the court finds that the criminal 
record of either reflects unfitness as a parent, it would 
withhold approval of the petition. Would the court consider 
both convictions and arrests? Specifically, what offenses 
would render a party unfit to be a parent? 
13. Portions of this bill need technical revision. 
a. Proposed Section 7503 should be revised to read "The 
superior court shall have jurisdiction over all 
proceedings and actions pursuant to this part." 
b.· In proposed Section 7505, delete "documentary" from 
"documentary evidence". 
c. Proposed Section 7507 should be revised to read "In 
making a determination pursuant to Section 7505, the 
court shall review all information submitted by the 
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petitioner and may order the submission of such 
additional information as it deems necessary to insure 
the ability of the ~arties to comply with the terms of 
the surrogate contract." 
d. In proposed Section 7508(a), delete "such a decree," 
and insert "each decree". 
e. Proposed Section 7512 should be revised to read "At 
the discretion of the court, proceedings pursuant to 
this part, except for the procedures referred to in 
Section 7511, may be heard before a commissioner or 
referee." 
14. AB 365 (Roos), which, except for the urgency clause, is 
identical to this bill, was scheduled to be heard in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on August 3, 1982. 
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SOURCE 
Surrogate Parent Foundation 
SUPPORT 
The Committee on Adoptions of the State Bar of California 
OPPOSITION 
Los Angeles County Adoption Council 
Quo Vadis Family Center 
California Catholic Conference 
California Conference of Catholic Charities 
Concerned United Birthparents, Inc. 
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EXHIBIT C 
f 
\!,Jo, vv::; didn't find you under o crJbba~;JC !eof, dear, ond the stork 
di~h't bring ycu. Do you knov1 ¥/hat a surrogate mo·!her is'!•' 
t --·----------·----------· 
Renault, Sacramento Bee 
Auqust 15, 1982 
Fcruw, Paqe 2 
Reprinted bv Permissio~ 
-148-
l 
I 
I 
·OFFICERS 
W•!liam C. Gentry 
William W. Handel 
Bernard A. Sherwyn 
Surrogate Parent F oundation9 Inc" 
A CALIFORNIA NON-PROFIT CORPORATION 
12301 WILSHIRE BLVD., SUITE 420 
LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 
{213) 820·4723 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
EXHIBIT D 
DIRECTORS 
William G. Karow, M.D .. F.A.C.S. 
John A. FitzRandolph, J.D. 
Prolf!!uor ot Uw 
Nina F. Kellogg, Ph.D. 
June M. Remisch, Ph.D. 
The following terms are defined by the Surrogate Parent 
Foundation to clarify the individuals and procedures relating 
to the practice of Surrogate Parenting. 
Infertility - The inability to conceive after being exposed to one's 
mate for one year. In instances where Surrogate Parenting is 
being considered, it is the wife's infertility that constitutes 
an "infertile couple". 
Surrogate Parenting - An alternate method of childbearing for an infertile 
couple when the wife is unable to bear a child. In this procedure, 
a woman known as .the surrogate agrees to be art if ically 
inseminated with the husband's sperm and carry the baby for the 
couple. The surrogate agrees to relinquish all parental rights. 
The husband, being the natural father, assumes custody with his 
wife who then legally adopts the child. 
Infertile Couple - A married couple in which the wife is infertile (see 
above definition) and the husband is fertile. 
Artificial Insemination - Placing the sperm in the mouth of the womb 
by means other than intercourse. In a surrogate arrangement, it 
is the sperm of the husband of the infertile couple. 
Surrogate - Fertile female over age 21 who agrees to be inseminated with 
the sperm of the husband of the infertile couple and carry the 
child for them. She further agrees to relinquish any parental 
rights at the time of the birth. 
Natural Father - Husband of the infertile wife, and biological father 
to the infant carried by the surrogate. He merely assumes 
custody as the natural father. 
Adoptive Mother - Also known as the infertile wife. She is the wife 
of the natural father and obtains a standard step-parent adoption 
of the child. 
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Adoption placa~ent and adoptions re~Jest: 
L.A. CHAPTER CHILDRENS HOHE SOCIETY 
J1.rs. Jorge (213) 306-4654 
630 Shatto Place L.A.CA 
HOLLY F.~ILY SERVICES 
Mrs. Sullivan (213} 484-1441 
357 S. Westlake Ave. - L.A.CA 
COUNTY BUREAU OF ADOPTION 
Mrs. Trader (213) 738-3673 
2550 W. Olympic Bl. - L.A.CA 
COUNTY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF ADOPTION 
~Js. Clemmons (213} 738-3274 
2550 W. Olympic Bl. - L.A.CA 
1980 
1981 
1980 
1981 
1980 
1981 
EXHIBIT E 
ADOPTIONS 
480 
408 
94 
85 
528 
524 
WILL!t..M C. GEtHRY 
;.lESft..MCH DI~EC10R 
REQUEST 
6300 
6500 
739 
805 
958 
948 
Independent Adoption Placement 
1980 CENSUS OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY: 
7,477503 
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~~-----.~----~ ~ 111 wr!ety of IWE!ii'INIL "We'N to lfiUIIIl 
-·l'fl oot p~tylftl fl'lf' a clilld-IM clilld 1111 ~ OUI'8. 
IM'ftiY p~tyU\1 fCC' l.hllllt'illther l.o eGT'1 1M clillci 
1M law does !liOt. dlllee!m 1M dlff~ bet~ 
clilld. M'!l'inlll cltl1d and II clllJd ~ JOW1!. 
one m,~ ~ 'anatlnl ~.'If you 
tlke away any part of thlt. lla1 :rou talul away !.he ldd 
from 1M naun! mcther and pay It« 1101111e WdiJJ for it.. 
:rou bur yt.lUI'Illelf a Jlli!IIIIMI full of trouble. ~ 14 
t.be pmal fltltl.!ta. 
AI1Citlwr ~t Handel Ill ~ Is the !'Jiet 
that m!Orlymoo& donoi' INeminatloftll (for 'IIP'IliiMD 'tiJboee 
b!JIIb.Mda 11ft lnfl!f'We 01' have &ad ~) have 
beer! ~lace fi'W 25 YI!IUS. "ll'a just the l"f:Va"llle at 
· the ~te II:IOther l!ltU.IIItkm 1M nobody' a e-rer com-
plained about it. The ~I.e~ llituation II a lit· 
!.le bit more compUeated ~the plumblnc'• differ. 
ent. a woman actlllllly hu l.o eG'f"1 a e!Uid for lliDe 
-~ and IP'ffl binh and tbel'fl'a a lot &Nat« na. De· 
pcM!it.inl spmn Into a eonllllMf' In a dotter's omc. dooea 
not eniJill a §l"f::lt delU of rillk. but c:Gnidh"kw!AIIy a 
lep.ily we l.hlnk It's l.he I.IIII'M. • 
Beyond that. Handell.bina he's found a ~or 
two In Callfomilllaw,looplloie~~ he'd !'lldler Dilt ~
!.hal will further prot.eet him and bill clieal.l. 
But what If one olllia 8t.lmlflll.e mot.Mra cbanp8 ller 
mll'll1 811 JoAn. Bb.imanlln Arelldia jUet did? 
!Apl, Mend~ · l 
uwe . try l.o be a liule more aaretul In t~~electin« OUt 
~ate mothen than they wel"f: In that cue.· say1 
Hatldel. ·u they clwlged their mlndll. firlt of a11 they I 
wooldn't ll!t 1M money and lleCOI'Idly, lbey'd ftnd them· 
!!elves Involved in very l.ar1e laW!!Uil.l. I have a lool 1 
coovef811lion with our surrogate lllOlbenl dl8etai.!lg not 
only tM le-gal ramtficaUons but the mora.II'1I.IJUf1c:AIUonL 
1 teil l.Mm. 'Ybu'l"f: B'Oill8 to be l'Uillllnl ~ -
people wbo simplY do not~ with JOU.' " 
In bill ovnultuation. however. Hmdel aaya be b..run't 
encoontered 1.o0 much roorallndJ«nadoc <m!r' what he'a 
doin!J. "Mo!lt people I aeelllgl'1!e wbolebNrtedly wtth the 
~ 't'i'lere'a no doubt In lll.Y mind !.bat the"~e l!'fl 
millionll of ~ who would lfO the way oliJI.IM'OiliiCII 
puenung If lt wm! made lepi," he .,... "But are there 
i!lll.l.lon8 of surrogate ll'IOtben? lilt worth IJOOII t.1!routJb 
tile lwllrle ollegislatton and bulld!nl ill'i enliR new -
of law If there's only four WOIMD who 11ft fOinii.O ® It 
a year! Ira a b~ ill.lbjecl.. ~ 
I 
t 
_1'tN.diy, NovemlliPr JO, 1981 
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f 
?otentoal surrogate Karen Smith expects thP 
.adoptong couple tn the delivery room woth her 
1 
lynne Endocott contends wrrogate motherhood 
wtll utosfy monetary and emotional needs . 
basic conc~rn, 
you want do 110metmng 
M this'" 
"lt"s a bt!Sl~• endeavor 
t1sfoes monetary 
!Jonal n~:· er, 
diCOU., a diVOMOei! and 
dent With an II -ye!U 
year-old of her own. 
eu.y pregnandea and ell,lOY l.h~ 
Orange County 
Books/Society 
PanV 
"But we've de<:!d«< it wouldn'l ~ 
to have a cJOf>e r<'lat!onSh!p." 
contmued. 'The mother's 
to lake baby nght after 1 
r I! and ~ internal mother 
nght then and there." 
One woman on the Slll'I'Ogat.e J>ll· 
l'lem _, SI.JRROO!I.TES. P•C"B 
(/) (!) 
rn ~--' 
r->·(1) 
0 (IJ 
::J ---~·----------------
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:::1 
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OGATES: 
roblems Posed 
- &oMs ., ... hp ~ &rtll!tt, 11M never had a cltild t>efol'1!, but 
-~\ly bollll1 oon~ KeUou l!he oould become u 
:~ve ~te lllOtber who would not change 1\er 
• mind and decide to keep tile baby m the end. Kellogg 
! revealed that Bartlett bed IAI!IIured her that in the event 
'&he truly Wllllled to kee!)Ule baby she would atill give it 
; up. reuollin& "1 will make 11n0tber baby for myself." 
; Responding to a quution from the audience that q• 
•seated tbat surrogate mctberhood wu e!lllentially ''pl'1!· 
: IJUidltaled abandonm8Dt," Bartleu. Aid. "Premeditated 
: abandonmeut ~ me. This child 1\u more love tl\an 
• probably tile ma)Ofity ot the cl\ildren who are con-
; ceived.ljUI!t can'liii.Y any more." 
, A clinical PIIY<:hol.og~~~t and a board member ol' Re· 
:ao~ve Infertility Inc .• tl\rough wluch she worlr.B will\ 111· 
; fertile oouple!l. Kellogg il&8Ul'ed tbe audience that one of 
• her chief coneems is if a wollli!Jl "can hlrve a child and 
' . t up and be all righL 
ou have my pi'OIIl.iM ll\at if it doean't work in a COI.l-
ean. I will be tbe first to say 1t." she Insisted. "but 
't go to Ule llte111ture ( u there l8 none). We have 
1.."'' 
at Kellogg wd aile has obl!erved so far, however, 
the bonding~ appeat!l to be not between 
:the surrogate and "her belly" but bet wean the surro-
J&te and tl\e couple. The surrogate mothers Kellogg hu 
~worked Wltb do not speak of the cluld they ll!'e carrying 
-:M "my baby" bill. ra!.hel: "their baby." 
I 'I'm 1M Pl...,.ltlac' She wd tile attitude of many surrogates amounts to 
jfunply. "I'm not the motner. I'm the plumbing providing 
:J.Ile opportunity for her to be tile mother." 
~ It wu precisely that v!ew-:the objee. tifytng of the 
iiflumail body-tl\at seemed to dlllturl> the memben1 of a 
~~ of rebg100a and etlucs spec!.ali.sts tnvtted to speak 
~symp011.1um. 
Profesaor Mananne Sawicki, a Catholic sacramental 
and d!rt!ctor of the gradu.ate program in rell· 
cation at Loyola Marymount Uruvemty. sald 
nd the other members of her panel all were 
-slruek" by the "dehumanwng" language that seemed 
.Jn ;u:eompany the phenomenon of surrogate p!lrenting. 
' "I have to t.alt.e the posttton that one may not give 
an ovum. My body Ill not a !.tung," Sawickt said. 
t doea it mean when l give away my body? When 1 
way an ovum!'' 
I at 1t meant to Sawtcld waa that the mother would "mamt.am the social and paycholog~<:al conneeuon tile life that wtH be begotten." ~ addition. Sawtcln slud that the chtld.ren of surra-· 
• arrangementil would not be loved unconditionally, 
cent.rat:tuall y the!t' iidOpUng parents. already had l 
-1 4-
specified that IIU1'l'Ogate motllera would nave no hl.wtory 
of dlaealle. be of Ule prop« race. be good stud<lmts and 
more. "That l)aby will be loved beeauee it fultllla the 
program. Chances ll!'e it CllllOOl l'ulfill aU the elqle(:ta· 
tiona of tile adopting parenl.l. That'a'nOt an ~lion· 
al aeceptanee ol' a chll.d." 
S&wlclu wj!Jlt on to u.y tl\at the difference betw~ , 
, 1"1-.-SURBOGAft:IS. ..._ t I 
'Problems Posed ln&lill the pooalbility of apklitallon when you bl'inC It Into the eunahlne of the law/' Rooo warned hla audience. which Inc.! I Jod many cou • 
plM mvesupunr the pooiiblllty of havtnr a ehild with • 
lll1T<l1Jilte. thai he would need their continued IIJPilOft li 
he hoped to get auch potenually "oxploolve" leplatlon 
paaa<od. He wd he -lilld a certain amount of outrage 
from the "unknowing public" which might lni!IIJ11ret !ua 
efforta .. another e:wnple of "Callfanua frultl an<l 
CMI:l ........ ~ ... lid! 1'-
~ an<~  through 8\ll't'Ogalill 
f~mn,. "alwa)11 involvl!!!l an (un· 
!IO<M oort." With the li\llT(liJate· 
or<~ Cl'<>llinl! a tragiC Cll'CUDI• 
"n·•~·•ft•l" material 
"toSJI!llaway re-
~billty, to abdicate or 
~er~w retlpOMi· 
blllty." 
In the llltliatlooof-
parenthood, !Wmmei 
"'\' 00 M'lllnU!n<llni to 
I cl!J1d to be de• I 
~~!"~wed of a parent." 
~ lntllcated ba f-..4 
~ ehlldnn 'III'OUid be 
nw.llld u eommodllleoi or 
mantliactur•d ltema. 
"When yoo pay money. 
theft ia a tend.mey to lhinl< 
100 lihollld pt value." he 
obaerwed. ~ auch 
potentl&l reacUona u "Did 
Nlnll Kl!lklgg ! ,.,t a good one? Do I have 
toweu..t?" 
In Krimmel wondered about the polillntl&l 
aay~ m od<:lpting family and whether the Mt· 
uraJ father would clalm l'OO<'tlO nght to the child than hla 
Wlfe (lll divoree p~. for example) becauee "I 
have a bwl~ rela!Jollllltip but you dOn't" 
MOIU!Igll<lr J'*ph Poll&ro. who _..,..., u peraonal 
theol~ to Cardinal Timothy MannlnB. Wd the Cath· 
otic chureh ill~ to the """"""ngly pro-life" prac-
tice of surrogate PM'enUng fill' a number of reasona. 
''The "'""' prolllern pomt of retlecuon that the 
Chnsuan or CatholiC Clm•uan hlll! to go through ia the 
nature of the marnage," saJd Pollard. "It il for life. be-
tween two people and exclus•ve of another love. That 
meant~ the trwt ol the womb 1• truly of love. The prob-
lem 111 that you'"' mtroduc•ns a thlrd party into the 
mom~. The child io a inot of the surrogate mother. 
not the husband lilld wlie. That'• why you don't find at· 
f.irmatJOn of .rurt'<lgaung m the Catholic church." 
AN-tin VIew 
Pollard remmded the .....,mbly that the -.e of lUI'· 
parenung wu not reelly new and thai the 
l!u h~Y lu!4 a negative vtew <II.~ 
or relal.lveo or mybody else" to irlllenunale a 
woman. even tar the purpo11e of producing tuwre klnp 
arqueens. 
Pollard brought up the potenl.lal prolllema for the 
cluld. "Such • cluld would never make Jl m the priell.· 
hood or make a.. a bl@bop or pope," h<t said. explaining 
that the cluld of a 3Utl'Ogale would be ruled out b«auH 
lUll parent>' conduct w u not beyond repro&<: h. 
Polterd allo commented on the brochure publllhed by 
the Surrogate Parent Foundation Inc .. wluch aponaored 
the sympoelum and whoo!le directoro include both Han-
del Kellogg and others actively Involved m prodw:ul& 
babies through surrogate-parent relai.IOnahiP<L 
Saya the brochure, ''The notion of surrogate parent· 
mg datell back 4.000 yellt8. According lo th~ Bible. Ge· 
""""'chapter 16. Abraham's w1fe Sarah could not con· 
ce1ve. so she sent her husband to sleep With her Egyp-
tian lllllld. Hagar. who !>ore Abraham's son. Ishmael, for 
them. " 
"Arofu:ial msemmal.loo w"" developed and succeos· 
fully U8l!d tn 1550 by EustacluW! (pbysiCUln to the 
pope). The freez1ng ol sperm {wh1ch can mruntam 118 
hfe) dates back to 1176, developed by an Jtallan pnest. 
Lazaro Spula:t.mt" 
Diff•nat Jaterpt<et&tioa 
Pollard conteo<ied lh.at ocnptural ochola:ra do not•n· 
terpret. Genetns chapter 16 m the a.ame way the Surro~ 
gate Parent Foundauon 00.,.. He added that the refer-
ence to the pope's phys1c1an and an ltahan pnest do not 
constitute "a statement of favor from the church." 
In two panel d!JicUlll>!Ons covenng lhe legal and leiJIS· 
laf.ive aspe<:l8 of surrogate parentlllg, the fact that there 
are no dear laws or mtM!h Jega1 precedent for surrogate 
parentmg was •tresaed repeatedly. In fact the only 
thmg that seemed evtdent from these dJSCU.SSJona was 
that not>O<ly knows for sure what Will happen 1f new 
laws ar• ool p~, laws spec1f1cally excluding SU!TO· 
gate parenung from eJO•ung statutes on baby buytng 
and !¥e!hng (which JS tllega.J }.laws wh1ch create new re· 
gulauon and standards lor contracta and adopuon 
procedures re!aung t.D surrogate parent sJluabona or 
laws w!uch specllltally proh1b1t surrogate parentmg. 
A proposed act reguiatmg •urrogate parenung, creat-
'E'd by law students m a cJaaa of Professor John A. F1tz~ 
Randolph's at Wh1tUer CoUegeSchool of Law. was pre· 
semed 1o the sympoemm audience, State ....,mbly~ru~n 
Ml!r.e R<loo (D.Loo Angeles) told the crowd that he was 
oonsldermg apol..-tn!! • ucll an act becawoe "If people 
want children, they should have every entitlement to <lo 
that. 
"There ia far more activity in thia """" than we can 
even comprehend." he said. adding that &nee surrogate 
parentin& fall• into a "gray a.rea" of the law, tltet'e 
"tremendoul potentl&l for aploitatil:>n by till.I!Crupulouo 
individuala . . , Bl& money ia clwl8iJ!s hand&. You ellm • 
1'1--.SUIUIOGATI:II.. ..... 111. 
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, ~daao4 ,,...,.. Gdo 1'•1• 
nuuo" trymg to !eplize "a!lliWIIve state orgy," 
....,~lib"" uked why the Jl!'OI)Otled surrogate law lnclud· 
ed no limllauone on llttorneY'• fee~~ for handling th-
c.aae-. Rooe. wbo i>l not an attorney. rephed. "Let'a 110( 
kJCI<~Urselvee. I work With, well. every other dell< lAo oc- , 
cup1ed by a lawyer. You start lookmg at a bill that hu a 
cap on !eea and you're loolung at a dead bill." 
Arid what has happened 1n the abeence of legislation? 
fn•th" Clll!e ol the two surrogate mothero who have 
born cblldren for couple• repreaenlilld by am Handel 
and )ua ueodate &mard Sherwyn. Handel said the 
adopUone were handled u "stan<llrd atep-parenl adop-
tJo~~ and were nol in Callfwnla u the adoptin& parentl 
lived out ofauu.e. 
1: 
)faJ<tr ...,.!em 
Dot. said Sllerwyn. the ma)Ot' problem that l'IOIIIllllll 
'1ltlresolved ia what happena wnen the IUI'1'0p!e mother 
~to give up the baby. · 
::ln the situation of the surrogate mother who lalla to 
gjv' up the baby. we have our bas1c rughtmare. What 
lVI!' e:q>ect in r.!atity IS a custody battle. We would hope 
tt would be dealt With m the IWtle way u a dilaoluUon of 
lnemage Situation, di!Clded in the best intereat of the 
ch)ld. The court hu ruled on very few CUM on thiaaub-
ject and In no caBell in th" state of Calliomla." 
David Leavitt an attorney IP«ializtJ:ll in adoption 
law and an adVIser to the State Bar of Calliomia Com· 
mittee on AdoptU>ns, argued. however, thai contracll 
bet ween li\llT(liJate ll'lOthel'l!l an<~ adopting couples may 
ultimately prove worthle~~ if the lllll'l'OJill't wmll to , 
ke.;p her child. ~ 
"I'm afraid that no matter what they put on paper 
that there ia no ooort tn the land that bas indicalilld the , 
sllgt>teet willlngn""" to enforce a contraet of this kind." 
he aaid. "The courta Will not fore" women to part With 
babtes they give birth to m the abaence of egreglooa 
misconduct on the mother's part." 
'GuiltT of Malpra<fl .. '
LeaVJtt allo con!ended lhat contracll he bad heard 
deccribed unduly favored the adoptmg parenl8 aM dJd 
not safeguard the righta of surrogate mothers." Any at-
torney who would permit a client (surrogate mother) to 
8JI!ll the ldnd of contract Mr. Handel hu described to 
you would be guilty of malpractice," he said. "Unl- a 
better way can be found. r can aMUre you the State Bar 
Will fight it totally and probably successfully." 
Then he added, "Thill sort of thing can be a bleoaing to 
infertile couple•. but lilt hit> the fan, guy•. you're in 
ternble trouble li yov start out m the state of Calllor-
nla." 
Ideas. both opposing and complimentary, flew back 
and forth hke that all day and also mcluded reports from 
ferullty spe<:1aJ1st Dr. Wilham Karow and June Rem-
!&ell, a developmental psycho-endocnnologiat, both di-
notors of the Surrogate Parent FoundatiOn. 
'Really Grut' 
When 1t was all over. 1t seemed obv1ous the audience 
had plenty to thmk about. and at least one woman weQl 
home relieved to know how openly surrogate parentmg 
lS bemg discussea and debated, I 
• Siud Sharon Sharpe. who W1th her husband ill oon- 1 
s1dermg adopting a ch1ld carr1ed by a surrogate mother. 1 
"When 1 f~r3t heard of th1a, l thought It would be t1k:~J 
Middle Ages where you go behmd a butcher shop and 
Alllllfthem a bag of money. But Um,. really great.." 
~- ... -..J.t.. ....... , • ..__.,.,,_ • ..........,__ ~.~~~.~~"""""~ -"--·~· ~ 
•· 
IN THE HOUSE 
HOUSE RILL NO. 
EXHIBIT G 
Introduced: 4/14/81 
Referred: Health,Education & 
Social Services 
BY BEIRNE AND METCALFE 
tH·THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 
TWELFTH LEGISLATURE 
A BIU .. 
FIRST SESSION 
I For an Act entitled: "An Act relat to bear children and parent 
1 child relationship, and providing an 
8 date. n 
9 8! IT F.NACTEO BY THE LI~GISLATURE OF TKE STATE OF ALASKA: 
10 
13 
14 
15 
18 
18 
19 
:u 
'22 
2l 
25 
* Section 1. AS 20.20 h amended by adding a new section to read: 
• Sec. 20.20.020. CONCEPTION BY AGREEMENT. A written agreement 
providing that a woman be impregnated by artificial insemination for 
the purpose of conceiving a child with sperm from a man other than her 
husband and providing compensation to the woman for bearing the child 
may be entered into and is enforceable according to its terms. A child 
~orn to a woman as a result of artificial insemination under an agree-
ment entered into as provided in this section is considered for all 
purposes the natu~al and legi~imate child of the man who furnished the 
sperm. The rights of a parent are relinquished by the woman and the 
relationship of parent and child as to the woman is terminated on birth 
of the child. 
* Sec. 2. . ?his Act takes effect on the effective date of an Act which 
requires reporting to the court ~ny compensation or expenses paid to the 
mother of a child being adopted and which allows relinquishment of the 
parent and child relationship on payment to the mother of an agreed-on 
~ompensation for time and services in bearing the child • 
.. 1- HB 498 
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~..J:zlm ;§tah~ 1fi£g t5Ia±ur£ 
House of Representatives 
Committee on 
Hu.ltli, Sducation & Social Services 
SEX:'TICNAL N:lALYSIS 
Pcucb V 
Stata Capitcl 
Juneau, Alaska 9'9811 
IDJSE BILL 498: An act relating to bea.ring children and the parent child 
relationship. 
Section 1 AS 20.20.020 Conception by Agreenent 
'!he present chapter on "Children Conceived by Artificial Insemination., is 
amended by the addition of a new section Which would legalize the concept 
Jcnown as surrogate parenting. 
tklder the provisions of this bill, any w:m:m could enter in to a contract 
with another m:m other than her husband, for the purposes of bearing him 
a chil,d. Up:m birth of the child, the w:mm relinquishes and tenninates 
all parental rights to the child. The man is recognized by law as the 
natural and legitimate father of the child. 
'!he contract 'V.Ollld include the requirerrent that the child be conceived by 
artificial insemination. In addition, it Y.Ould stipulate the arrount of 
canpensatian the surrogate nother is to receive for her tine and services. 
As is tl ~ case with all legal contracts, any other conditions agreed to 
by both parties Y.OUld be clearly spelled out in the agreerrent • 
.. 
Secticn 2 
This act is dependent up:::m passage of House Bill 497 'Which provides the 
enabling language. 
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DRAFT 1 
SUBSTITU'l'E 
BOUSE BILL NO. 84 
A bill to establish the legal status of a child conceived 
through the artificial insemination of a surrogate; to provide 
for the termination of the parental rights of a surrogate; to 
require that.certain documents be filed with the state registrar; 
and to impose certain duties on the state registrar. 
' THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT: 
1 Sec. 1. As used in this act: 
2 (a) "Natural father" means a male of at least 18 years of 
3 age whose semen will be used to artificially inseminate a 
4 surrogate. 
5 (b) "Surrogate" means a married or single female of at least 
6 18 years of age who agrees to be artificially inseminated with 
7 the semen of a natural father, and, if she conceives and bears a 
8 child, to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to the child 
9 as provided in this act. 
o 2 4 4 o ' a 1 (a-1 > Draft 1 MLS 
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1 Sec. 2. A. child born to a natural father and a surrogate 
2 conceived through the artificial insemination of the surrogate 
3 with the semen of the .natural father shall considered to be 
4 the legitimate child of the natural father and his spouse if all 
5 of the following conditions are met: 
6 (a) The natural father provides his semen to a licensed phy-
7 sician under the supervision of the physician. 
8 (b) The artificial insemination of the surrogate is per-
9 formed by a licensed physician. 
10 Cc) The spouse of the natural father signs a written 
11 acknowledgment as provided in section 3. 
12 (d) The surrogate signs a consent to the termination of her 
13 parental rights as provided in section 4 which is not revoked as 
14 described in that section. 
15 Ce> If the surrogate is married, the surrogate's husband has 
16 acknowledged.the arti£icial insemination of the surrogate before 
17 the surrogate is inseminated. 
18 Sec. 3. The spouse of the natural father shall sign in the 
19 presence of the licensed physician performing the artificial 
20 insemination upon the surrogate a written acknowledgment which 
21 acknowledges all of the following: 
22 (a) That the spouse is aware that the natural father's semen 
23 will be used for the artificial insemination of the surrogate. 
24 (b) That the spouse will have full parental responsibility 
25 for a child conceived through the artificial insemination of the 
26 surrogate with the semen of the natural father. 
02440'81 (B-1) Draft 1 
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1 Sec. 4. ( 1) Not more than 72 rs er the birth 
2 child conceived through the artifici semination of 
3 surrogate semen natur r, the sur 
4 s a written r r: 
5 rights to the 
6 (2) The consent requir t (1 1 
7 effective 20 r the consent unless 
8 gate revokes her consent in wr ing init ates an ac 
9 the child custody act of 970, No .. 91 of the 
10 1970, as amended, be sections 722.21 to 722.29 of 
11 Compiled Laws, to determine the custody the child. 
12 sent executed by the surrogate shall state clearly the 
13 which the consent becomes effective and the actions wh 
14·preclude the consent from becoming effective. 
a 
r 
of a 
ate 
sur 
i 
Acts 
con-
te on 
d 
15 (3) The execution of the consent required by subsection (1) 
1 
r 
16 shall be witnessed by 2 persons and a duplicate copy of the con-
17 sent shall be retained by the surrogate. 
18 (4) The consent required by subsection (1) shall contain the 
19 name of the surrogate at the time of the child's birth and the 
20 surrogate's most recent address. 
21 (5) The consent required by subsection {1) shall inform the 
22 surrogate that she may file a denial of the release of her name 
23 with the state registrar at any time and that the denial may be 
24 revoked at any time. The state registrar shall develop a rm 
25 for a surrogate to deny or revoke a denial of release of her name 
26 and shall make the form available to the surrogate. 
02440'81 (H-1) Draft 1 
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1 Sec. 5. (1) Each acknowledgment, consent, or evoca 
2 described in this act shall be notarized and shall f 
3 the state registrar appointed pursuant to section 28 3 
4 public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts 
5 amended, being s'ection 333.2813 of the Michigan Compil 
6 (2) The state registrar shall not disclose name 
7 surrogate unless ordered to do so by a court of record or 
8 vided in subsection (3). 
9 (3) A child conceived through the artificial 
10 a surrogate with the semen of a natural father may obtain 
11 name of the surrogate from the consent executed by sur 
12 pursuant to section 4, upon reaching 18 years of 
13 surrogate has filed with the state registrar a wr r 
14 the information not be released. 
02440'81 <B-1) Draft 1 Final page. 
-161-
House: Rawl 
Attorney: Munnerl:,'11 
Stenographer: Corley 
Date: 1-26-82 
No.: 
if. 31 '!/ 
A BILL / 
TO AMEND CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 20, CODE OF LAWS 
1976, RELATING TO CARE AND SUPPORT IN DOMESTIC 
BY ADDING ARTICLE 15, SO A.S TO ENACT THE SOUTH 
PARENTING ACT, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE MAKING 
HOOD AGREEMENTS, THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
AND THE ADOPTION OF A CHILD CONCEIVED PURSUANT 
PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT; AND TO AMEND SECTION 20-7 
RELATING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE F.MULY COURT, 
THAT THE FAMILY COURT SHALL HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
ACTIONS FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION. 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of S 
SECTION 1. Chapter 7 of Title 20 of the 1976 
adding: 
II ARTICLE 15 
Surrogate Parenting 
Section 20-7-3600. This article ~ay be c as 
Surrogate Parenting Act. 
ection 20-7-3610. The purpose of this 
existence of and regulate surrogate p 
Sectic~ ?0-7-3620. As used in this 
(A) 'Child' means a person conce d 
fo1lo\<Ting artificial insemination ~ri th 
(B) 1 Court 1 means the family court. 
(C) 'Husband' means a surrogate 1 s 
years of age, 1·rho agrees pursuant to a 
ment to permit the surrogate to be artifici 
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semen of a natural father, and, if the surrogate conceives and 
a child, to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights, if any, 
the child. 
"'"'" 
(D) 'Judge' means a judge of the family court. 
(E) 'Natural father' means a married male of at least eighteen 
years of age whose semen will be used to artificially inseminate 
a surrogate and who, with the wife, proposes to adopt a child to be 
conceived pursuant to a surrogate parenthood agreement. 
/ 
/ 
,.~----------------------------------
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(F) 'Surrogate' means a married female or at 
years of age who agrees pursuant to a surrogate p 
ment to be artificially inseminated with the semen 
father, and, if she conceives and bears a Cftild, 
relinquish her parental rights to the child. 
(G) 'Surrogate parenthood agreement' means a 
executed as provided in this article. 
(H) 'Wife' means a natural father's spouse, at ast 
years of age, who, with the natural father, proposes 
child to be conceived pursuant to a surrogate. p 
Section 20-7-3630. The s~~ons and petition in s 
proceedings must be served in the manner prescribed 
personal service of s~~~ons in civil actions. 
Section 20-7-3640. (A) If a wife and a natural 
adopt a child to be conceived pursuant to a sur 
a;~eement, they must file a petition for sur 
the court of the county in which they reside or 
and her husband reside. 
(B) The petition for surrogate adoption must b 
triplicate, verified by the wife and the nat 
specify: 
(1) The full names, dates and places 
of residence of the wife and the natural father. 
(2) The place and date of the ma 
natural father. 
( 3) The f'J.ll names, dates and places of b 
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residence of the surrogate and her husband. 
{4) The place and date of the marriage of the sur 
and her husband. 
/' 
(5) That the wife and the natura~father intend to ac 
custody of the child from the surrogate and her husband pursuant 
to a surrogate parenthood agreement. 
(6) The desired name for the child. 
(7) That it is the desire of the wife and the natural father 
that the relationship of parent and child be established between 
them and the child following the birth of the, child. 
(8) Facts, if any, which excuse consent on the p8.rt of 
surrogate or her husband to the adoption. 
(C) A copy of the surrogate parenthood agreement entered nto 
pursuant to the provisions of this article by the wife, the 
father, the surrogate, and the husband must be attached to the 
petition. 
(D) One copy of the petition must be retained b the court. 
Another copy must be sent to any agency or person partici 
the surrogate adoption proceeding. The third copy of the peti on 
must be served upon the surrogate and her husband as provided 
Section 20-7-3630. 
Section 20-7-3650. Every party to a surrogate parenthood 
~d a surrogate adoption proceeding must be a resident of 
ement 
ta 
Any surrogate who enters into a surrogate parenthood agre must 
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have given birth to at least one child prior 
the agreement. 
Section 20-7-3660. Within twenty days 
the summons and petition for surrogate ado?tion 
and her husband must file a verified response 
copy of which must be served on the natural r 
their attorney. 
Section 20-7-3670. (A) Upon the filing of 
surrogate adoption, the court must order an inves 
made by the Children's Bureau of the State S 
by a private or public \<Telfare organization 
main purposes the care and placement of 
designated by the co~.1rt and must further order 
investigation be filed with the court by s 
w~thin sixty days from the issuance of the o r 
unless time therefor is extended by the co 
The investigation must consider: 
(1) The capacity and disposi on of 
natural father to give the child to be concei 
(2) The capacity and disposit 
natural father to provide the child with 
rmanence, medical care, and other mate 
(3) The permanence as a family t 
wife and the natural father. 
(4) The moral fitness of the wi 
(5) The mental and physical health of 
natural father. 
0 
d 
6 
(6) Any other factor considered by the court or 
investigating agency to be relevant to the surrogate ad 
proceeding. 
(C) The report of the investigation ~usi become a part of 
files in the case and must contain a definite recommendation r or 
against the proposed surrogate adoption and state reasons there 
provided, that the signer of the report and all persons participat 
in, conducting, or associated with the compiling, separation and 
filing of the report must be available ~or examination and cross-
examination by any party to a surrogate adoption proceeding conce 
the contents and recommendation contained in the report, c 
deta:l. 
(D) The judge must review the report prepared ~nd filed 
to this section. If the report recommends that surrogate ad on 
be permitted, the judge, within ten days after receipt of t~e o 
must enter an order certifying the suita~ility of tte wife and 
natural father for surrogate adoption. 
If the report recommends that surrogate adoption not be 
the judge, within ten days after receipt of the report, must c 
a hearing to review the report and to ta~e other evidence 
the suitability of the wife and the natural fat~er for s 
adoption. The wife and the natural father and the surro te 
husband must attend the hearing. The court may also re~ re 
attendance at the hearing of the persons specified in subsection 
of this section. At the conclusion of the hearing, ~f 
satisfied as to the suitability of the wife and the 
based on the evidence produced at the hearing, the cour~ must, 
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ve days of the hearing, enter an order certi 
of the wife and the natural father for surrogate 
judge is not satisfied as to the suitability 
natural father for surrogate adoption based e 
./ 
at the hearing, the court must, within five days 
an order dismissing the petition for surrogate 
Section 20-7-3680. (A) If an order is entered ce 
suitability of the wife and the natural father 
pursuant to subsection (D) of Section 20-7-3670, a p 
physician, licensed ~~der the laws of this State, p 
artificial insemination of a surrogate. 
(B) When the inseminating physician is ab 
the surrogate is pregnant as the result of an a 
he must file notice of the pregnancy with the 
a copy to the w~fe and the natural father, 
h,_l::;se.nd, or the::.r respec-ti·1e attorneys. 
(c) Upon rece::.nt of a copy of the ~ot::.ce 
preg~ancy, the 'v<tife and the natural father must 
sur te and her husband and acknolflledge 
to the surrogate is the natural father's 
and ac1r.no'tlledged by them in the same manner p 
execution and acknowledgment of deeds of re 
ther must file the acknowledgement with 
(D) Upon receipt of an ac~~owledgement 
((; ~~ o~ t.h_-: s c:P.ct.-i en, tne -:ur1.cre must ente"' "'r: 
, - - ~ - - ~ ·· v -o ~ ~" 
the natural father's pqtern!ty of the child to e 
I .-168-
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8 
On the next business day after entry of the order 
court must send a copy of the order to the Office 
and Public Health Statistics of the State Department 
-~"""' 
Environmental Control. The order of filia~ion is 
immediately upon the birth of the child. 
come e 
Section 20-7-3690. (A) Following entry of an order 
required by subsection (D) of Section 20-7-3680, a c 
relinquishment of parental rights over a child conceived 
to a surrogate parenthood agreement must be executed by s 
and her husband. 
(B) The consent required by subsection (A) must e 
b~fore the birth of the child to become effective 
child. 
(C) The consent required by subsection (A) must be e 
a separate instrument executed before the judge 
of the surrogate adoption proceeding. 
(D) The consent required by subsection (A) must 
until after the judge has fully explained to the 
husband the legal rights of a parent and the fact that 
and her husband, by virtue of the consent, voluntari re 
permanently their rights to the child. 
Section 20-7-3700. After the receipt of notice of sur 
pregnancy and the completion of the surrogate's si 
care, and control over the child to the natural fathe and 
The inter:m order must grant to the natural father 
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than interested parties, their counsel, and persons 
required by the court to be in attendance. 
(B) All papers and records pertaining to a s 
f~"'"', 
proceeding must be sealed and kept as a per.manent rec 
withheld from inspection, and filed in the office of 
of co~~on pleas. No person shall have access to 
order of the judge of the court in which the decree 
adoption Has entered for good cause shoi .. rn. 
(C) All files and records pertaining to the sur 
proceedings in the State Children's Bureau or, in 
Social Services of the State of South Carolina, or 
agency, must be confidential and withheld from 
order of court for good cause she·~. 
(D) The provisions of this section must not b 
p rc•::;nt e.n~· adoption agency from furnishinG to 
biolo~ic'll parent~ or adoptees nonidentifying 
sole discretion of the chief executi •re officer of 
inform:'. tion l·;ould serve the best inte res of 
nor must the provisions of this article be construed p 
dentif~ring information to any other person, p 
the discretion of the chief executive o ce 
established a sufficient reason justifying re 
~ifying information. As used in this subse 
rmation' may include but is not limited to 
1 . The health of the surrogate. 
2. The health of the child. 
":) The child's general family bac ..) . 
re rences. 
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4. The length of time the child has been in 
custody of the natural father and his wife. 
The release of other nonidentifying info~~~ion may be made 
only at the discretion of the chief executi-ve officer of tion 
agency. 
Section 20-7-3740. (A) For each surrogate adoption d 
to the provisions of this article, the attorney for the 
father and his wife must, within fifteen days of the filing of e 
final decree, transmit to the Office of Vital Records and Pub c 
Health Statistics of the State Department of Health and Environmen 
Control a certified copy of the surrogate adoption decree and 
Certificate of Adoption with Part II completed and ve fied 
natural father and his wife, and Part III certified by the c 
of court. The court or the State Children's Bureau must c e 
Part I of the Certificate of Adoption and transmit the form to 
State Registrar of Vital Records within thirty days of the ~~ 
of the final decree. 
(B) The State Registrar, upon receipt of a certi ed 
of Adoption, must prepare and file an original certificate of bir 
in the name of the child. The certificate of birth must be ree o 
any reference to or indication of the fact that the 
and must show the natural father and his wife as the real p 
The surname of the natural father must be listed as t surname for 
the child. 
Section 20-7-3750. An appeal is allowed from any final o 
,ju:1grr:ent or decree rendered under this article to t:'1e court sy 
per;;on against whom any such order, judgment, or ·~ ree be 
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made or who may be affected the 
appeals from the court in other 
surrogate adoption is not subject 
reason after a period of one year 
Section 20-7-3760. Prior to the ent 
adoption, the natural father and his 
sworn statement describing money or 
value paid to or exchanged by any 
of a 
must 
r cons 
in 
proceeding, including anyone consenting to 
the child, any relative of a party to 
ceeding or the surrogate parenthood 
attorney, social worker, or member of the 
corporation, association, or other organization 
rove or disapprove fees and e s. 
amoQ~~s in excess of those appro 
lation of this section. Any person 
provisions of this sec ~on is 
vic on, shall be fined an no 
or be i~prisoned for a period not to exce 
To assure compliance with the p 
court may require sworn testimony f 
in informing, noti , e 
locating, assisting, or in any r 
sur te renthood agreement or re ted 
directly or indirectly, led to s 
Section 20-7-3770. (A) A person cannot b a 
in which a female agrees to conce 
172 
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insemination unless that person, together with her or 
executes a surrogate parenthood agreement as provided 
article. 
s 
(B) An attorney who represents a prospective natural 
his wife cannot represent the surrogate and her husband in 
execution of a surrogate parenthood agreement. Any atto 
s 
r and 
representing a person or persons executing a surrogate paren 
agreement must also sign the agreement, but not as a party. 
Section 20-7-3780. A surrogate parenthood agreement must contain 
the following terms: 
(A) That the surrogate agrees to be artificially semina 
with the semen of the natural father by a licensed physician and 
the wife of the natural father and the husband of the surrogate ree 
that the insemination shall take place. 
(B) That the surrogate and her husband agree not to rm 
attempt to form a parent-child relationship during 
the interim order as provided for in this article or 
termination of the parental rights of the surrogate and 
the child. 
0 
(c) That the surrogate and her husband expressly ac e 
intent and purposes of the surrogate parenthood agreement and 
voluntarily relinquish all parental rights to the c and, 
request of the natural father and his wife, to execute a 
the Rdoption of the child by the natural father and his 
(D) That the surrogate and her husband understand and :ree to 
assume all risks, including the risk of death, which are ~nciden to 
conception, pregnancy, childbirth, and postpart'.1ll'l comp cations. 
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(E) That the surrogate agrees to undergo medical and p 
or ps:,rchiatric evaluations and to submit the eva.luat t 
father and his wife and to the inseminating physician, abs 
./,' 
information which would tend to identify the ·surrogate, and 
surrogate agrees to sign medical releases prior to any evaluation. 
(F) That the surrogate agrees to submit to the in 
physician any medical and psychological or psychiat e 
relating to the surrogate parenthood agreement which are not 
the inseminating physician. 
(G) That the surrogate agrees to adhere, to all medical instruct ons 
given to her by the inseminating physician as well as her own i 
(H) That the surrogate agrees to follow a prenatal 
examination schedule to consist of at least one visit per month 
the first seven months of pregnancy and at least two visits 
during the eighth and ninth months of pregnancy. 
( ~) 
' .L That the surrogate agrees that she will not ab rt 
child once conceived unless she desires to do so be 
inseminating physician that an abortion is necess r 
health. 
That the surrogate agrees to undergo a camp i "Ie 
evaluc-~tion, under the direction and supervision of a cens 
to determine whether her physical health is satisfac 
compre~ensive medical evaluation must include test~ 
diseases before each insemination. 
(K) That the natural father and his wife agree to 
surrogate's compensation in an interest bearing escroy; accoun on 
.... . ... th execu~1on OL e surrogate parenthood agreement, to be paid 
+ v 
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surrogate in full with accrued interest upon the b 
and the termination of the parental rights of the su 
husband. 
(L) That the natural father and his wife agree 
d 
r 
the 
expenses incurred by the surrogate as a result of r p 
The expenses must include all medical, psychiat c 
hospitalization, pharmaceutical, laboratory, and the 
c 
expenses 
incurred in the surrogate's pregnancy, not covered or allowed by her 
present health and major medical insurance, includ any me cal 
expenses ~ncurred upon order of a licensed physician. ez:penses 
must not include any expenses for lost wages of s te or 
nonrelated incidentals, unless specifically enume d D t 
agreement. 
(rvf) That the natural father agrees to unde a re ive 
medic::..l evc=tluation, under the direction and s rvision of a icensed 
r 
The comprehensive medical evaluation must include test r venereal 
diseases, specifically including syphilis and 
father must agree to submit to venereal disease be r-e 
each donation of semen for an artificial ins on 
agreement. 
(N) That the natural father agrees to s t to in 
physician any medical evaluations which relate to 
parenthood agreement which are not made by the nat c:e.n& 
(0) ~hat the surrog~te parenthood agreement 11 terminate upon 
written notice to the surrogate and her husband from the na~ 
~~~~e- ~nd his ~J.·fe if thft natu'~"al ~a~her ~n~ 'n1s ~· 4 fe and t 
.1. "'- v d L ~ •- .~ ' .I. <';:; • • - • • - <:.'- •- - YL- - -
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inseminating physician determine that pregnancy of s 
not occurred within a reasonable time. A 1 reas 
period not shorter than three months and not longer 
.,fl", 
(P) That the natural father and his wife agree to ass 
legal responsibility for any child conceived pursuant 
agreement. 
(Q) That if the natural father or his die 
termination of the parental rights of the surrogate and her 
the surrogate parenthood agreement must remain in full force 
surrogate and her husband, the surrogate is entitled to 
compensation and expenses and may elect to keep the chi or, 
husband, execute a consent to adoption of the chi 
the child for adoption. 
or a re a 
(R) That a fee for compensation of the surrogate 
to by the natural father and his wife and by the s 
surrogate's husband and must be stated in the 
surrogate miscarries prior to the fifth month of pre 
compensation other than medical expenses will be p 
surrogate miscarries during or after the fifth month 
percent of the agreed-upon fee for compensation, 
will be paid. 
Section 20-7-3790. A surrogate parenthood agreement 
agreed to by the parties in addition to the terms re 
20-7-3780. 
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Section 20-7-3800. A physician must not artificially ins a 
person who the physician knows to be a surrogate 
is professionally satisfied with the mental and physi 
'· . 
of the surrogate~and an order certifying the/suitability of the wi 
and the natural father, granted by the court pursuant to Sec on 
20-7-3670, is presented." 
SECTION 2. Section 20-7-420 of the 1976 Code, as 
Act 102 of 1981, is further amended by adding: 
t d 
11 (33) To hear and determine actions for surrogate adoption and 
all matters arising from surrogate parenthood ~greements, 
but not limited to matters of a contractual nature.u 
SECTION 3. This act shall take effect upon approval the 
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ANALYSIS H3491 
PROCEDURE FOR SURROGATE PARENTHOOD/ADOPTION 
Surrogate agrees: 
j.Locate Surroaate Mother] 
0 State Resident 
0 18 years old 
0 married 
0 has borne one child 
~ 
four party agreement 
1. M.D. does artificial insemination. 
2. No attempt at mothering after birth, but can hold. 
on 
Section 20-7-3650 
Section 20-7-3780 
(A) 
(B) 
3. Termination of parental rights at birth and consent 
to adoption. (C) 
4. Accept physical and emotional health risks. (D) 
5. Submit to psychological examination and submit results(£ and F) 
to father. 
6. Follow medical instructions of attending physician. 
7. Receive pre-natal care. 
~;8. No abortion unless health of mother is endangered. 
9. Physical exam including V.D. test before every 
artificial insemination. 
Natural father agrees: 
(G) 
(H) (I) 
(J) 
1. Deposit money at time of agreement to be paid at birth(K) 
with interest. 
2. Expenses paid by father. (L) 
3. Father undergoes medical exam i uding V.O. te (M and N) 
Other provisions: 
1. Agreement te na 
within 6 months. 
2. Father acce 1 
3. In case of 
agreement is bindi 
surrogate receives 
or release for a 
4. The fee is establi 
5. Miscarriage 
Miscarriage after 
in if no pregnancy resul {0) 
(P) si for child. 
or oner ( s 
In case of death of both, 
compensation and may keep the 
on. 
ses. 
us 10%. 
) 
ld 
(Q) 
(R) 
(S) 
6. Other provisions are Section 20-7-3790 
Section 20-7-3670 
Petition s nc 
1. Name~ date of 
2. Marriage records. 
of all parties. 
3. Intent to adopt i1 d, i 
4. Proposed name of ild. 
of parental relationship. 
5. Facts to excuse consent 
6. Copy of Surrogate Pa 
of surrogate or husband, if any. 
Agreement. 
-· ~urrr.~ate l't::r·e:llthood/fldopt ion 
]lnvestiqation[ 
Childrens'Bureau, DSS, or other institution 
or individual conducts Court ordered nves-
tigation as to suitability of persons 
involved. 
Family Court Certifies/Approval for 
Or Conducts Hearing 
Section 20-7-3 
Section 20-7-3670 
Section 20-7-3680 lArtificial Inseminationz 
Physician charged with the responsibility of being 
"professionally satisfied" with the physical and Section 20-7-3800 
mental health of the father and surrogate. 
~ 
~ 
f Preqnancy J 
"" 
. . . I Family CourtJ . . .section 20-7-3680 
1. Ver1f1cat1on of pregnancy f1lcd by the phys1c1an. (B) 
2. 
3. 
Acknowledgement of paternity filed by parties. (C) 
Order of Filiation establishing paternity executed 
by Court. (D) 
Copy of Order of 
F'l ·ation sent to DHEC 
(effective at birth) 
(D) l 
!Sixth Month of Precnancy J Section 20-7-3700 
ks/2/17/82 
1. Court issues an interim order granting custody 
to natural father. 
2. Surrogate signs consent to terminate parental Section 20-7-3690 (A) 
rights. (But can see and/or hold child within 
24 hrs. after birth.} 
3. Both agreements will take effect upon birth of 
the child. ~ 
®ill 1. Fourteen days after birth, parental ghts of surrogate 
and her husband are terminated. Section 20-7-3710 
2. Surrogate and her husband will be notified of 
this pending order within 4 days of bi and 
told to raise ar.y objections before t order (B) 
is issued. 
3. Hearing to determine paternity or 
of the child will be held in case 
t interest 
of ections.(C) and (D) 
6. Order to adoption and termination 
of surrogate will be issued if 
objections as stated above. 
of parental rights 
re are no 
. ""'" lfui~B Copy of final decree sent to DHEC 
j Other Conditio~s/Prohibition~iJ 
1. No collatera1 attack aft~r 1 year. 
2. Register money or any thing of value that 
is "paid" in such a contract with the urt 
prior to final decree, for Court approval. 
3. Attorney may not represent both sides. 
4. Such contract requi :-ed for anyone enter 
into surrogate arrangement. 
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(C) 
Section 20-7-3740 
Section 20-7-3750 
Section 20-7-3760 
Section 20-7-3770 
Section 20-7-3770 
§ 5172 
§ 7000. 
§ 7001. 
§ 7002. 
§ 7003. 
§ 7004. 
§ 7005. 
§ 7006. 
§ 7007. 
§ 7008. 
§ 7010. 
§ 7011. 
§ 7012. 
§ 7013. 
§ 701-t 
§7015. 
§ 7016. 
§ 7017. 
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of this title extend to the § 5173. 
PART 7 
Uniform Parentage Act 
[Added by Stats 1975 ch 1244 § ll] 
Title. 
"Parent and child relationship". 
Marital status of parents irrelevant. 
Establishment of parent and child relationship. 
Presumption of natural fatherhood. 
Father of child conceived by artificial insemination. 
Actions with respect to existence of father and child 
Jurisdiction and venue. 
Parties. 
Judgment. 
Fees and costs. 
Enforcement of obligations of father. 
Continuing jurisdiction. 
Clo:>ed hearing and records. 
Actions with respect to existence of mother and child 
Written promise to furnish support. 
Rights of parent upon other parent's reiinquishment or 
Petition to terminate parental rights of father: 
§ 7017.1. Fee not to be charged for filing petition to tem1inate 
§ 7018. Severability. 
§ 7020. Restraining orders; Offenses. 
§ 7021. Judgment and orders; Offenses. 
Cal fur 3d Venue § 20; Cal Practice Rev, Ch 153:1, Uniform 
Action Under Uniform Support Act. Cal Forms-38:2. 
§ 7000. [Title.) This part shall be known 
and may be cited as the "Uniform Parentage 
Act." [1975 ch 1244 § 11.] Cal fur 3d Fam-
ily Law§ 68. 
§ 7001. ["Parent and child relation-
ship".] As used in this part, "parent and 
child relationship means the legal relation-
ship existing between a child and his natural 
or adoptive parents incident to which the 
law confers or imposes rights, privileges, 
duties, and obligations. It includes the 
mother and child relationship and the father 
and child relationship. [ 197 5 ch 1244 § 11] 
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Cal fur 3d 
§ 7002. 
v:<nt.] The 
extends 
may 
(l) Between a child 
mother it mav be established 
)o ·birth the 
Act, 
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(2) Between a child and the natural fathu 
it may be established under this part. 
(3) Between a child and an adoptive par-
ent it may be established by proof of adop-
tion. (1975 ch 1244 § 11.] Cal fur 3d Family 
Law§ 154. 
§ 7004. [Presumption of natural father-
hood.] (a) A man is presumed to be the 
natural father of a child if he meets the 
conditions as set forth in Section 621 of the 
Evidence Code or in any of the following 
subdivisions: 
(1) He and the child's natural mother are 
or have been married to each other and the 
child is born during the marriage, or within 
300 days after the marriage is terminated by 
death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, 
or divorce, or after a decree of separation is 
entered by a court. 
(2) Before the child's birth, he and the 
child's natural mother have attempted to 
marry each other by a marriage solemnized 
in apparent compliance with law, although 
the attempted marriage is or could be de-
clared invalid, and, 
(i) If the attempted marriage could be 
declared invalid only by a court, the child is 
born during the attempted marriage, or 
within 300 days after its termination by 
death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, 
or divorce; or 
(ii) If the attempted marriage is invalid 
without a court order, the child is born 
within 300 days after the termination of 
cohabitation. 
(3) After the child's birth, he and the 
child's natural mother have married, or at-
tempted to marry, each other by a marriage 
solemnized in apparent compliance with law, 
although the attempted marriage is or could 
be declared invalid, and 
(i) With his consent, he is named as the 
child's father on the child's birth certificate, 
or 
(ii) He is obligated to support the child 
under a written voluntary promise or by 
court order. 
(4) He receives the child into his home 
and openly holds out the child as his natural 
child. 
(b) Except as provided in Section 621 of 
the Evidence Code, a presumption under 
this section is a rebuttable presumption af-
fecting the burden of proof and may be 
rebutted in an appropriate action only by 
clear and convincing evidence. If two or 
more presumptions arise under this section 
which conflict with each other, the presump-
tion which on the facts is founded on the 
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weightier considerations of policy and logic 
controls. TilC presumption is rebutted by a 
court decree establishing paternity of the 
child by another man. [1975 ch 1244 § 11.] 
Cal fur 3d ramily Law§§ 86,. 88, 110, 164-
166, 168, 198, 203; Cal Prachce Rev, Ch 
153:1, Uniforrn Parentage Act; Cal Forms-
38:21. 
§ 7005. [Father of child conceived by 
artificial insemination.] (a) If, under the 
supervision of a licensed physician and with 
the consent of her husband, a wife is insemi-
nated artificially with semen donated by a 
man not her husband, the husband is treated 
in law as if he were the natural father of a 
child thereby conceived. The husband's con-
sent must be in writing and signed by him 
and his wife. The physician shall cer:ify 
their signatures and the date of the insemi-
nation, and retain the husband's consent as 
part of the medical record, where it shall be 
kept confidential and in a sealed file. How-
ever, the physician's failure to do so does 
not affect the father and child relationship. 
All papers and records pertaining to the 
in·U':mination, whether part of the permanent 
record of a court or of a file held by the 
supervising physician or elsewhere, are sub-
ject to inspection only upon an order of the 
court for good cause shown. 
(b) The donor of semen provided to a 
licensed physician for use in artificial insemi-
nation of a woman other than the donor's 
wife is treated in law as if he were not the 
natural father of a child thereby conceived. 
[1975 ch 1244 § 11; 1978 ch 429 § 34, effec-
tive July 17, 1978, operative July 1, 1978; 
1979 ch 889 § 1, effective September 22, 
1979.] Cal fur 3d I--'.:1mily Law § 155; Cal 
Practice Rev, Ch 153:23, Uniform Parentage 
Act; Cal Forms-38:1. 
§ 7006. [Actions with respect to exis-
tence of father and child relationship.] (a) A 
child, the child's natural mother, or a man 
presumed to be his father under paragraph 
(l), (2), or (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 
7004, may bring an action as follows: 
(I) At any time for the purpose of declar-
ing the existence of the father and child 
relationship presumed under paragraph (1 ), 
(2), or (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 7004. 
(2) For the purpose of declaring the no-
nexistence of the father and child relation-
ship presumed under paragraph (1), (2), or 
(3) of subdivision (a) of Section 7004 only if 
the action is brought within a reasonable 
time after obtaining knowledge of relevant 
facts. After the presumption has been rebut-
§ 7006 DEERING'S CIVIL 
ted, paternity of the child by another man 
may be determined in the same action, if he 
has been made a party. 
(b) Any interc~ted party may bring an 
action at any time for the purpose of deter-
mining the existence or nonexistence of the 
father and child relationship presumed under 
paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 
7004. 
(c) An action to determine the existence 
of the father and child relationship with 
respect to a child who has no presumed 
father under Section 7004 or whose pre-
sumed father is deceased may be brought by 
the child or personal representative of the 
child, the State Department of Social Ser-
vices, the mother or the personal representa-
tive or a parent of the mother if the mother 
has died or is a minor, a man alleged or 
alleging himself to be the father, or the 
personal representative or a parent of the 
alleged father if the alleged father has died 
or is a minor. The commencement of such 
an action shall suspend any pending pro-
ceeding in connection with the adoption of 
such child, including a proceeding pursuant 
to subdivision (b) of Section 7017, until a 
judgment in the action is final. 
(d) Except as to cases coming within the 
provisions of Section 621 of the Evidence 
Code, a man not a presumed father may 
bring an action for the purpose of declaring 
that he is the natural father of a child 
having a presumed father under Section 
7004, if the mother relinquishes for, consents 
to, or proposes to relinquish for or consent 
to, the adoption of the child. Such an action 
shall be brought within 30 days after the 
man is served as prescribed in subdivision (f) 
of Section 7017 with a notice that he is or 
could be the father of such child or the birth 
of the child, whichever is later. The com-
mencement of such action shall suspend any 
pending proceeding in connection with the 
adoption of such child until a judgment in 
the action is final. 
(e) Regardless of its terms, an agreement 
between an alleged or presumed father and 
the mother or child does not bar an action 
under this section. 
(f) An action under this section may be 
brought before the birth of the child. 
(g) The district attorney may also bring 
an action under this section in any case in 
which he believes that the interests of justice 
will be served thereby. [ 197 5 ch 1244 § 11; 
1978 ch 429 § 35, effective July 17, 1978, 
Operative July 1, 1978; 1979 ch 752 § 1.) 
Cal Jur 3d Family Law §§ 169, 304; Cal 
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Pmctice Rev, Ch 153:3, Uniform Parcn(J~. 
.. 4.ct; C~1J I~)rnJs-38:31. s .. 
§ 7007. [Jurisdicticn and venue.] (a) n. 
superior court has jurisdiction of an act!,·; 
brought under this part. · 
(b) A person who has sexual intercou:-~ 
in this state thereby submits to the juri,z; ,. 
tion of the courts of this state as to a~ 
action brought under this part with re,p-c~·; 
to a child who may have been conceived b·. 
that act of intercourse. · 
(c) The action may be brought in t~.~ 
county in which the child resides or is four.~ 
or, if the father is deceased, in which nr"" 
ceedings for probate of his estate have be.;n 
or could be commenced. [1975 ch 12.;..: 
§ 11.] Cal Jur 3d Family Law § 170, Vent:: 
§ 20. Cal Practice Rev, Ch 153:5, Unifom 
Parentage Act. 
§ 7008. [Parties.] The child may, if ur.-
der the age of 12 years, and shall, if 12 ye:m 
of age or older, be made a party to the 
action. If he is a minor and a party to thr 
action he shall be represented by a guardi.!r: 
ad litem appointed by the court. The natur3l 
mother, each man presumed to be the father 
under Section 7004, and each man alleged t,l 
be the natural father, may be made p:~rtte<. 
and shall be given notice of the action in the 
manner prescribed in subdivision (f) of Se("· 
tion 7017 and an opportunity to be hearJ. 
The court may align the parties. (1975 .:h 
1244 § 11; 1977 ch 207 § 1; 1978 ch 3SO 
§ 13.] Cal Jur 3d Family L:1w § 171; Cl 
Practice Rev, Ch 153:7:8:10, Uniform Par-
entage Act. 
§ 7010. [Judgment.] (a) The judgment cr 
order of the court determining the existcn..:L 
or nonexistence of the parent and chilJ 
relationship is determinative for all purpc1~("' 
except for action<> brought pursuant to Sec· 
tion 270 of the Penal Code. 
(b) If the judgment or order of the cou:: 
is at variance with the child's birth certl11· 
cate, the court shall order that a new birth 
certificate be issued as prescribed in Artie!~ 
6 (commencing with Section 10450) t)! 
Chapter 8, of Division 9 of the Health 3n..l 
Safety Code. . 
(c) The judgment or order may contW1 
any other provision directed against the 
appropriate party to the proceeding, c0n· 
cerning the duty of support, the custody ad 
guardianship of the child, visitation pnvl, 
leges with the child, the furnishing of bond 
or other security for the payment of the 
judgment, or any other matter in the b::st 
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interest of the child. The judgment or order 
may direcl the father to pay the reasonable 
expenses of the mother's pregnancy and 
confinement. 
(d) In determining the amount to be paid 
by a parent for support of the child z.nd the 
period during which the duty of support is 
owed, a court enforcing the obligation of 
support shall consider all relevant facts. 
[i975 ch 1244 § l L] Cal fur 3d Family Law 
§ 174; Cal Practice Rev, Ch 153:1, Uniform 
Parentage Act, Ch 154:5, Achon U!1der 
Uniform Support Act. 
§ 7011. [Fees and costs.) The court may 
order reasonable fees of counsel, experts, and 
the child's guardian ad litem, and other 
costs of the action and pretrial proceedings, 
including blood tests, to be paid by the 
parties in proportions and at times deter-
mined by the court. [1975 ch 1244 § 11.) C1l 
fur 3d Family Law§ 173; Cal Practice Rev, 
Ch 153:5, Uniform Parentage Act. 
§ 7012. [Enforcement of obligations of 
father.] (a) If existence of the father and 
child relationship is declared, or paternity or 
a duty of support has been acknowledged or 
adjudicated under this part or under prior 
law, the obligation of the father may be 
enforced in the same or other proceedings 
by the mother, the child, the public author-
ity that has furnished or may furnish the 
reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confine-
ment, education, support, or funeral, or by 
any other person, including a private agency, 
to the extent he has furnished or is furnish-
ing these expenses. 
(b) The court may order support pay-
ments to be made to the mother, the clerk of 
the court, or a person, corporation, or 
agency designated to administer them for the 
benefit of the child under the supervision of 
the court. 
(c) Willful failure to obey the judgment or 
order of the court is a civil contempt of the 
court. All remedies for the enforcement of 
judgments apply. [1975 ch 1244 § 11.] Cal 
fur 3d Family Law § 176; Cal Practice Rev, 
Ch 153:1, Uniform Parentage Act. 
§ 7013. [Continuing jurisdiction.] The 
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify a 
judgment or order made under this part. A 
judgment or order relating to an adoption 
may only be modified in the same manner 
and under the same conditions as a decree of 
adoption may be modified under Section 
227b or 227d. {1975 ch 1244 § 11; 1976 ch 
404 § 2.] Cal fur 3d Family Law § 175; Cal 
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Practice J(;_'v, Ch 153:25, Uniform P:m·nt:Jge 
Act. 
§ 70 14. £Closed hearing and records.] 
Notwithswmling any other law concerning 
pnhlic hearings and ;-e.::ords, any hearing or 
tri:d held under this part may be held in 
closed coun without acimiU;mce of any per-
sen other tilan those necessary to the action 
or proceeding. All p.1pers and" records, other 
tb~1I. the fmd judg;nent, ~Ji~rtaining to the 
action nr wh:thei part of the 
perman;::;t r,:,·orrl court or of a file in 
any public agency or cisewhere, are subject 
,·o inspecticn only m exceptional cases up,m 
an r;rde:· of the court for goc1d cau,,e shown. 
[197:' ch 1244 § 11.] Cqj Jur 3d Family Law 
§ 172. 
§ 7015. [Actions with respect to exis-
tence of molher and child relationship.] Any 
interested p:1rty may bring an action to 
determine the existence or nonexistence: of a 
mother and child rdationsh; 1;. Insofar as 
practicaiJL:, the provi~ions of this pan appli-
cable to !lie f::ither and chiid relationship 
apj1ly. [1975 sh 12~4 § ll.j Oil fur Jd 
Family Law § 1 69; C:il Pr::.ctice Rev, Ch 
153:1, Uniform Parentage Act; Cal Forms-
J?:U!. 
· § '/016. [Written promise to furnish sup-
po~t.] (a) Any p:-omis,~ in writing to furnish 
support for a chiid, growing out of a pre-
sumed or alleged father and child relation-
ship, does not require consideration and is 
enforceable according to its terms, subject to 
subdivision (d) of Section 7006. 
(b) In the best interest of the child or the 
mother, the coun rnay, and upon the promi-
sor's r.~quc:st shall, order the promise to be 
kept in confidence and designate a person or 
agency to receive and disburse on b·::half of 
the child all amcmnts paid in performance of 
the promise. [1975 ch 1244 § ll.] CallurJd 
Family Law§ 292. 
§ 7017. [Rights of parent upon otl • .:r 
parent's rdinqclishment or consent to adop-
tion of child: Petition to terminate parental 
rights of father: Notice] (a)( l) If a mother 
relinquishes for or consents to or proposes to 
relinquish for or consent to the adoption of 
a child who has (1) a pre<>umed father under 
subdivision (a) of Section 7004 or (2) a 
father as to whom the child is a legitimate 
child under prior law of this state or under 
the law of another jurisdiction, the father 
shall be given notice of the ad,)ption pro-
cef'ding and have the rights provided under 
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 221), 
Title 2, Part 3, Division 1 of the Civil Code, 
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unless the f:::ther's relationship to the child 
has been previously terminated or deter-
mined by a court not to exist or the father 
has voluntarily relinquished or consentt:d to 
the adoption of such child. 
(2) If a father relinquishes or consents to 
or proposes to relinquish a child for adop-
tion, the mother shall be given notice of the 
adoption proceeding and have the rights 
provided under Chapter 2 (commencing with 
Section 221), Title 2, Part 3, Division l of 
the Civil Code, unless the mother's relation-
ship to the child has been previously termi-
nated by a court or the mother has volunta-
rily relinquished or consented to the adop-
tion of such child. 
(b) If a mother relinquishes for, consents 
to, or proposes to relinquish for or consent 
to the adoption of a child who does not have 
(1) a presumed father under subdivision (a) 
of Section 7004 or (2) a father as to whom 
the child is a legitimate child under prior 
law of this state or under the law of another 
jurisdiction, or if a child otherwise becomes 
the subject of an adoption proceeding and 
the alleged father, if any, has not, in writing, 
denied paternity, waived his right to notice, 
voluntarily relinquished or consented to the 
adoption, the agency or person to whom the 
child has been or is to be relinquished, or 
the mother or the person having custody of 
the child, shall file a petition in the superior 
court to terminate the parental rights of the 
father, unless the father's relationship to the 
child has been previously terminated or de-
termined not to exist by a court, or unless 
the father has been served as prescribed in 
subdivision (f) with a written notice alleging 
that he is or could be the natural father of 
the child to be adopted or placed for adop-
tion and has failed to bring an action for the 
purpose of deciaring the existence of the 
father and child relationship pursuant to 
subdivision (c) of Section 7006 within 30 
days of service of such notice or the birth of 
the child, whichever is later. 
(c) In an effort to identify the natural 
father, the court shall cause inquiry to be 
made of the mother and any other appropri-
ate person by the State Department of Social 
Services, a licensed county adoption agency, 
or the licensed adoption agency to which the 
child is to be relinquished, or in the case of 
a stepparent adoption, at the option of the 
board of supervisors, a licensed county adop-
tion agency, the county department desig-
nated by the board of supervisors to admin-
ister the public social services program, or 
the county probation department. The in-
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quiry sbll include the following: whether 
the mother was married at the time tf 
conception of the child or at any time there. 
afler; whether the mother was cohabit1q 
with a man at the time of conception c~ 
birth of the child; whether the mother h~ 
received support payments or prom1ses l'f 
support with respect to the child or i:~ 
connection with her pregnancy; or whether 
any rnan has formally or informally a.;. 
knowledged or declared his pos~ible pate;. 
nity of the; child. The department or tr.~ 
licensed adoption agency shall report tre 
finding::. to the court. 
(d) If, afLer the inquiry, the natural father 
is identified to the satisfaction of the cow 
or if more than one man is identified as ~ 
possible Lther, each shall be given notice ci 
the proceeding in accordance with subdi\ 1. 
sion (f), unless he has been served Wlth J 
written notice d!leging that he is or could l'< 
the natural father of the child to be adoptee. 
or placed or relinquished for adoption and 
has failed to bring an action pursuant to 
subdivision (c) of Section 7006 to decbre the 
existence of the father and child relationship 
within 30 days of serving such notice or the 
birth of the child, whichever is later. If an1 
of them fails to appear or, if appearing, f3/\ 
to claim custodial rights, his parental nghts 
with reference to the child shall be term!· 
n;lted. If the natural father or a man reprc· 
scnting himself to be the natural fatl;cr. 
claims custodial rights, the court shall prv· 
ceed to determine parentage and custod1:d 
rights in whatever order the court de~r:l> 
proper. If the conn finds that the mJ:\ 
representing himself to be the natural fa;hc: 
is a presumed father under subdivision (a) ci 
Section 7004, then the court shall issue ;::'! 
order providing that the father's conse;.: 
shall be required for an adoption of ttc 
child. In all other cases, the court shall issue 
an order providing that only the mother·~ 
consent shall be required for the adoption c: 
the child. 
(e) It~ after the inquiry, the court is un3::;c 
to identify the natural father or any poss1~.: 
natural father and no person has appe3rc~ 
claiming to be the natural father and cbnr.· 
ing custodial rights, the court shall enter J~ 
order terminating the unknown natural fl· 
ther's parental rights with reference to the 
child. 
(f) Notice of the proceeding shall be gi1 '~: 
to every person identified as the natu;~. 
father or a possible natural father in accl•r·. 
dance with the provisions of the Code ,,: 
Civil Procedure for the service of process tn 
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a civil action m this state, provided that 
publication or posting of the notice of the 
proceeding shall not be required. Proof of 
giving the notice shall be filed with the court 
before the petition is heard. However, if a 
person identified as the natural father or 
possible natural father cannot be located or 
his whereaboL'ts are unknown or cannot be 
ascertained, the court may issue an order 
dispensing with notice to such person. 
(g) Any order requiring or dispensing with 
a father's consent for the adoption of a child 
may be appealed from in the same manner 
as an order of the juvenile court declaring a 
person to be a ward of the juvenile court. 
[1975 ch 1244 § 11; 1977 ch 207 § 2; 1978 
ch 1045 § 1; 1979 ch 752 § 2.] Cal Jur 3d 
Family Law § 110; Cal Practice Rev, Ch 
153:10, Uniform Parentage Act. 
§ 7017.1. [Fee not to be charged for 
filing petition to terminate parental rights of 
father.] There shall be no filing fee charged 
for any petition filed pursuant to subdivision 
(b) of Section 7017. [1976 ch 404 § 3.] 
§ 7018. (Severability.] If any provision 
of this part or the application thereof to any 
person or circumstances is held invalid, such 
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or 
applications of the part which can be given 
effect without the invalid provision or appli-
cation, and to this end the provisions of this 
part are severable. (1975 ch 1244 § 11.] 
§ 7020. [Restraining orders; Offenses] 
(a) During the pendency of any proceeding 
under this part, upon application in the 
manner provided by Section 527 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure by the party who has 
care, custody, and c._mtrol of the minor 
child, the superior court may issue ex parte 
orders (1) enjoining any party from contact-
ing, molesting, attacking, striking, threaten-
ing, sexually assaulting, battering, or disturb-
ing the peace of the other party or the minor 
child; (2) excluding one party from the 
dwelling of the party who has care, custody 
and control of the child upon showing that 
the party to be excluded has assaulted or 
threatens to assault the other party or the 
minor child and that physical or emotional 
harm would otherwise result to the party or 
the minor child; and (3) enjoining a party 
from specified behavior which the court 
determines is neces~ary to effectuate orders 
un~er paragraph (1) or (2). In the case in 
wh1ch a temporary restraining order is 
granted without notice, the matter shall be 
made returnable on an order requiring cause 
to be shown why the order should not be 
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granted, on the earliest day that the bu'>iness 
of the court will permit, but not later than 
15 days or, if good cau:ce appears to the 
court, 20 days from the date the temporary 
restraining order is granted. The court may 
on motion of the plaintiff or on its own 
motion shorten the time for service on the 
defendant of the order to show cause. 
(b) The court may issue upon notice and a 
hearing any of the orders set forth in subdi-
vision (a). Any restraining order granted 
pursuant to this subdivision shall remain in 
effect, in the discretion of the court, not to 
exceed 90 days, unless otherwise terminated 
by the court, extended by mutual consent of 
the parties or extended by further order of 
the court on the motion of any party. Any 
extension by mutual consent of the parties 
shall not exceed one year. 
(c) Any order issued pursuant to subdivi-
sion (a) or (b) shall state on its face the date 
of expiration of the order. 
(d) The court shall order the party who 
obtained the order or the attorney for the 
party to deliver or the clerk to mail a copy 
of any order, or extension, modification or 
tcfmination thereof, granted pursuant to 
subdivision (a) or (b), by the close of the 
business day on which the order, extension, 
modification, or termination was granted, 
and any subsequent proof of service thereof, 
to each local Jaw enforcement agency desig-
nated by the party or the attorney for the 
party, having jurisdiction over the residence 
of the party who has care, custody and 
control of the minor child and such other 
locations where the court determines that 
acts of domestic violence against the party 
and the minor child are likely to occur. 
Each appropriate law enforcement agency 
shall make available through an existing 
system for verification, information as to the 
existence, terms and current status of any 
order issued pursuant to subdivision (a) or 
(b) to any law enforcement officer respond-
ing to the scene of reported domestic vio-
lence. 
(e) Any willful and knowing violation of 
any order granted pursuant to subdivision 
(a) or (b) shall be a misdemeanor punishable 
under Section 273.6 of the Penal Code. 
[1979 ch 795 § 5, operative July 1, 1980; 
1980 ch 1158 § 3.) 
§ 7021. [Judgment and orders; Offenses] 
A judgment entered under this part may 
include any orders issued pursuant to subdi-
vision (a) or (b) of Section 7020. Any such 
judgment shall state on its face (1) which 
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provisions of the judgment are such orders, 
and (2) the date of expiration of such orders, 
which shall be one year from the date the 
judgment is issued unless extended by the 
court after notice and hearing. The judg-
ments, or orders, or extensions thereof shall 
be transmitted to law enforcement agenctes 
in the manner provided by subdivision (dl , 
Section 7020. Any willful and knowing ., :: 
lation of any such order shall be a mis·-
meanor punishable under Section 273.c , 
the Penal Code. [ 1979 ch 795 § 6, opera:: . 
July 1, 1980; 1980ch 1158 §4.] 
PART 8 
AUTOMATIC CHECKOUT SYSTEM 
[Added by Stats 1981 ch 224 § 1.] 
7100. 
§ 01. 
§ 71 
§7103. 
§ 7104. 
§ 7105. 
§ 7106. 
Readable prices on packages required; Exceptions 
Penalty 
Liability for losses and expenses incurred; Applicabilit 
Unintentional error excepted 
·elusive remedies 
Sho title 
Preem ·on of field 
§ 7100. [Readable rices on packages re· 
quired; Exceptions] (a) "very retail grocery 
store or grocery departme within a general 
retail merchandise store whi uses an auto-
matic checkout system shall ca e to have a 
clearly readable price indicated 85 per-
cent of the total number of packa d 
sumer commodities offered for sale 
are not exempt pursuant to subdivision 
The management of any such retai 
eery store or grocery department shal eter-
mine the number of consumer com odities 
normally offered for sale on a d y basis, 
shall determine the consumer c modities 
to be exempted pursuant to this 'ubdivision, 
and shall maintain a list of t se consumer 
commodities exempt pursua to this subdi-
vision. The list shall be m e available to a 
designated representative the appropriate 
local union, the membe of which are re-
sponsible for item prici , in those stores or 
departments that hav collective bargaining 
agreements, seven d s prior to an item or 
items being exemp a pursuant to this subdi-
vision. In additio , the list shall be available 
and posted in a rominent place in the store 
seven days p · r to an item or items being 
exempted pu uant to this subdivision. 
(b) The ovisions of this section shall not 
apply to · y of the following: 
( 1) A consumer commodity which was 
not g .erally item-priced on January 1, 
1977 as determined by the Department of 
Fo and Agriculture pursuant to subdivi-
si (c) of Section 12604.5 of the Business 
d Professions Code, as in effect July 8, 
977. 
(2) Any unpackaged fresh food produce, 
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or t consumer commodities which are u~­
de ·three cubic inches in size, weigh !C"",, 
t n three ounces, and are priced und~: 
orty cents ($0.40). 
(3) Any consumer commodity offered a, 1 
sale item or as a special. 
(4) Any business which has as its on:} 
regular employees the owner thereof, or tl:: 
parent, spouse, or child of such owner, or, 1:1 
addition thereto, not more than two otr :r 
regular employees. 
(5) Identical items within a multi-it::rn 
p age. 
( Items sold through a vending r.1l· 
chine. 
(c) Fa the purposes of this section: 
(1) "Au atic checkout system" me!::, 
a computer able of interpreting the ur.:· 
versa! product de or any other code wh:.-:-, 
is on an item o ed for sale to dctern;:::~ 
the price of items ing purchased, regad· 
less of whether the de entry is accom· 
plished manually by a man or automJ!l-
cally by a machine. 
(2) "Consumer commodi '' includes: · 
(A) Food, including all m rial wh.:t11cr 
solid liquid or mixed and w ther stmj!e 
or c~mpound, which i; used or i nded fl'f 
consumption by human beings or 
animals normally kept as househol <1'· 
and all substances or ingredients adde 1'' 
any such material for any purpose. ' 
definition shall not apply to individual p3(k-
ages of ci :_;arettes or individual cigars. . . 
(B) Napkins, facial tissues, toilet ttsSUl~· 
foil wrapping, plastic wrapping, paper tO\\C;· 
ing, and disposable nlates and cups. 
EVIDENCE 
§ 621. Legitimacy; Blood test. 
(a) ~xcept as provided in subdivision (b), 
the tssue of a wife cohabiting with her 
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is 
conclusively presumed to be a child of the 
marriage. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of 
subdivision (a), if the court finds that the 
conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by 
the evidence based upon blood tests per-
fo.rr.1ed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing 
With Section 890) of Division 7 are that the 
husband is not the father of the child the 
question of patemity of the husband sh~ll be 
resolved accordingly. 
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests 
under subdivision (b) may be raised by the 
husband not later than t\VO years from the 
child's date of birth. 
(d) The notice of motion for blood tests 
under subdivision (b) may be raised by the 
mother of the child not later than two years 
from the child's date of birth if the child's 
biological father has filed an affidavit with 
the court acknowledging paternity of the 
child. 
(e) The provisions of subdivision (b) shall 
not apply to any case coming within the 
provisions of Section 7005 of the Civil Code 
or to any case in which the wife, with the 
consent of the husband, conceived by means 
of a surgical procedure. 
(f) The notice of motion for the blood 
tests pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be 
supported by a declaration under oath sub-
mitted by the moving party statino the fac-
tual basis for placing the issue ot paternity 
before the court. This requirement shall not 
apply to any case pending before the couft 
on September 30, 1980. 
(g) The provisions of subdivision (b) shall 
not apply to any case which has reached 
final judgment of paternity on September 30, 
1980. [1965 ch 299 §2; 1975 ch 1244 §13; 
1980 ch 1310 § l, effective September 30. 
1980; 1981 ch 1180 § 1.] Cal Ju,- 3d Crimi-
nal Law § 2232, Evidence § W4, Fami!v 
Law §§ i 63, 164; Flitkjn Evid~nce pp 25l 
620; Su;nmary (8th ed) pp 4723, 4724 4729 
4732. ' J 
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE 
§ 10619. Petition 1or adoption 
CIVIL 
§ 226.9. [Adoption by stepparent: Cnn-
sent: Procedure: Consent of father or 
mother outside State; Consent of miilOr par-
ent.) NotwithSU\Jlding any other provi~ions 
of this chapter, in case of an adoption of a 
child by a stepparent where one natural or 
adoptive parent retains his or be: custody 
and control of said child, the consent of 
either or both parents must be signed in the 
presence of a county clerk, probation officer 
or county welfare department staff member 
of any county of this state on a form pre-
scribed by the State Department of Social 
Services and the county clerk, probation 
officer or county welfare department staff 
member before whom such consent is signed 
shall immediately file said consenr with the 
clerk of the superior court of the county 
where the petition is filed and said clerk 
shall immediately file a certified copy of 
such consent to adoption with the State 
Depr.rtment of Soci<:Il Services. 
If the father or mother of a child to be 
adopted is outside the State of California at 
the time of signing consent, his or her con-
sent may be signed before a notary or other 
person authorized to perform notarial acts. 
Such consent, when reciting that the per-
son giving it is entitled to sole custody c·f the 
minor child, shall, when duly ackncwlcdgc,1 
before the county clcrk, probation ot11ccr, or 
county \Velfare department staff member be 
prima facie evidence of the right or the 
pe~son making it to the sole custody of the 
chlld and such person's sole right to consent. 
A parent who is a minor shall have the 
right to sign a consent for the adoption of 
his or her child and such consent shall not 
be subject to revocation by reason of such 
minority. [1963 ch 1806 § 11; 1971 ch 1593 
§ 47.17, operative July 1, 1972; 1973 ch 237 
§ 1; 1977 ch 1252 § 68, operative July 1, 
1978.] Cal Jur 3d Acknowledgments §§ 1 ct 
s~q, 12, ~3, 22 et seq., Family Law § 93; 
Cal Pra~tJce R.ev,. Ch 150:10:16, Adoption 
Proceedmg; WJtkm Summary (8th ed) pp 
4698, 4716. 
th A fee of elev:n do1Jar~ ($1 1) for each int.liviclual being adopted shall be puid to 
f e county clerk ~t the time of filing the petition in nn adoption proo,edin"" e"ceot ~r agency adoptiOns in which the adoption fee is waired and n st:uem~;t -~ro~ ~ e ~gency to t~is effect is filed with the petition, which fr:e shfdl be 'paid monthly 
d
y b e county C1erk to the State :F:egistrar of Vital Statistics for the sc· Yices requir-
e y statute of that office. 
(Added by Stats.197S, c. SOD, p. 259<!, § 10.) 
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PENAL 
§ 181. [Infrbgement of jJCrsonal liberty 
or attempt to assume ownership of persons: 
Penalty.) Every person who holds, or at-
tempts to hold, any person in involuntary 
servitude, or assumes, or attempts to as-
sume, rights of ownership over any person, 
or who sells, or attempts to sell, any person 
to another, or receives money or anything of 
value, in consideration of placing any person 
in the custody, or under the power or con-
trol of another, or who buys, or attempts to 
buy, any person, or pays money, or delivers 
anything of value, to another, in considera-
tion of having any person placed ir. his 
custody, or under his power or control, or 
who knO\vingly aids or assists in any manner 
any one thus offending, is punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison for two, 
three or four years. [1901 ch 155 § l; 1976 
ch 1139 § 131, operative July 1, 1977.) Cal 
Jur 3d Criminal §§ 81, 2414; Cal Practice 
§ 150:36; Witkin Crimes pp 737, 991. 
§ 182. [Criminal conspiracy: Acts consti-
tuting: Punishment: Venue.] If two or more 
persons con~pire: 
I. To commit anv crime. 
2. Falsely and maliciously to indict an-
other for any crime, or to procure another 
to be charged or arrested for any crime. 
3. Falsely to move or maintain any suit, 
action or proceeding. 
4. To cheat and defraud any person of any 
prop.crty, by any means which are in them-
selves criminal, or to obtain money or prop-
erty by false pretenses or by false promises 
Wllh _fraudulent intent not to perform such 
prom1ses. 
5. To commit any act injurious to the 
public health, to public morals, or to pcn·ert 
or obstruct justice, or the due administration 
of the laws. 
. 6. To commit any crime against the per-
~n of the President or Vice President of the 
United States, the Governor of auv state or 
territory, any United States justice. or jll.:lge, 
or the secretary· of any of the executive 
departments of the United States. 
They are punishable as follows: 
When they conspire to commit any crime 
against the person of any official sp.:'cified in 
subdivision 6, they are guilty of :;. felony and 
are punishable by imprisonment i:1 t:-te state 
prison for five, seven, or nine years. 
When they conspire to commit any other 
felony, they shall be punishable: in thE.; s~rne 
manner and to the same extent as is pro-
vided for the punishment of the s:tid fdony. 
If the felonv is one for which difftrent 
punishments ·are prescribed for difierent de-
grees, the jury or court which ~nds the 
defendant guilty th<;;reof shall determiBe the 
degree of the felony defendant conspir:;c to 
commit. If the degree is not so cktermined, 
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the punishment for conspiracy to commit 
such felony shall be that prescribed for the 
lesser degree, except in the case of conspir-
acy to commit murder, in which case the 
punishment shall be that prescribed for mur-
der in the first degree. 
If the felony is consr-iracy to commit two 
or more felonies which have diffcrer:t pun-
ishments and the commission of such felo-
nies constitutes but one offense of conspir-
acy, the penalty shall be that prescribed for 
the felony \<,;hich ha;; the greater maximum 
term. 
When they conspire to do an act de-
scribed in subdivision 4 of this section, they 
shall be punishable by imprisonment in the 
state prison, or by imprisonment in the 
county jail for not more than one year, or by 
a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars 
($5,000), or both. 
When they conspire to do any of the other 
acts described in this section they shall be 
punishable by imprisonment in the county 
jail for not more than one year, or in the 
state prison, or by a fine not exceeding five 
thousand dollars ($5,000) or both. 
All cases of conspiracy may be prosecuted 
and tried in the superior court of any county 
in which any overt act tending to effect such 
conspir:1cy shall be done. [1872; 1873-74 ch 
614 § 14; 1919 ch 125 § l; 1943 ch 554 § 1; 
1953 ch 32 § 1; 1955 ch 660 § 1; 1965 ch 
924 § 1; 1976 ch 1139 § 132, operative July 
1, 1977; 1978 ch 579 § 1.) Cal Jur 3d Crimi-
nal Law §§ 8, 9, 26, 104, 512, 2354, 2357, 
2365, 2369, 2626, 2974, 3141, 3152, 3153, 
3155, 3156, 3160, 3162, 3163, 3166, 316S, 
3174, 3177, 3181, Monopolies and Restraints 
of Trade§ 27, Public Aid and W::lfare § 18· 
Witkin Crimes pp 27, 37, 40, 43, 100, 10~ 
109, 110, 111, 466, 656, 915; Criminal Pro. 
cedure p 36. 
PENAL 
§ 273. [Payments to p:1rent for phcing 
child for ndoption: :\btern!ty expenses: Re-
ceipt of financial benefits hy parent.] (<:) 1t 
is a misdemeanor for any person cr agency 
to offer to pay money or anything of value, 
or to pay money or anything of va!ue, to a 
parent for the pbcemcnt for adoption, for 
the cc.nscnt to an adoption, or for cooper-
ation in the completion of an adoption of his 
child. This section does not make it unbwful 
to pay the maternity-connected medical or 
hospital and necessary living expenses of the 
mother preceding and during confinement as 
an act of charity, as long as the payment is 
not conti:1gent upon placement of the child 
for adoDtion, consent to the adoption, or 
cooperation in the completion of the adop· 
tion. 
(b) It is a misdemeanor for any parent to 
obtain the financi::il benet1ts set forth in 
subdivision (a) with the intent to receive 
such financial be:H:fits without completing 
the adoption or without consenting to the 
adoption. (i 967 ch lOSS § 1.] 32 Cal Jur 3d 
F:~mily L:-.v §§ 84, 181; H'itkin Cn'mes pp 
159, 160, 242, 257, 258, 265, 511, 527, 556, 
55 7, 862; Summar;.-· (Srh ed) p ·t690. 
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CIVIL 
§. 224p. [~dvertising placement or sup-
plymg of chlldren for adoption a mistl~­
meanor.] Any person or organization that, 
without holding a valid and unrevoked li-
c.ense. or permit to place children for adop-
t:on 1ssu~d by the State Department of So-
eta] Servtces, advertises in any perioJical or 
n~wspaper, by radio, or other public rne-
dmm,. that he or it will place children for 
a~opt101_1, or accept, supply, provide or ob-
tam chddren for adoption, or that causes 
any advt:.rtisem~nt to b.c. ~ublished in or by 
any. public medtu.m soltca.mg, requesting, or 
~skm~ for ~ny ch.tld or children for adoption 
JS gm.ty 01 a m1sdemeanor. (19·\5 ch 1317 
§ 2; 1~51 ::h 638 § 2; 1971 ch 1593 § 47.2, 
operat~ve July I, 1973; 1977 ch 1252 §52, 
operative July 1, 1978.] Cal fur Jd Family 
Law§ 77; Witkin Summary (8th ed) p 469-f. 
§ 4600 DEERiNG'S CIViL 64t, 
§ 4601. 
§ 4602. 
Visitation rights: A ward to parent or to other person. 
Custody investigation and report thereon: Consideration by court, availability hJ 
parties, and receipt in evidence: Repayment to county of such investigation-, 
and reports. 
§ 4603. Spouse's action for exclusive custody: Entry and modification or revocation of order 
or decree. 
§ 4604. 
§ 4605. 
§ 4606. 
§ 4607. 
Duty of district attorney to locate child and party in possession of child. 
Expenses of district attorney. 
Appointment of counsel to represent minor child. 
Mediation. 
§ 4600. [Custody order: Consideration of 
child's wishes: Order of preference: Plearling 
and finding before award of custody to per-
son(s) other than parent, and exclusion of 
public from hearing.] (a) The Legislature 
finds and declares that it is the public policy 
of this state to assure minor children of 
frequent and continuing contact \vith both 
parents after the par~·nts have separated or 
dissolved their marriage, and to encourage 
parents to share the rights and responsibili-
ties of child rearing in order to effect this 
policy. 
In any proceeding where there is at issue 
the custody of a minor child, the court may, 
during the pendency of the proceeding or at 
any time thereafter, make such order for the 
custody of the child during minority as may 
seem necessary or proper. If a child is of 
sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to 
form an intelligent preference as to custody, 
the court shall consider and give due weight 
to the wishes of the child in making an 
award of custody or modification thereof. In 
determining the person or persons to whom 
custody should be awarded under paragraph 
(2) or (3) of subdivision (b), the court shall 
consider and give due weight to the nomina-
tion of a guardian of the person of the child 
by a parent under Article 1 (commencing 
•vith Section 1500) of Chapter l of Part 2 of 
Division 4 of the Probate Code. 
(b) Custody should be awarded in the 
following order of preference according to 
the best interests of the child: 
(1) To both parents jointly pursuant to 
Section 4600.5 or to either parent. In mak-
ing an order for custody to either parent, the 
court shall consider, among other factors, 
which parent is more likely to allow the 
child or children frequent and continuing 
contact with the noncustodial parent, and 
shall not prefer a parent as custodian be-
cause of that parent's sex. 
The court, in its discretion, may require 
the parents to submit to the court a plan for 
the implementation of the custody order. 
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(2) If to neither parent, to the person cr 
persons in whose home the child has bee:1 
living in a wholesome and stable environ· 
ment. 
(3) To any other person or per,of!, 
deemed by the court to be suitahk and able 
to provide adequate and proper care and 
guidance for the child. 
(c) Before the court makes any order 
awarding custody to a person or persons 
other than a parent, without the consent ol 
the parents, it shall make a finding th::n an 
award of custody to a parent would be 
detrimental to the child and the award to a 
nonparent is required to serve the best inter-
ests of the child. Allegations that parent3l 
custody would be detrimental to the child. 
other than a statement of that ultimate fact, 
shall not appear in the pleadings. The court 
may, in its discretion, exclude the pub\i,; 
from the hearing on this issue. [1969 ch 
1608 § 8; 1970 ch 1545 § 2; 1972 ch 1007 
§ l; 1979 ch 204 § 1, ch 730 § 13, operative: 
January l, 1981, ch 915 §3.) Calfur3d 
Family Law §§ 205, 229, 232, 235, 237, ]_lS. 
243, 771; Cal Practice Rev, Ch 142:33.57, 
Proceedino For Separation, Ch 143:33:63. 
Nullity Proceeding, Ch 144:51:58:67:153. 
Dissolution of Marriage, Ch 146:1, Enforce· 
ment of Judgment or Order, Ch 14S: I, j'vfod· 
ification of Orders, Ch 149:2, Termination ef 
Par en tal Custody. Witkin Procedure 2d, _PE 
330, 2358; Summary (8th ed) pp -!.53 1, 4:>8 ', 
4590, 4594, 4598, 4599, 4610, 4615, 46-+1. 
4673, 4675, 4678, 4680, 4682. 
§ 4600.1. [Temporary order pending de-
termination of custody.] In any procecdmg 
under Title 2 (commencing with Secttor. 
4400) or Title 3 (commencing with Se:non 
4500) where there are minor children ot the 
marriage, and in any action for excluslYC 
custody under Section 4603, a petition for 3 
temporary custody order containing th~ 
statement required by Section 5158 may. be 
included with the inital filing of the pentwn 
or action or may be filed at any time there· 
645 DEERING'S CIVIL § 4600.6 
after. If the parties have agreed to or 
reached an understanding on the custody or 
temporary custody of their children, a copy 
of the agreement or an affidavit as to their 
understanding shall be attached to the peti-
tion or action. As promptly as possible after 
such filing, the court shall, except in excep-
tional circumstances, enter an order award-
ing temporary custody in accordance with 
the agreement or understanding, or in accor-
dance with any stipulation of the parties. Jn 
the absence of an agreement, understanding, 
or stipulation, the court may, if jurisdiction 
is appropriate, enter an ex parte order, set a 
hearing date within 20 days and issue an 
order to show cause on the responding 
party. If the responding party does not 
appear or respond within the time set, the 
temporary order may be extended as neces-
sary, pending the termination of the pro-
ceedings. [1976 ch 1399 § 2.) Cal Practice 
Rev, Ch 144:51, Dissolution of Marriage. 
§ 4600.2. [Award of custody to parent 
receiving assistance: Order for support.] 
Any order awarding custody to a parent 
who is receiving, or in the opinion of the 
court is likely to receive, assistance pursuant 
to the Burton-Miller Act (Chapter 2 (com-
mencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 of 
Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code) for the maintenance of the child shall 
include an order pursuant to Section 4700 or 
4702 directing the noncustodial parent to 
pay any amount necessary for the support of 
the child, to the exterit of the noncustodial 
parent's ability to pay. [1979 ch 1030 § 3.] 
§ 4600.5. [Joint custody.] (a) There shall 
be a presumption, affecting the burden of 
proof, that joint custody is in the best inter-
ests of a minor child where the parents have 
agreed to an award of joint custody or so 
agree in open court at a hearing for the 
purpose of determining the custody of the 
minor child or children of the marriage. 
If the court declines to enter an order 
awarding joint custody pursuant to this sub-
division, the court shall state in its decision 
the reasons for denial of an award of joint 
custody. 
.. (b) Upon the application of either parent, 
J?mt custody may be awarded in the discre-
tiOn of the court in other cases. For the 
purpose of assisting the court in making a 
determination whether an award of joint 
c.ustody is appropriate under this subdivi-
s~on, the court may direct that an investiga-
tion be conducted pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 4602. If the court declines to 
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enter an order awarding joint custody pursu-
ant to this subdivision, the court shall state 
in its decision the reasons for denial of an 
award of joint custody. 
(c) For the purposes of this section, "joint 
custody" means an order a\varding custody 
of the minor child or children to both par-
ents and providing that physical custody 
shall be shared by the parents in such a way 
as to assure the child or children of frequent 
and continuing contact with both parents; 
provided, however, that such order may 
award joint legal custody without awarding 
joint physical custody. 
(d) Any order for joint custody may be 
modified or terminated upon the petition of 
one or both parents or on the court's own 
motion if it is shown that the best interests 
of the child require modification or termina-
tion of the order. The court shall state in its 
decision the reasons for modification or ter-
mination of the joint custody order if either 
parent opposes the modification or termina-
tion order. 
(e) Any order for the custody of the 
minor child or children of a marriage en-
tered by a court in this state or any other 
state may, subject to the jurisdictional re-
c;nirements set forth in Sections 5152 and 
5163, be modified at any time to an order of 
joint custody in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section. 
(f) In counties having a conciliation court, 
the court or the parties may, at any time, 
pursuant to local rules of court, consult with 
the conciliation court for the purpose of 
assisting the parties to formulate a plan for 
implementation of the custody order or to 
resolve any controversy which has arisen in 
the implementation of a plan for custody. 
(g) Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, access to records and information 
pertaining to a minor child, including but 
not limited to medical, dental, and school 
records, shall not be denied to a parent 
because such parent is not the child's custo-
dial parent. [1979 ch 915 § 2.) Cal Practice 
Rev, Ch 142:33, Proceeding For Separation, 
Ch 144:153, Dissolution of Marriage. 
§ 4600.6. [Trial] (a) In any case in which 
a contested issue of custody of a minor child 
is the sole contested issue, the ca<>e shall be 
given preference over other civil cases, ex-
cept matters to which special precedence 
may be given by law, for assigning a trial 
date and shall be giYen an early hearing. 
(b) In any case in which there is more 
than one contested issue and one of the 
issues is of the custody of a minor child, the 
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PRECIS 
The author presents various demographic and motivational 
data on 125 surrogate mother applicants. He describes 
three groups of complementary motivational factors and 
points out the need for the longitudinal studies on 
surrogate mothers which he is conducting. 
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Recently there has been both an increased de~~nd for newborn white 
babies accompanied by a decrease in their supply. Infertile couples 
are turning to alternative choices including surrogate motherhood. 
A surrogate mother is a wom~~ who contracts with a man to be impreg-
nated by artificial insemination, carry the child, and after delivery 
relinquish the child and all parental rights to the biologic father. 
Usually the biologic father is married to an infertile woman who 
hopes to adopt the child herself. The purpose of this study is to 
understand the motivation of these women with the intent of following 
them during the surrogate mother process to observe how they adjust, 
psychologically to the various phases of this procedure. This kind 
of data is needed to assist in the informed consent of the surrogate 
and parental applicants as well as to provide a reasonable basis for 
any policy decisions regarding surrogate motherhood. 
METHOD 
So far I have interviewed well over 175 surrogate mother applicants 
referred by an attorney Who works with the parental applicants and 
surrogate mother applicants. The interviews were semi-structured and 
were administered on at least two separate occasions following their 
completion of a questio~~aire. Some data were not available on some 
applicants but the first 125 were used as the Sai!'\Ple for this study. 
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RESULTS 
Preliminary findings indicated that L~e applicants average about 25 
years old; of 118, 56\ were married, 20\ divorced, a~d 24\ single 
and never married. Of 120, about 42\ were Catholic, 57\ are Protestant 
and there was one Jewish applicant. 
Of the first 50 applicants, slightly over 40\ were either unemployed at 
the time of the interviews. and/or receiving some form of financial aid. 
Almost 60\ were working or had a working spouse with a range of incomes 
(actual 1980 or projected 1981) from $6,000 to $55,000. The applicant's 
formal education ranged from well below high school to completion of a 
Bachelor's Degree. Almost 20\ did not complete high school; about 55\ 
either graduated high school or received a GED; about 25\ have some post 
high school college courses, business school, nursing school, (LPN or RN); 
one applicant received a Ba~~elor's Degree. 
About 90% of the 125 surrogate applicants said that they required a fee 
for their participation with most giving $5,000 as the minimum amount. 
Of 124, about 37% said they would participate only for a married couple 
unable to have a child, iO% for a married or unmarried couple unable to 
have a child, 15\ for a single man or couple (married or unmarried) but 
only if unable to have a child, 10\ for a couple for any reason, and 28\ 
for anyone for any reason. 
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The data on the sample of 125 yielded some interesting results about 
the applicant's history of pregnancy. 114 (91\) had at least one pre-
vious pregnancy and 101 (81\) had at least one live birth with the 
average for this latter group being 1.7. Those who·had been previously 
pregnant to term described a feeling regarding their pregnancy that 
varied from a tolerable experience to the best time of their life such 
that they wanted to be pregnant the rest of tlle.i.r lives. This latter 
group felt more content, complete, special, adequate, and often felt 
an inner glow; some felt more feminine and attractive and enjoyed the 
extra attention afforded them. Those who were never pregnant to term 
described wishing to have the experience even if they planned on tav-
ing other children of their own later. 
In the sample of 125, about 35\ had either a prior voluntary abortion 
(26\) or relinquished a child for adoption {9\). Some women believed 
these previous losses would help them to control and minimize any de-
pressive feelings in response to relinquishing the baby. A few con-
sciously felt that they were participating in order to deal with unre-
solved feelings associated with the prior losses. The only applicant 
who was herself adopted had been "forced" to relinquish her baby at age 
14 and wanted to repeat .the experience of relinquishment and master it. 
One applicant with a history of an abortion said that instead of "kill-
ing a baby" she wanted to give the gift of a live baby to a needed and 
loving family. 
Most of t~e surrogate applicants denied the significance of their bio-
logic (genetic) contribution to the prospective baby. Some felt that 
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the experiential contribution to child development is more important 
than the biologic (genetic), thus minimizing the influence of their 
own genetic contribution to the baby. Most women admitted t.."'la t they 
would experience some feelings of loss and sadness but minimized them 
saying: 
DISCUSSION 
"I'm only an incubator." 
"I'd be nestwatching." 
"1'11 attach myself in a different way -hoping 
it ' s heal thy. " 
Several factors appear to have a complementary relationship in determin-
ing the applicant's decision to be a surrogate mother, including (1) the 
perceived desire and need for money, (2) the perceived degree of enjoy-
ment and desire to be pregnant, and (3) the perception of the advantages 
outweighing the disadvantages of relinquishing the baby. This latter 
factor consisted of two aspects. The first is the often expressed strong 
wisn to give the gift of a baby to a neeey parent. The second motivation-
al component regarding relinquishment is L"'le repetition of a previous 
voluntary loss of a fetus or baby (by abortion or relinquishment) which 
helps master the unresolved feelings connected with these events. 
These results are just the tip of the data iceberg needed to help both 
the participants in the surrogate mother process and the policy makers 
of our society make reasonable and informed decisions. I am presently 
conducting longitudinal studies on the surrogate mother process and will 
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report on them soon in an attempt to help foster a reasonable approach 
to this very controversial reproductive alternative. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A surrogate mother is a woman who contracts with a man to be impreg-
nated through artificial insemination, to carry the child, and after 
delivery, to relinquish the child, as well as all parental rights, to 
the biologic father. Usually this biologic father is married to an in-
fertile woman who hopes to eventua~ly adopt the child. The purpose of 
this ongoing longitudinal research is to observe how these surrogate 
mothers adjust psychologically over the course of their pregnancy and 
after delivery. This paper reports some of the psychological data 
which emanates from a pilot study on surrogate mothers. 
METHOD 
Of the over 225 surrogate mother applicants evaluated, with semi-
structured int~rviews, 25 have so far become pregnant after being 
selected by the various parental applicants; 12 of these 25 have de-
livered. Of the 25 surrogates who have been or are pregnant, all but 
one was interviewed prior to deciding to participate in the surrogate 
mother process. Most were further interviewed individually during 
each trimester and periodically after delivery. Two were also inter-
viewed on the days immediately following delivery in the hospital, and 
direct observations of these two surrogate's interactions with the new-
born, including feedings, were made. Many surrogates also attended a 
support group of pregnant and post-partum surrogates that met about 
every three weeks. A registered nurse also observed some of the sur-
rogates during labor, delivery and the post-partum period.* 
*The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Nancy Rerune, R.N., 
Ph.D., a private consulting nurse and Associate Professor of Parent-
Child Nursing, University of Michigan School of Nursing. 
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RESULTS 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
All 25 pregnant surrogate mothers are white due to the fact that all 
the parental applicants are white and desired only white surrogate ap-
plicants. The average age at the time of artificial insemination by 
donor (A.I.D.) was 25.0. At A.I.D. 18 were married, 5 \'lere single, 
and 2 were divorced. It is projected that at delivery 19 \'lill be 
married, 4 will be single and 2 "lill be divorced. Thirteen (52%) are 
Protestant and 12 (48%) are Catholic. Three had less than a high 
school education, 14 had graduated from high school or had a GED, and 
8 had some college or professional training. The average number of 
pregnancies was 1.9 with 1.6 being the average number of live births. 
Three surrogates had no previous pregnancies. Nine (36%) had volun-
tary losses of a fetus or child, by abortion - 4, or by relinguuish-
ing a-child - 4. One surrogate experienced her mother relinquishing 
a younger sibling at birth and is included in this group. One who had 
relinquished a child had also been adopted herself soon after birth. 
Twenty-two of the 25 required and will receive (projected) a $10,000 
fee. Twenty-fotirrof the 25 carried a child for a married couple un-
able to have a child; one carried the child for a divorced man. 
ADAP'I'ATIONAL DATA 
In an earlier paper, this author discussed the motivations of 125 surro-
h 1 . 1 gate mot er app ~cants. Three groups of motivational factors \'/ere pre-
sented: 1) perceived desire and need for money, 2) perceived degree of 
enjoyment of and desire to be pregn<mt, and 3) perceived aclv,lntages ver-
sus disadvantages of relinquishing the baby. This latter factor included 
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both the experience of giving the gift of a baby to an infertile 
couple and of repeating a prior voluntary loss of a fetus by abortion 
or baby by relinquishment. Each of these three motivational factors 
will be discussed as it related to the experience of these pregnant 
surrogate mothers. 
As stated, 22 of the 25 surrogate mothers did receive or are receiving 
a $10,000 fee. Those 12 who have already delivered and received this 
fee did not seem to have any adverse psychological consequences merely 
because they received the fee. As a matter of fact, one surrogate ex-
pressed that spending some of the money on items for the house helped 
her to deal with feelings of loss. Of interest is that one surrogate 
who already delivered, changed her mind during the course of the preg-
nancy a~d refused the $10,000 fee once she established a relationship 
with the parental couple. In general, the fee becomes less important 
as the pregnancy develops and as the surrogate establishes a relation-
ship with the parents-to-be. 
Lerner et a1 2 have described the enjoyment of pregnancy itself, inde-
pendent of the anticipated experience of eventually raising a child. 
They described four categories of pregenital motivating factors: 
l) narcissism and dependency, 2) identity and body image, 3) power, and 
4) guilt and pain dependence •. Most surrogates felt very contented when 
they received the special attention dne to their pregnancy. Sever.-:tl de-
scribed that this pregnancy was doing something and producing something 
(a baby) that only a woman could do. None have described any sense of 
power or desire to experience the physical pain or discomfort. 
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Many pregnant surrogates found that their experience gratified their wish 
to give the gift of a baby to a needy couple. Thus, many experienced a 
sense of accomplishment of doing something worthwhile and valuable; this 
was reinforced when they received the appreciation overtly from the paren-
tal couple. For example, one biological father repeatedly said, "You made 
my dream come true," much to t;he excitement of the surrogate. 
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The experience of relinquishing the baby also appeared to help the surrogate 
deal with prior unresolved voluntary losses of a fetus or child - either 
their own loss or that of a close family member (mother) with whom she· iden-
tified. These voluntary losses included abortions or relinquishing the baby 
for adoptio~ at birth. For example, one surrogate dealt with her own bio-
logic mother's giving her up for adoption as well as her own relinquishment 
of a newborn at age 14. She related that as a result of having some phone 
contact with the parental couple who accepted this child, she felt more 
confident about the personality and child caring ability of the unknown 
couple who accepted the newborn she relinquished at age 14. Generally, 
these repetitions have often been an attempt to master in a willful act 
what was felt to be less in control originally. So far no surrogate has 
consciously experienced the surrogate mother process as a righting of a 
·wrong (undoing) or as a punishment which expiates any guilt. 
Preliminary findings indicate that pregnant surrogates usually deal with 
the anticipated loss in one of several ways. After quickening, most surro-
gates tended to further deny the feeling that this was "my" child and felt 
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like it was "theirs .. (what might be termed non-possessive feelings). Most 
also experienced a need to have some contact with the parents (either in 
person, by phone, or letter} which facilitated the fostering of empathy 
(transient identification). The surrogates often demonstrated a need to 
idealize the parental couples and to repress any agrgressive feelings to-
wards them. Thus, they tended to feel "they will be good loving parents 
and I like them very much." This idealization and positive feeling tended 
to further facilitate empathy {transient identification) and a sense of 
sharing in the parental couple's happiness. One stated that she and the 
infertile wife were sharing in the mothering process; she was the biologic 
mother while the infertile wife would be the psychologic mother. 
The degree of contact with the parental couple varied during the post-
partum hospital stay as well as during the pregnancy. Some couples chose 
not to visit the surrogate and their baby in the hospital, while others 
established a close relationship in the hospital. In the latter case.-:;, 
the couple often fed the baby with the surrogate either present or absent, 
and received special child care instructions from the hospital staff. 
Those surrogates who participated in tl1e support group seemed to foL~ a 
closely knit community characterized by a sense of belonging. This feeling 
of comraderieand sharing complemented and tended to support the empathetic 
feelings toward the parental couple. 
Attachment behaviors 1:o the baby varied qreatly from infrequent dist-;-mt !10n-
involved contacts to frequent and intimate closeness. Thns, one surrogate 
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held the baby on her lap while feeding in a businesslike manner; another 
lovingly held the baby close to her body while feeding and had even con-
sidered nursing the baby. Significantly, this latter surrogate who main-
tained an intimate relationship to the child in the hospital, carried the 
baby for a divorced man with no consistent maternal figure in the picture;. 
After delivery, the surrogate mothers expressed transient grief symptoms 
which are highly variable·. One stated that she had almost no consciously 
experienced feeling of loss. Another described one episode of deep cry-
ing, while still another related repetitive symptoms such as crying daily 
at the time of delivery and sleeplessness, both lasting about one month. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the preliminary results of this study, I have drawn certain conclu-
sions about recommending the availability of various components to the 
multituqe of surrogate mother programs springing up all over the country. 
These factors should be made available to those who choose to take advan-
tage of them in order to maximize the psychological outcomes of the surro-
gate mother process. 
1) A skilled mental health professional should be available 
to assist the competent surrogate mother applicants with 
a voluntary informed consent. 
2) The surrogate mother and parental couple should be al-
lowed to mutually arrange the extent and nature of any 
contact between them. This would permit the development 
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of empathy to the extent desired and needed. Of course, 
the participants should also be made aware of the possible 
problems arising from the desired contacts so that their 
decision is an informed one. 
3) The pregnant and post-partum surrogate mother should have 
the opportunt·ity to participate in a support group exper-
ience. An important aspect of this experience is to have 
at least one facilitator-therapist be female. 
4) The pregnant surrogate mother should be offered special 
pre-natal classes specifically tailored to the pregnant 
surrogate. She should also have the opportunity to have 
the cooperation of a specifically trained female labor 
coach (perhaps the teacher of the prenatal classes) who 
is familiar with the surrogate mother process. 
The preliminary results from my resaerch with the surrogate mothers also 
has application to various legal and policy issues. In my judgment, the 
various psychological responses and motivations of the surrogate mother, 
as compared to '~nwed mothers", are significantly different so as to war-
rant different treatment of these two groups under the law. Also, I have 
so far found no evidence to support the notion that surrogate motherhood 
with or without a fee, leads to serious adverse psychological consequences 
and therefore (as some people feel) should be prohibited. 
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As a result of interviewing over 225 surrogate mother applicants, I 
have discovered that most of these women have not previously suffi-
ciently explored their own motivations and the possible advantages 
and disadvantages of their involvement. In my judgment, they needed 
the added experience of psychiatric interviews to help them give a 
competent, voluntary, informed consent. 
Therefore, it is my recommendation that regulatory legislation be 
~ 
passed to help guarantee that these women become surrogate mothers 
as a result of a voluntary and informed choice. This would help to 
prevent abuse by unscrupulous busines~men who might go to a welfare 
office with a stack of $100 bills and unduly influence a woman to be 
a surrogate mother. 
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SURROGATE 
MO'"fHERHOOD: 
WHAT ARE THE 
ETHICAL ISSUES? 
by Barbara Eck Menning 
Last November a baby was born to a woman in 
Kentucky. The woman, "Elizabeth Kane" to use 
her media p~eudonym, had agreed to bear a child 
for a couple u•ho were infertile due to female prob-
lems. Sht> was inseminated by the husband's 
semen. and bore the child nine months later. She 
surr ,,dered the child to the couple at birth and 
collected an estimated $10,000 in exchange for 
her efforts. 
The intermediary in this birth was Dr. Richard 
Levin, a Louisville, Kentucky gynecologist. He is 
the first physician to "instiTUtionalize" surrogate 
parenting, to use his own words. He formed Sur-
rogate Parenting Associates in Louisville in 1980. 
The RESOLVE staff was aware of Dr. levin and his 
program from the beginning. We watched with in-
terest as Dr. Levin became more widely known and 
quo1ed in a variety of magazines and popular TV 
talk show<. At the &arne time, each counselor at 
RESOLVE has had re5ervations and conflicts with 
the entire issue of surrogate motherhood. As our 
members may recall, we have carried two cau-
tionary announcements about this program and its 
possible expense in past nPwsletters. 
This March l had the opportunity to meet Rich-
ard Levin in person. We were both in Atlanta at the 
American Fertility Society annual meeting. He 
was not there to deliver a paper on his work, but 
rather to staff an exhibit on his program. We talked 
for about an hour and I voiced some of my reserva-
tions. At one point he became dismayed, saying he 
know J was an advocate of donor insemination and 
that hi~ service was just a kind of "reverse AID," 
where a woman donates an egg. It was then that I 
knew J had to write this article. 
Ethics may be a science, but it is also intensely 
personal. The ethics of surrogate motherhood and 
it> comparison or contrast with AID are also very 
complex. I do not speak for RESOLVE as an or-
gonization in writing these thoughts. I am simply 
trying to put on the record my grave reservations 
concerning this method for helping infertile cou-
ples achieve families. 
Surrogate motherhood is hardly a new concept. 
lt goes back to biblical times. But when one reads 
the romanticized stories of barren women achiev-
ing children through their maidservants, one must 
also recall that the maidservants were slaves, that 
they received no money, and that they usually re-
mained close to their surrendered offspring as an 
extended family. 
As I begin to examine the ethical issues of sur· 
wgate parenthood in our time, I must first ask, is it 
l<'ga!? The answer to this question is, at bPs!, un-
clear. It appears to be no accident that Dr. Levin's 
program is situated in the one state in the country 
which does nol make it Illegal for a woman to re-
cerve money for bc<ning another couple's child. 
However, Dr. Levin i~ currently under invesligation 
by the Attorney General's office in Kentucky and 
has had to temporarily cea~e p; ocessing i?lppli· 
canis pending the outcome of this litigation. 
Another person interested in surrogate mothering, 
attorney NoeiKeane,lost a lower court decision to 
legalize this alternative in the state of Michigan 
last year. When Keane attempted to strike down 
present laws preventing surrogate mothering for 
pay because of 'the right to privacy' of parties in-
volved, the court rejected his request, stating, 
wMercenary considerations used to create a par-
ent-child relationship ... strike at the very foun-
dation of human society and are necessarily in-
jurious to the community.h 
Second, I feel it is important to ask whether the 
fee for this service is reasonable. "How can you put 
a price on a baby?" asks Levin in one magazine in-
terview. He hastens to add, "People don't do jobs 
without getting paid." The fee paid to the surro-
gate mother is supposedly not for the baby, but for 
her ~potential loss of income, loss of consortium 
with her husband, pain and suffering. and poten-
tial risk of death," according to the program's law-
yer, Katie Brophy. The figure involved would de-
pend on the circumstances. If a good surrogate 
candidate wanted $25,000 and couple were willing 
to pay that amount, the program would match 
them up. The fees to Levin and his staff have been 
estimated to be about S5,000 per case, though he 
stopped divulging his fees when the media probed 
this sensitive area too often. A recent letter to RE-
SOLVE received from Dr. Levin's program inform-
ed us, "We must advise you that the fees involved 
in the surrogate procedure begin at $15,000, 
which includes professional fees a> \vel! as com· 
pensation for the mother." I do not !Pel these fees 
are reasonable. 
And what of the risk of exploitation? "Surrogate 
parenthood will be here in time; people are willing 
to do anything to have a baby.h These are the 
words of a New York Cit;• physician quoted in The 
New York Times. He is aware of the desperation of 
some infertile couples. Exploitation can be subtle, 
appealing to the needs and longings of childless 
couples who see that by surrogate motherhood 
they could have a baby within a year, when tradi-
tional adoption now takes 4-6 years. Infertility it-
self provides a powerful. coercive force which may 
compel couples into choices they would normally 
never consider. Sometimes the best advocacy we 
can give at agency like RESOLVE is helping peo-
ple to see that they are vulnerable, are perhaps not 
thinking impartially or cautiously, and therefore, 
are possibly exploitable. 
With such a legally risky situation, one inevit-
ably wonders about the possibility of problems. 
Despite what Levin claims are airtight contracts 
bet~A.'een all parties, l am concerned that things 
can and will go wrong in surrogate motherhood. It 
is just a matter of time. These contracts are not en-
forceable in court, If one of the parties involved 
decided to sue. The legitimacy of these agree-
ments depends basically on the good faith of each 
person. Already we know of one surrogate who has 
chosen not to surrender her child (see accompany· 
ing article). What about a baby born defective? 
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EXHIBIT .J 
What If the r£cipient couple change their minds? 
the pregnancy ends in miscarriage or stillbirth, d 
the couples get their money back? And, If the su1 
rogate decided to keep the child, would the fathE 
have to pay child support? There are many unan 
swered questions; I am sure you can think of man 
more. 
The statement by Dr. Levin that surrogat< 
motherhood is just the reverse of donor insemina 
tion cannot go unchallenged. The surrogate is no 
merely donating an egg; she is renting her body lot 
a nine-month period. The surrogate mother, 
because she will carry a pregnancy, has more 
medical and emotional risks than the donor in ar-
tificial insemination. She has a small but real risk 
of maternal death. She has about a 5% risk of 
postpartum complications leading to infection, in-
fertility or possible hysterectomy. Then thEere is the 
matter of emotional bonding between mother and 
child, a subject of which we know little prenatally, 
but which seems to be important. We have heard 
poignant stories from women who had unplanned 
pregnancies and surrendered their babies for adop· 
tion. Might there be an infant-mother bond at 
birth. u•hich if broken has psychological conse· 
quences for both? Who has studied this? 
In artificial insemination by donor, the male 
donor of a semen specimen has no pregnancy 
risks. He also has no connection to, or even 
knowledge of, children born as a result of his dona-
tion. 'Bonding' issues are not a concern. Since preg-
nancy will not take place in his body, he has no 
surrender decisions. Legally, AID has been written 
into the laws of 14 states, and in all other states 
AID is at least not declared illegal, so the donor 
and the couple choosing artificial insemination 
haw very few legal problems. 
A very important point of comparison is the fee 
for service paid. Of course, a surrogate mother 
gives up nine months of her life; the donor just 
gives an ejaculate on demand from time to time. 
The donor receives about $25-$50 per specimen. 
The donor does not set the price (unlike the sur-
rogate mother) nor do AID programs charge "what 
the traffic u•ill bear,~ to use Dr. Levin's nou• in· 
famous words. The fee for the physician doing the 
insemination is relatively standardized too -
about $20 per insemination on the average. No 
one is getting rich from AID couples. The average 
AID pregnancy takes about 5 cycles at two ins<'m· 
inations a cycle for an average of $700. 
There are clearly many differences between 
donor insemination and surrogate motherhood. 
The first has a medical-legal history of over 30 
years and has stood the test of time. The latter 
might date back to biblical times, but has yet to be 
accepted legally. The ethical issues involved are 
complex. Is it legal? Is it a reasonable fee for serv-
ice? Is there risk of exploitation? All are questions 
which have not been answered to my satisfaction. I 
have a 'wait and see philosophy' on this. I am will-
ing to change my point of vieu· if safeguards are 
enacted to control surrogate motherhood. 
I would be heartless if I did not conclude on a 
note that speaks to the infertile couples who are 
considering this option. I understand the despera-
tion of the infertile couple With a female problem 
that cannot be treated. l am one of you. I under-
stand the adoption situation in America, for I have 
adopted my family. Had surrogate motherhood 
been offered to me when I was most eager, I might 
have considered it. I would have looked for 
resources to tell me more about it. Whether you 
look to a family lawyer, a rabbi. minister, or RE· 
SOLVE, I hope the word you hear is CAUTION. 
RESOL\~E. I~c. 
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INFERTILiTY COUNSELING • REFERRAL • SUPPORT GROUPS 
P. 0. BOX 474. HEL!\10::-:T. !'lASS. O~l71l-O·l7·1 
TELEP!IO~E (1117) 4H4·:l4:t4 
RELEASE 
RESOLVE, Inc. 
P. 0. Box 474, Belmont, MA 02178 
(617) 484-2424, 2456 
RESOLVE, Inc. is a nationa2 organization with chapters in 4C sz::ates whic! offe:::s 
counseling, s<Jpport groups, anc information anc re.ferrc:.l for co;_r;.-12es experiencinq 
pro])]ems of infertilit~··. Vlo::_-J:in~ v.~~th infertilit~~~ .. c~peci[:.Ji::~-:s - urcloqist.:: anC 
g: ... mecologists with specialized r:.raining in prohlems of ma2e and female infertility -
RESOLVE meets the needs of couples who are trying tc cope wir:.h the emotional impact 
of infartility. 
Currently, it is estimar:.ed that 10 million couples in the U.S. are facing inferr:.ility 
problems. Not ever"'·one iE a careeT woman over thirty. Problems associated with 
birth conr:.rol, infectious disease and physical disabilities of various kinds in 
both the man and woman, are only some of the factors which can delay childbearing 
for ff6ny couples. 
Vic": RESOLVE's network of medical specialists and RESOLVE public education, couples 
learn ~hout and are referred to RESOLVE counselors for: 
,; Counseling to address personal, emotional issues the couple 
PXperiences as a result of the infertility problem 
o P 1 :::tcement in support groups for "''omen and for couples, 
supervised by RESOLVE professional staff and designed to 
help infertile couples help each other to cope with the 
trauma and disappointments of delayed childbearing 
o Information on the medical aspects of infertility, and 
o Referral for treatment and diagnosis. 
The national office of RESOLVE is located in Belmont, Massachusetts, just outside 
of Boston. By rtrri ting to RESOLVE, a couple can become members of RESOLVE, entitling 
them to the quarterly newsletter, information on membership in local chapters, and 
fact sheets and books on infertility which will answer many of the questions and 
issues couples typically have about their infertility problems and appropriate 
treatment. 
The National RESOLVE staff, on behalf of the natiomvide network of chapters, provide 
daily phone counseling and respond to literature and information requests from 
people from all over the U.S. and Canada. Currently staff handle an average of 
25 counseling calls and respond to 100 individual pieces of mail each day from 
couples requesting help. 
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Professional staff also field requests from chapters and interested groups from all 
over the country for information, advice, and organizational support. 
Staff respond to requests from the media for information on medical treatment, 
testinq, and the emotional aspects of infertility. Examples of RESOLVE media 
exposure include an article written by Carol Pogash about her infertility 
experience, featured in the August 1982 issue of Redbook Magazine. In March, 
RESOLVE was featured in the Boston Globe Living Pages. A.nd, on May 26, 1982, a 
Bostor:-based RESOLVE support group was featured on the ABC-Til TODAY SHOW "After 
Eight" segment. 
RESOLVE today reaches almost 5,000 couples in the U.S. The nar:.ional office is 
assisted b~ its national network of chapters and medical specialists and 
RESOLVE mem ... hers in b'1e Boston area who volunteer to help l1'i th mailing, 
correspondence, phone counseling and local prograws. 
1·-"el;:::.,ersh::._r: is grorving continually. 'I'ti:: c:::I bs e:r. r;.r_:_bur:eci rc r-e:::enr: favorable 
media publicity and increased public awarenesE about infertiJ.ity, the potential 
for effective treatment and the eventual success of couples who obtain early 
anc ar;pr·opriate treatment. Couples can become members of RESOLVE by calling 
(617) 484-2424 or by writing RESOLVE, Inc., P. 0. Box 474, Belmont, 11A 02178. 
Contact: Beverly ?reen~n, Executive Director 
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AOULTANO PEDIATRIC UROLOGY 
MALE INFERTILITY 
June 28, 1982 
Elihu Harris 
GENE A. NAFTULIN, M.D. 
SIO NORTH PROSPECT AVENUE, !;:;UITE 206 
REDONDO BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90277 
(213i 374-9670 
Judiciary Committee Chairman 
State Capitol Building 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Re: Assembly Bill 3771 
Dear Mr. Harris: 
EXHIBIT K 
DIPLOMATE AMERICAN 
BOARD OF UROLOGY 
I am writing regarding the "surrogate parent bill", This is a subject of 
grave concern to me, as a large portion of my practice in the field of 
Urology deals with male reproduction and infertility. As you can see, 
I am a diplomate of the American Board of Urology and a member of the 
American Fertility Society and Pacific Coast Fertility Society. I am 
currently consulting urologist for the Male Reproductive Research Center 
at .Harbor General-UCLA Medical Center. 
It is my strong conviction that it would be premature for there to be 
legislative action confirming the validity of "surrogate parenting" at 
this time. Unlike donor artifical insemination, which is justifiably a 
well-established procedure with limited emotional involvement from the 
"donor", surrogate parenting is a new phenomenon with thoroughly uncharted 
ramifications scientifically, ethically, legislatively, and most importantly 
psychologically- in particular reference with the 11donor". I fully 
recognize and participate in the need for intensified research and treatment 
for the infertile couple, In fact, such recent advances as in vitro ferti-
lization, artifical insemination, and diagnostic tools have increased the 
likelihood of conception for the infertile couple. But, just as "Laetrile" 
should not substitute for bonified cancer remedies because of its potential 
harmful side effects medically and psychologically, so should not surrogate 
parenting become a readily acceptable means to justify the end of parenthood 
without thorough investigation of its potential ramifications. 
The surrogate "contract" is expected to streamline the process and validate it 
legally of surrogate parenting. It would only seem appropriate that, prior to 
establishing the legality of the process, the burden of proof regarding its 
appropriateness scientifically and psychologically should rest with the pro-
ponents. This at least should include a non-partisan investigative group 
with no financial or other potential conflicts of interest with respect to 
the outcome of the bill. Only when it has been established as a valid approach 
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Re: Assembly Rill 71 
to the childless couple should consideration be given to the appropriate 
method of implementation legally. 
Having commented in general, I would like to become more specific at this 
time with respect to the criteria outlined for the "surrogate parent 'Dill" 
as represented in the quarterly newsletter from the Surrogate Parent Foundation. 
One of the requirements of a contract would be "indicating that the surrogate 
will relinquish all parental rights immediately after oirth and, 21 legal and 
equitable remedies available in the event of a oreach of contract by either 
party". To consider the need for these two requirements raises the ugly 
specter of the government being in a position to support legal redress on a 
woman who bas borne a child and now hesitates to relinquish all maternal 
rights. Somehow, the sanctity of motherhood seems to deserve more dignity. 
What emotional scars would be left following such an experience; what emotional 
experiences would have led to participating in such a contract? Considering 
the recent concerns regarding the emotional and legal needs of adopted children, 
what effect might there be if a child knew their mother had "prostituted her-
self" for their birth. 
Having considered briefly the potential surrogate mother and child, what about 
the couple who enters into this "contract". Practicing in the field of 
infertility for several years, I have become quite familiar with the special 
needs, fears, and emotional distresses associated with prolonged infertility. 
What happens to the surrogate mother and child should the contracting marital 
partners separate? Is a legal contract with either financial or other penalties 
going to resolve the emotional and social problem presented? Similarly, what 
solution would there be for s~ch an emotionally distraught couple whose marriage 
is anticipating a child and the surrogate, regardless of legal restriction, 
decides to keep the child? I have witnessed such a problem which resulted in 
extreme emotional distress no different from grief reaction experienced from 
the death or loss of family member. Obviously, there are multiple other issues 
that could be raised. 
The question is, are we creating a "monster"? Yes, with every scientific or 
social advance there are real problems. It is my strong conviction that the 
potential benefit of surrogate parenting is far outweighed by the overwhelming 
potential for emotional destruction. I urge you to not only defeat Assembly 
Bill 3771 but to introduce legislation to disallow it in the State of California. 
I have no vested interest in the success or failure of Assembly Bill 3771. It 
is my strong belief and that of many coworkers in the field of infertility that 
surrogate parenting is at best a misguided approach to a medical problem and, 
at worst, a financial scheme perpetrated at the expense of innocent couples. 
I would very much appreciate a response to my letter in the way of being kept 
abreast of any progress in this legislation, 
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Re: Assembly Bill 3771 
Thank you very much for your attention and consideration. 
GAN/jmt 
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EXHIBIT L 
.TATE OF CAlifORNIA--HEAlTH AND WElfARE AGENCY 
.. -----=-===================== 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
· ·+4 P Street, Sacrumcnto, CA 95814 
Jl()/445-8956. 
November 10, 1982 · 
Ms. Lettie Young, Counsel 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
Stute Capitol, Room 6031 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Ms. Young: 
This is in answer to your letter of October 25, 1982, in which you requested 
that our department submit comments on AB 3771, the Surrogate Parent Act. 
While the State Department of Social Services did not offer support for 
AB 3771, we believe that since surrogate parent contracts are now taking place 
and have been accepted by some members of the community, statutory safeguards 
are needed for the protection of all concerned. 
Our department is particularly concerned about adequately protecting the child's 
best interests and preventing a potentially harmful situation from developing. 
Although the welfare of the child is paramount, it is also important that the 
rights of the surrogate mother and of the infertile couple be protected. 
A social study, or investigation, should be made of a petition for court 
approval of a surrogate parent contract. We recommend that a fee be established 
to meet the cost of the study which could be performed by either a public or 
private adoption agency. The study should include interviews with the surrogate 
mother and her husband, if any, and with the infertile couple. The report of 
the study should be made to the court within 90 days of the placement of the 
child in the home. 
In reference to the question of the long-range impact surrogate parent contracts 
will have on children conceived by such an arrangement, our department believes 
that it is essential that the study include an adequate means of securing and 
preserving social and medical information about the surrogate mother for use 
later. We see this as very important for the individual's well being, and vital 
in relationship to hereditary health conditions. 
The study should include verifications of marriages and dissolutions of marriages 
of th~ surrogate parent, as well as of the infertile couple. Reports of physical 
examinations of the surrogate mother, the child and the infertile couple should 
be included in the report to the court. 
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Jd t ,,,_mqll l\n l771 ind icales thal the prer;umptions in Section 621 of the 
l.v i '1nn, ·c Codr~ ;md contained j n Civil Cmk sections 7004 and 7005 shall 
llt>t ,lpply to a child conceived during a surrogate contract period, we 
believe that it would be desirable £or an adoption agency representative 
t.o wjtncss consents to adoption to be signed by the surrogate mother, 
and her husband, if any. This would assist in insuring that there is 
no misunderstanding about the rights of the parties involved, and would 
help in ascertaining that the plan was entered into voluntarily. The 
consent of the surrogate mother should not be witnessed until she has 
been medically discharged from the hospital and the consent of the presumed 
father, if any, should not be witnessed until after the birth of the child. 
The names of the infertile couple should be on the consent form and should 
not be concealed from the consenting parent(s). If a consent from a 
presumed father is needed, a statement should be obtained from him that he 
is not the natural father of the child and that he will agree to a blood 
test to rebut paternity, if necessary. 
If the home of the infertile couple cannot be recommended for adoption, 
the investigating agency must recommend a suitable alternative plan for 
the child. In the event that either the surrogate mother or the infertile 
couple breaches the contract for any reasons, custody and support of the 
child should be based on Sections 4600 and 4700 of the Civil Code. The 
investigating agency should make a recommendation in accordance with the 
child's best interests. 
~ve recommend that the funds deposited in escrow for monetary payment to the 
surrogate mother be placed under the supervision of the court as part of the 
approval of the surrogate parent contract. In cases of breaches of contract, 
the funds should be disposed of at the discretion of the court. 
In conclusion, the State Department of Social Services has no statistical 
information on the number of surrogate parent contracts now being made. 
However, we do npt believe that there will be a major impact on the public 
adoption agencies because most of the adoptive placements made by public 
agencies are of older children who have been in foster care and have been 
legally freed from their natural parents so that permanent adoptive plans 
can be made for them. There may be more impact on private agency adoptions 
and upon independent adoptions since these involve a larger proportion of 
infant placements; however, it is not possible to estimate the extent of the 
numerical impact. 
If additional information is needed, please call Willie Hausey, Deputy Director, 
Government and Community Relations, at 5-8956. 
Sincerely, 
~M 
CLAUDE FINN 
·~ Deputy Director 
Adult and Family Services Division 
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PHILIP J. PARKER, M. D. 
FRANKLIN-12 OFFICE PLAZP. SUITE 206 
26645 W. TWELVE MILE ROAD 
SOUTHFIELD. MICHIGAN 48034 
TELEPHONE 477-8575 
EXHIBIT M 
Written Testimony of Philip J. Parker, M.D., before the Hearing 
on Surrogate Parenting Contracts of the Assembly Judiciary Com-
mittee of California on Friday, November 19, 1982. 
I am a psychiatrist in the Detroit, Michigan area and have been 
doing longitudinal psychological research on the surrogate mother 
process for several years. I have enclosed a curriculum vitae 
which particularly relates all of the various presentations that 
I have made regarding my research on surrogate motherhood. 
You have copies of two of my papers in the exhibits. The first 
is "Surrogate Mother's Motivation: Initial Findings" which is 
presently in press and will be published in the American Journal 
of Psychiatry, Volume 140, January 1983 under the title "Motiva-
tion of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings." 
The other paper which you have in the exhibits is "The Psychol-
ogy of Surrogate Motherhood: An Updated Report of a Longitudinal 
Pilot Study." 
I have also written another paper entitled "Surrogate Motherhood: 
The Interaction of Litigation, Legislation, and Psychiatry" which 
will be published in the International Journal of Law and Psychi-
atry in Volume 5, No. 4, 1982. 
I have already testified twice before the House Judiciary Sub-
Committee on Surrogate Parenting of the State of Michigan House 
of Representatives. 
In this written testimony I will briefly summarize how the results 
of my research with surrogate mothers drew its direct application 
to the proposed legislation before the Assembly Judiciary Committee. 
I have interviewed over 225 women who have applied to be surrogate 
mothers and of these, 25 are presently pregnant or have already de-
livered. The preliminary results of my research with about one 
year follow-up after the first delivery, seems to indicate that 
there is no reason, on a psychological basis, at this point, to 
prohibit the surrogate mother process totally. However, regulatory 
legislation within a framework of maximum freedom of arrangements 
to the participants does seem indicated. 
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At this time I am unable to correlate ~ny of the personality fac-
tors, or motivational factors for the surrogate mothers with 
their psychological outcome. Thus, I believe, no evidence pre-
sently exists by which to screen out or eliminate any surrogate 
mother applicants from the surrogate mother process. Further, 
there seems to be no evidence that mandating any external arrange-
ments and thus removing the freedom of choice from the participants, 
seems to be of any benefit psychologically to these participants. 
On the contrary, the results of my research seem to indicate that 
there was an advantage to allowing the surroaate mother applicants 
and the parental applicants to arrange between themselves the nature 
and extent of the relationship between them. Thus, for example, I 
can find no evidence that would tend to indicate that enforced ano-
nymity between the participants would be helpful for their psycho-
logical well being. 
My psychiatric research on surrogate mothers has shown that most of 
the woman have not previously sufficiently dealt with their own mo-
tivations and the possible advantages and disadvantages of their 
involvement. They needed the added experience of psychiatric inter-
views to help them give a competent, voluntary, informed consent, 
and in my judgment, this type of psychiatric interview should be 
guaranteed by a regulatory legislation. 
In my judgment, Assembly Bill No. 3771 of California, has insuffi-
cient guarantees to help the surrogate mother applicant give a compe-
tent, voluntary, informed consent both to become a surrogate mother 
and to terminate her parental rights. Thus, I refer to Section 7505 
(b) (4) which is found on Page 3, Lines 19-23. Although I agree that 
the surrogate mother applicant and the infertile couple should have 
separate legal counsel, I believe that more than just voluntariness 
and understanding of the terms of the contract, particularly by the 
surrogate mother applicant, are necessary. Thus, for example, I be-
lieve that the assistance of a psychiatrist or another mental health 
professional is needed to help the surrogate mother applicant under-
stand her motivations and the possible advantages and disadvantages. 
I would also like to refer you to two small examples in Assembly Bill 
No. 3771 which, although they seem insignificant may interfere with 
the participant's mutually agreed upon arrangements in the surrogate 
mother process. I am presently working with a surrogate mother who 
is having twins and who is presently discussing with her parental 
couple the possibility of each of them taking one of the twins. It 
seems to me that if such arrangement is mutually agreed upon, it 
should be permitted by any regulatory legislation on surrogate mother-
hood. However, in Section 7506(a), which is presented on Page 4, 
Line 12, there would seem to be statutory preclusion for such an 
arrangement. The statute states "that the surrogate agrees to relin-
quish all parental rights to, and the custody of, any child conceived 
as a result of the insemination to the infertile couple ... " Also, in 
Section 7506(h), which is contained on Page 4, Line 39, once again 
the term "any child" is stated. 
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I would recommend adding the phrase, at the end of Section 7506(a) 
and (h) "unless agreed upon otherwise by the parties." 
I would also like to mention briefly about the necessity of having 
an adoption at all, as part of the surrogate motherhood process. I 
would refer the reader to Michigan Substitute for House Bill No. 
5184 which included in the exhibits. I personally favor not hav-
ing adoption as part of the surrogate mother process and part of 
my reasoning and rationale can be found in my paper entitled "Sur-
rogate Motherhood: The Interaction of Litigation, Legislation and 
Psychiatry." I should mention that Lettie Young, the counsel for 
the Assembly Judiciary Committee, has a copy of this paper. 
It is time for society to rationally regulate the surrogate mother 
process. I think that the potential abuse by unscrupulous business-
man going to a welfare office with a stack of $100 bills and unduly 
influencing a woman to be a surrogate mother, necessitates passage 
of regulatory legislation like Assembly Bill No. 3771. This legis-
lation should require and ensure psychiatric and other necessary 
medical input for all parties to help achieve a competent, volun-
tary, informed consent. I strongly urge regulation of the surrogate 
mother process by such legislation either similar to California 
Assembly Bill No. 3771 or Michigan Substitute for House Bill No. 5184. 
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f{{)) ~IFORN~ ~0"; .INC. 
~~~L National ()rgruuzatton for ''Otnen 
::~-
543 N. Fairfax Los Angeles,'California 90036 (213) 651-1241 
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITI'EE 
HEARING ON SURROGATE PARENTING, N:>VMEBER 19, 1982 
GINNY FOAT I STATE CX)()RDINATOR 
CALIFORNIA NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN 
-220-
Jean Zoeller Sandra Farha Nancy Cirino Noe!ie Azzopardi P,.i;cilla A!e..ander Johnnie Phelps 
Puhlic Relations Rec. Secretary Corres. Secretary Treasurer 
Mr. Chairman and Committee members, my name is Ginny Foat. I am 
State Coordinator for California National Organization for Women. California 
NOW is an organization consisting of both women and men working to bring women 
into ftul participation in society. With a membership of over 40,000 California 
NOW is the largest feminist organization in the state. 
The California NOW Board of Directors discussed the issue of Surrogate 
Parenting at our November 1982 meeting. We heard representatives from all sides 
and discussed in-depth the many social, moral, ethical, and legal ramifications of 
surrogate parenting. Attatched for your in£ormation is the resolution adopted by 
the Board. 
NOW supports the right of an individual to enter into a surrogate arrangement. 
We are concerned, however, that all parties to such an arrangement be fully 
aware of their legal rights, and that they be protected from exploitation. 
We feel that the responsibilities of all parties must be carefully defined 
and that the best way to work out the responsibilities is through carefully 
drafted contracts. At a minimum, each contract should advise the parties that 
they should seek the advise of an attorney, and that they may be w:ll ving important 
rights under such a contract. 
We also have some specific problems with the proposed legislation, AB 3771. 
First, AB 3771 would limit the availability of surrogate contracts only to 
married, infertile couples. This limitation is too restrictive, we believer 
as is the requirement that a married surrogate must have her husband's permission 
to enter into the contract. The option to enter into a surrogate arrangement must 
be available to any individual who chooses it. Instead of these- requirements, 
legislation may be needed to clarify paternity and custody laws relating to 
the practice of surrogate parenting. 
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We also see an inconsistency in the requirement that the surrogate undergo 
psychological screening, yet there is no requirement for such screening of the 
adopting couple. Both the surrogate and the adopting parent ( s) should urrlergo 
equal examination. 
The legislation provides for health insurance for the surrogate for the 
term of pregnancy, deliver; and a post-deli very period. Provisions should also 
be made for cases of pregnancy-related disability, some of which may last months, 
years, or a lifetime. 
A major concern of ours is the provision requiring court monitoring of 
the contract and the pregnancy. We fear this could establish a dar:gerous precedent 
whereby the court monitors reproductive functions. We strongly oppose any 
provision requiring pre-approval or monitoring by the courts. 
While NOW supports the right of an individual to arrar:ge surrogate parenting, 
we do not want to divert attention or resources from research on infertility. 
Nor do we want to deflect attention from the adoption process, adoption reforms, 
or assistance to those seeking to adopt. And by no means should NOW's 
position be constured to detract or interfere in any way with NOW's support 
for a woman's right to choose an abortion. 
In conclusion, we feel surrogating is an area where the feminist perspective 
is needed. We would be pleased to work with Mr. Roos and all parties concerned 
to develop legislation which will meet the needs of inf~~ile persons, interested 
surrogates, adoption agencies, and the legal and medical communities. 
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SURROGATE PARENTING 
CALIFORNIA NOW BOARD RESOLULTION--NOVEMBER 1982 
We reaffirm our committment to the right of every woman to control 
her body which includes among other things the right to have and 
not to have children· as a single parent, as part of a couple, and 
as a surrogate. 
We also oppose any attempts by the Legislature to create laws that 
in any way limit this right of each woman. 
We believe that there is a need to define the rights and duties 
of various parties in a surrogate situation but believe that such 
responsibilities are best created between the parties through 
carefully drafted contracts which define the rights and duties 
of each person. 
Each contract shall at a minimum advise the parties that they should 
seek the advise of an attorney, and that they may be waiving 
important rights by the signing of such a contract. 
Contracts for childbearing which require pre-approval and continued 
monitoring by the courts are an impermissible state intervention 
in the area of reproductive freedom. 
Nothing in this statement should be read to detract from or interfere 
in any way with NOW's position supporting a woman's right to choose 
an abortion. 
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Ron. Elihu Harris 
EXHIBIT 0 
Shiela Anderson, Southern Chairperson 
Jim Forderer, Northern Chairperson 
~!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
1214 South Gramercy Place 
Los Angeles, California 90019 
November 13, 1982 
Chairperson, Assembly Judiciary Committee 
6031 State Capital 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear Assemblyman Harris: 
The California Adoption Advocacy Network, made up of over 2000 California adoptive 
families and other advocates, wishes to thank you for the opportunity to respond 
to the Surrogate Parenting Act. Although we do think that practitioners of 
surrogate parenting should be regulated through the legislative process, the act, 
as proposed4 does not contain strict enough regulations and monitoring of this 
practice which could be misused. 
Our Network's involvement and concerns are centered around the children (about 
1900 now free in the state) who are awaiting adoptive placement. The agencies 
responsible for these children are already dividing their attention to provide 
studies at no cost to applicants for stepparent and independent adoptions--at 
great cost to California taxpayers. The proposed Surrogate Parenting Act would 
require that agencies study "infertile couples" to determine their appropriateness 
as parents, yet contains no fiscal support to cover the cost of providing these 
home studies. Meanwhile, adoptive parents providing permanent, caring families 
for those children in the out-of-home-care system pay up to $500 for their home 
study. 
Agencies are facing fiscal crises that are unprecedented, as the federal govern-
ment attempts to withdraw from its responsibilities for our nation's children. 
The proper, major task of adoption agencies should be that of serving the children 
trapped in the chaos of the out-of-home-care system. Our Network members are 
opposed to this planned dilution of the resources of California's adoption 
agencies. If home studies are to be provided to those seeking surrogate parenting, 
private agencies might be established, or existing ones might contract to provide 
them. Surrogate parenting practice must not be allowed to sap dwindling resources 
from needy children in California. 
We urge revision of the home study portion of the Surrogate Parenting Act, either 
changing the source of the study of "infertile couples" or charging them the 
complete cost of the study, plus some support for the relinquishment adoptions 
program. 
Sincerely, 
Katherine Miller 
CAAN Legislative Chairperson 
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* NACAC is an organization made up of adoptive parents' groups, representing L~e 
interests of thousands of families across the nation. 
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State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Honorable Assemblyman Harris: 
GEORGE KoNHEIM 
President 
SAMUEL P. BERMAN 
Executive Director 
I was very glad to learn that you are accepting written 
testimony regarding the surrogate parenting issue. I was out 
of town the day of the hearings in Los Angeles and therefore would 
like to take this opportunity to express my feelings regarding 
this issue. 
I have been associated with adoption practices for the past 30 
years, having worked with social agencies, local, State and 
National organizations interested in adoptions. I have written 
widely on the subject, more recently with my research colleagues 
published a book entitled, "The Adoption Triangle." 
I feel that my vast experience in this field qualifies me to 
speak on this issue. 
Without question surrogate parenting presents many serious and 
complex legal, ethical and moral issues. Although I am certainly 
concerned with these issues, as we all should be, my primary concern 
is with the psychological problems. 
Our many years of experience with adoptions, particularly the 
research that my colleagues and I have been involved in for the 
past six years, tells us very clearly that surrogate parenting will 
produce serious, complex problems for all the parties involved. 
Rather than encourage this kind of unsound and potentially harmful 
practice, I believe that we need to explore other alternatives to 
meet the needs of the childless couple. 
Furthermore, since surrogate parenting is a very expensive 
proposition it becomes limited to those in our society who can 
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2. Vista Del Mar Child Care Service 
afford this kind of transaction. Therefore, it becomes not 
only psychologically unsound, but discriminatory. 
Surrogate parenting condones mercenary considerations in the 
creation of parent/child relationships and consequently strikes at 
the very foundation of human society. We have fought very hard 
throughout the years to prevent commercialism to influence or 
enter into any way the birth parent's decision to consent to the 
adoption of their child. We feel that this was and is sound 
practice which in no way should be reversed. 
Should there be no transaction of money for services performed, 
the practice of surrogate parenting would still be psychologically 
unsound. 
We are indeed very concerned with these psychological effects, not 
only upon those directly involved, but upon the community at large. 
How does one explain to the children of the surrogate mother and 
how do her children explain to their friends that their mother gave 
birth to a child, chose not to raise the child, but gave the child 
to another couple in exchange for a large sum of money? 
How do you reassure these children that their mother will not also 
give them away if the family is again in need of money? 
Our being concerned with the plight of others means that we give 
them our children? 
Will the surrogate mother's children have the right to see their 
half-brothers or sisters or know what is happening with them? 
What about the surrogate mother's emotional reaction to this 
experience? Will she feel the same about the child a year or more 
after the child is given up? Will she not have the same feelings 
of loss and the need to mourn the child,that many mothers experience 
who relinquish children for adoption through traditional channels? 
How will the new parents explain the circumstances of a child born 
to a surrogate mother to that child? Are they prepared in fact to 
view their new relationships as a life-long, continuing experience 
in which there may be on-going relationships between all the parties 
involved? 
How will all of the parties involved handle the many complicated 
issues after the initial euphoria has worn off? 
These questions are indeed only forerunners of the many complex 
and potentially serious issues that need to be addressed and that 
I strongly feel are inherent in surrogate parenting. 
My many years of experience in adoption tells me that children born 
out of these arrangements will know that they were not wanted and 
that they would not in fact be raised by the mother who gave birth 
to them. 
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The proponents of surrogate parenting, who to my knowledge, do 
not represent knowledgeable professionals in the field, have given 
very little, if any, considerations to these very serious problems. 
I firmly believe that we must not allow ourselves at this point in 
time to be stampeded into what on the surface seems like a very 
simple so".ution for the childless couple. 
Sincerely yours, 
~~~ 
Reuben Pannor 
Director, Community Services 
gm 
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